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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, we take a behavioral view on the process of common stock valuation. 
Our main goal is to value common stocks using a sophisticated discounted cash flow (DCF) 
valuation model. We build the model and estimate its inputs by trying to replicate as closely 
as possible investors’ behavior in valuing stocks in the stock market and consequently use a 
mix of different methods to determine cash flow growth, the growth duration and the 
discount rate. 
We test the model’s ability to differentiate between under- and overvalued stocks in the US 
market over the ten year period from 1993-2002. The results of the approach are very 
promising: an investment strategy buying undervalued stocks as identified by the model 
yields an annual return of 27.57% over the ten year testing period compared to a benchmark 
return of 19.47% and the returns of a portfolio of overvalued stocks as identified by the 
model of only 6.26%. We conclude therefore that a complex discounted cash flow valuation 
model can identify and exploit systematic mispricing in the stock market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife. The author also gratefully acknowledges the contribution of 
Thomson Financial for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System. These data have been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings 
expectations research. We also thank the University of Hawai’i for the use of Research Insight. 
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1. Introduction 
We believe that what a researcher chooses to study in the field of capital markets is largely 
a function of his level of belief in the efficiency of these markets. In our opinion, a naïve 
view of market efficiency in which price is assumed to equal intrinsic value is an inadequate 
conceptual starting point for market-based research. This view is an oversimplification that 
fails to capture the richness of market pricing dynamics and the complex process of price 
formation in the stock market.  
We investigate the subject of market efficiency by scientifically approaching common stock 
valuation in the belief that replicating the price discovery process and identifying possible 
mistakes in the market pricing of stocks can yield abnormal returns. We try to use all 
relevant fundamental information available to investors to determine intrinsic values of 
stocks mechanically. For this we build an objective and verifiable discounted cash flow 
valuation model. The model follows an interactive approach combining many fundamental 
input factors into a flexible spreadsheet model. The model is thus not algebraic in nature 
and therefore difficult to describe in its entity.  
We find that our DCF model is able to identify mispriced stocks in the US stock market. A 
trading strategy based on the model’s investment recommendations earns large and stable 
excess returns. We would like to emphasis at this point already that the model is in its 
original form purely objective and does not require any human input - although such input 
is possible and improves the model’s results. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Part one consists of a short 
introduction to investment, including an overview of the investment process and of different 
valuation models commonly applied in this process. In part two, we develop our own 
valuation model and determine the appropriate input factors. In the third part, we test the 
valuation model to examine whether it is able to differentiate between under- and 
overvalued stocks in the US stock market and thus whether it is a practically useful 
investment tool. 
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PART I: COMMON STOCK INVESTMENT AND 
VALUATION 
“Happily, there is nothing in the law of value which remains 
 for the present or any future writer to clear up;  
The theory of the subject is complete.” 
 John Stuart Mill, 1848 
 
Despite John Stuart Mill’s view, common stock valuation today is still a very subjective and 
unscientific matter. Most financial professionals compare different ratios of one stock with 
the same ratios of other, similar stocks. Others calculate efficient frontiers and buy stocks 
based on correlation coefficients, but only few apply the fundamental principle of valuation 
which states that the value of any financial asset is the cash flow this asset generates for its 
owner, discounted at the required rate of return. In this part of the dissertation, we present a 
short overview of the current investment practices and equity valuation approaches. 
 
2. The Investment Process 
In his book ‘Capital’ Karl Marx (Marx, 1887) uses a remarkably simple equation to explain 
the capitalist system: M-C-M’. In words, the capitalist starts with Money (M), converts it 
into Capital (C) by investing it and ends up with More Money (M’) – that is in essence the 
investment process. Investing is essential for the functioning of the capitalist system. 
Investors provide money to entrepreneurs that build businesses to produce goods and 
services demanded by society. In return for providing capital, the investor is compensated 
with a share of the profits of the business.  
An investment can therefore be defined as the current commitment of dollars for a period of 
time in order to derive future payments that will compensate the investor for (1) the time the 
funds are committed, (2) the expected rate of inflation, and (3) the uncertainty of future 
payments or risk.1  
 
In relation to common stocks, two different methods of investing can be distinguished: 
modern portfolio theory and fundamental analysis. In the following pages, we take a more 
detailed look at both approaches. 
                                                 
1
 Based on Reilly and Brown (2003), p. 5 
 4 
2.1 Market Efficiency: Modern Portfolio Theory vs. 
Fundamental Analysis  
The stock investment process looks considerably different depending on the investor’s 
belief about market efficiency. The discussion in the academic literature about whether the 
stock market is efficient or not is endless long and the conclusions differ.2 Based on the 
belief in the degree of market efficiency, two major investment theories emerged that still 
separate the financial community. On the one hand is fundamental analysis based on the 
idea of non-efficient markets and on the other hand modern portfolio theory (MPT) with a 
strong faith in market efficiency. 
 
Fundamental Analysis 
Fundamental analysis is an investment approach that uses existing economic information, 
such as historical financial statements or different fundamental information about a 
company, to make investment decisions. The principles of fundamental analysis were first 
outlined in the book ‘Security Analysis’ of Graham and Dodd (Graham and Dodd, 1934).  
Two approaches to fundamental analysis are widely used today: the ‘Top down’ and the 
‘Bottom up’ approach.  
The idea behind the ‘Top down’ approach is to use all information available, including 
macroeconomic data, to make an investment decision. In general, fundamental analysts look 
first at the current macroeconomic conditions, because for them the decision to invest 
depends mainly on what stage of the business cycle the economy is heading and which 
industry is expected to perform well in the forecasted economic environment. Then analysts 
try to find the best companies in these industries. The stock selection process is based on the 
idea that the stock of the selected company must outperform its peers in the industry and the 
industry must outperform other industries.  
The top-down approach is widely accepted and followed on Wall-Street and well 
documented in investment textbooks. Investment strategies based on that approach include 
sector rotation (changes in the sector allocation based on changes in the economic 
environment) and style investing (the differentiation between value and growth stocks).  
 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion supporting efficient markets see e.g. Fama (1991); for a case against efficient markets see 
Haugen (1995) or Dreman (1998). 
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In contrast to the top-down approach, the ‘Bottom-up’ approach to fundamental analysis 
does not attempt to forecast the economic environment. It consists mainly of estimating the 
value of a stock and comparing it to its current market price. If a stock is significantly 
undervalued, it is considered a buying candidate independent of future market or 
macroeconomic conditions. The proponents of this approach try to find good companies 
that are selling at a low price in relation to their fundamentals. Mainly because academics 
feel uncomfortable ignoring some important available information, the bottom-up approach 
is less of a focus in textbooks and empirical research and therefore also known as the 
practical approach to investing.  
 
Although we know of no academic study comparing the empirical validity of the top-down 
and bottom-up approach to fundamental analysis, it seems that the bottom-up approach 
produced the most profit for its followers (Buffet, 1984). Forecasting the economy has been 
proven to be a very difficult task that rarely produces satisfactory investment returns. The 
most common mistake in the top-down approach is however that investors focus on 
companies rather than on stocks. Investors must recognize that a good company is not 
necessarily a good investment. The stock selection process should always be based on a 
comparison between the intrinsic value of a stock and its current market price. Investors 
must thus determine whether a stock is under- or overvalued based on the fundamentals of 
the business. Only when value exceeds price by a high enough margin of safety should a 
stock be bought.  
 
Modern Portfolio Theory 
Modern portfolio theory (MPT) is based on the idea of efficient markets. The underlying 
philosophy of this investment theory is that all investors in the marketplace are intelligent, 
profit-oriented and are trying to find mispriced stocks. The large number of informed 
participants will ultimately drive a stock price to its intrinsic value and hence create an 
efficient market. In such an environment mispriced stocks would be detected immediately, 
the under- or overvaluation would disappear and no profit could be gained from using any 
form of investment analysis.  
In other words, the MPT states that all stocks are priced fairly and nobody can persistently 
outperform the market. Consequently, followers of this method of investing will try to 
reduce risk by diversification and costs by minimizing transaction fees and taxes. The 
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optimal investment strategy is the creation of an efficient portfolio based on covariances of 
all the stocks in the global marketplace. In praxis however, this strategy usually means 
investing in index funds.  
 
Conclusion: It’s about value and price 
A postulate of sound investing is that an investor should not pay more for an asset than it is 
worth. The two different approaches to investment (MPT and fundamental analysis) are 
based on two fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between intrinsic 
value and price. 
Price balances supply and demand for stocks on the stock exchange and therefore can be 
exactly determined. Intrinsic value is more difficult to establish and measure. Value must be 
determined in a valuation process. This process requires forecasting the future and is 
therefore unavoidably subjective and various approaches are generally used. The 
differences in methods and views about future prospects of a company make value 
individualistic and unobservable.   
 
In efficient markets price should equal intrinsic value, but fundamental analysis assumes 
that value and price can deviate. In our opinion, it is too simplistic to assume that markets 
are always efficient so that prices adjust to intrinsic value instantly. According to Lee 
(2001) price convergence towards intrinsic value is better characterized by a process, which 
is accomplished through the interplay between noise traders and information arbitrageurs. 
Prices move as investors’ trade on the basis of imperfect informational signals. Eventually, 
through trial and error, the information procession is completed and prices fully reflect the 
impact of a particular signal. However by that time, many new informational signals have 
arrived, starting a new adjustment process. Consequently, the market is in a continuous state 
of adjusting prices to intrinsic values.  
Based on this view is price discovery an on-going market process and the current price of a 
stock should be regarded as a noisy proxy for that stock’s intrinsic value. In that context, 
market-based research should focus on understanding the dynamics of price discovery and, 
based on the findings, on deriving an independent measure of intrinsic value through a 
systematic valuation process.  
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2.2 Valuation – more Art than Science? 
Valuation is the process of determining the intrinsic value of common stocks. In order to 
understand valuation, two main concepts of value must be understood. First, the commonly 
accepted theoretical principle to value any financial asset is the discounted cash flow 
methodology (Reilly and Brown, 2003). An asset is worth the amount of all future cash 
flows to the owner of this asset discounted at an opportunity rate that reflects the risk of the 
investment (Pratt, 1998). This fundamental principle does not change and is valid through 
time and geography. A valuation model that best converts this theoretical principle into 
practice should be the most useful.  
Based on the first concept, the second concept states that valuation is inherently forward 
looking. Valuation requires an estimate of the present value of all expected future cash 
flows to shareholders. In other words, it involves looking into an uncertain future and 
making an educated guess about the many factors determining future cash flows. Since the 
future is uncertain, intrinsic value estimates will always be subjective and imprecise. Better 
models and superior estimation techniques may reduce the degree of inaccuracy, but no 
valuation technique can be expected to deliver a single correct intrinsic value measure. 
 
These main concepts illustrate that there are few things more complex than the valuation of 
common stocks. Thousands of variables affect the future cash flows of a company and thus 
the value of a stock. Most variables are known, but very few are understood; they are 
independent and related, they are measurable, but not necessarily quantitative, and they 
affect stock values alone and in combination. The combination of thousands of factors with 
each other leads to such high numbers of possible outcomes that in the stock market every 
moment must be viewed as unique. This view is explicitly considered in newer theories like 
the chaos theory. According to this theory even a small change in an insignificant variable 
may lead to a complete different final outcome. It is not that the changing variable is of that 
great importance, but that the small change results in a different combination with other 
variables and thus leads to a multiplication of changes until the outcome is completely 
unpredictable (Mouck, 1998).  
This makes every day in the stock market unique. Historical data is everything available to 
forecast the future, but investors should adequately consider the uniqueness of the current 
situation. The fact that each economic and social set of facts is unique implies that strict 
scientific models should not work satisfactory. Valuation is therefore not a science.  
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In our opinion is valuation much more of an art than it is science; at best it can be viewed as 
a scientific attitude towards art. Given the complexities of analyzing all factors influencing 
a company’s value directly, and indirectly in combination with other factors, it is impossible 
to scientifically determine what a stock is worth at a certain point in time. The best we can 
do to deal with this immense complexity is to build a comprehensive and systematic 
valuation model based on an accepted valuation theory. In this dissertation, we try to build 
such a valuation model.  
 
3. Equity Valuation Models 
As discussed above is equity valuation a complex and therefore diverse process. In this 
process, equity valuation models help specifying what is to be forecasted, directs to the 
information needed to make the forecast, and shows how to relate the forecasted data into 
an intrinsic value estimate. Three major valuation model categories can be distinguished:  
1. Asset based Valuation 
2. Absolute Valuation or Discounted Cash Flow models 
3. Relative Valuation or Price Multiple models. 
 
Other methods exist like the yield-based valuation method, which focuses on dividend yield 
when the investment priority is income, or option valuation models that explicitly consider 
management flexibility in the value creation process. We focus on the three main valuation 
techniques above as they are conceptually the most appealing, generally applicable and 
widely used. 
 
3.1 Asset based Valuation  
Asset based valuation is closely associated with Value investing dating back to Benjamin 
Graham’s book ‘Security Analysis’ (Graham and Dodd, 1934). After several years of 
confusion about the value of equity prices in the largest bear market in history, Graham 
researched stock prices and outlined for the first time something like a scientific approach to 
common stock valuation. He finds that the law of diminishing returns in a competitive 
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economy implies that growth does not always create value and furthermore is usually not 
persistent.  
Graham suggested therefore to value stocks based first of all on the market value of the 
existing tangible assets of a company. He noticed that since the book value of an asset in the 
balance sheet reflects its historical cost, it might deviate significantly from market value if 
the earning power of the asset has increased or decreased significantly since its acquisition 
and needs therefore to be adjusted. He proposes to adjust book value to reflect reproduction 
costs of the asset because these are the costs a competitor would have to incur to enter the 
business and consequently represent the economically best estimate of the current market 
value of the assets. When a company is earning excess returns in a competitive economy, 
new firms will enter the business driving down these excess returns. This process will go on 
until it costs more for a new company to reproduce the necessary assets to enter the business 
than the excess returns justify in terms of economic benefit. Consequently, reproduction 
costs reflect the fair value of a company’s assets.  
Increasingly, it is however not sufficient to correct reported book values to reflect 
reproduction costs as certain valuable assets are not reflected in the balance sheet. The asset 
based valuation process requires also the requantification of non-monetary real assets. R&D 
or advertisement expenses, for example, represent a cost for new entrants that are not 
reflected in the balance sheet. To adjust, estimates should be made to reflect the number of 
years of expenses the competitor would need to invest in order to enter the business. These 
expenses then would be capitalized and included into the asset value. The sum of the 
adjusted book values of all assets would then equal the value of the company. 
As these adjustments require some difficult and subjective assumptions about values, 
Graham favored stocks that were selling below the reproduction costs of their current assets 
after all liabilities have been paid. These assets do not require any adjustment. It was 
however easier to find such stocks during the Great Depression than it is today and since 
then Value investors adjusted their approach by valuing the reproduction cost of all assets as 
described above.  
 
In asset based valuation, the second most reliable measure of a firm’s intrinsic value is the 
value of the current earnings the company is able to generate with its assets. Graham calls 
this ‘past performance value’ (Graham, 1973). He assumes that the current earnings 
correspond to the sustainable level of distributable cash flow and that this level remains 
constant over the infinite future. Graham assumes though no growth in discounted earnings 
 10 
based on the same belief that in a competitive economy growth usually does not create 
value and therefore has no value.  
Consequently, the third and least likely source of firm value according to Graham is the 
value of growth. This element is the most difficult to estimate and is accordingly highly 
uncertain. In a competitive environment growth creates value only when the firm is 
operating at a sustainable competitive advantage. The ‘past-performance value’ should 
therefore only be adjusted for growth if “the future appears reasonably predictable” 
(Graham, 1973). 
 
3.2 Absolute Valuation or Discounted Cash Flow Models 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation models recognize that common stock represents an 
ownership interest in a business and that its value must be related to the returns investors 
expect to receive from holding it. A business generates a stream of cash flow in its 
operations and as owners of the business, shareholders have a legal claim on these cash 
flows. The value of a stock is therefore the share of cash flow the business generates for its 
owners discounted at their required rate of return. This is the fundamental principle of 
valuation as developed in the ‘Theory of Investment Value’ by John Burr Williams in 1938 
(Williams, 1938). Mathematically, the principle is expressed as follows:  
( )∑= +=
n
t
t
t
k
CFV
1
0 1
 
V0 = Value of the stock in period t=0 
CFt = Cash flow generated by the asset for the owner of the asset in period t 
k = Discount rate  
n =Number of years over which the asset will generate cash flows to investors. 
 
The value of common stocks in DCF models is determined by the stream of expected future 
cash flows to investors in the nominator and their required rate of return in the denominator. 
In the following, we take a closer look at the three most widely used versions of DCF 
models: 
1. Dividend discount models,  
2. Free cash flow discount models, and  
3. Residual income models. 
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The models differ only in their definition of expected cash flow to investors. As we are 
valuing one specific company, we theoretically should obtain the same value no matter 
which expected cash flows are discounted, as long as the assumptions are coherent 
(Lundholm and O'Keefe, 2001a,b). 
 
3.2.1 Dividend Discount Models 
The dividend discount model (DDM) is the theoretically most correct model for firm 
valuation (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). It’s a very intuitive approach as well. When 
investors buy a stock, they expect to receive two types of cash flows: the dividends in the 
period over which the stock is owned and the market price at the end of the holding period. 
The market price however is again determined by the dividends the new owner of the 
security expects to receive over his holding period. From this follows that the market price 
can be replaced again by a stream of dividends, until the entire value of the stock is 
expressed in terms of dividends. Consequently, even from the perspective of an investor 
with a finite investment horizon, the value of a stock always depends on all future 
dividends: 
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                 (1-1) 
V0= Value of the stock in t=0  
Dt = Dividend received in period t 
Pt = Market price in period t 
k = Discount rate 
n = Number of years over which the asset will generate dividends for investors. 
 
The most widely known DDM model is the Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1962). It 
expresses the value of a stock based on a constant growth rate of dividends so that 
)1(1 gDD tt += −  where g is the expected constant growth rate in dividends. For any time t, 
Dt equals the t=0 dividend, compounded at g for t periods: tt gDD )1(0 += . If Dt is 
substituted into equation 1-1 we obtain ( )∑= +
+
=
n
t
t
t
k
gDV
1
0
0 1
)1(
. As this represents a geometric 
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series, the equation can be simplified into the Gordon growth model: 
gk
gDV
−
+
=
)1(0
0  or 
even simpler  
gk
DV
−
=
1
0 .
3
  These equations show that the value of a stock is determined by 
the current dividend, its growth rate and the discount rate. 
 
Even though the DDM is the theoretical correct valuation model for common stocks, it has 
some major weaknesses related to its practical application. The main problem is that 
observed dividends are not directly related to value creation within the company and 
therefore to future dividends. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961) currently observed 
dividends are not informative unless the pay-out policy is tied to the value generation within 
the company. Penman (1992) describes this as the dividend conundrum: “price is based on 
future dividends but observed dividends do not tell us anything about price”. The missing 
link between value creation and value distribution leads to a problem in forecasting 
dividends as it is difficult to forecast pay-out ratios.  
Today, share repurchases are further complicating the practical application of the DDM. 
Grullon and Michaley (2002) document that since the mid 1980’s, many corporations have 
been repurchasing large amounts of shares. Repurchases transmit cash from the corporation 
to investors and are, in that sense, not different from dividends. 
For these reasons, dividends as the relevant cash flow to investors have been more and more 
replaced since the 1980’s with free cash flows.  
 
3.2.2 Free Cash Flow Discount Models 
Although dividends are the actual cash flows paid out to stockholders, the discounted free 
cash flow (DFCF) models are based on the cash available for distribution but not 
necessarily distributed to shareholders. Common equity can be valued either directly 
discounting free cash flow to equity (FCFE) or indirectly by calculating the value of the 
firm using free cash flow to the firm (FCFF) and then subtracting the value of non-common 
stock capital (usually debt and preferred stock) from this value.  
FCFE is the cash flow available to the company’s suppliers of equity capital after all 
operating expenses (including interest and taxes) and principal repayments have been paid, 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed deviation of the Gordon growth model see Reilly and Brown (2003), p. 406. 
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and necessary investments into short-term assets (working capital) and long-term assets (net 
capital expenditures) have been made (Damodaran, 2004). It is called ‘free’ cash flow to 
equity to indicate that it is the amount of money free to distribute to equity investors without 
negatively affecting the continuation of the business.   
 
A related approach to discounted free cash flow valuation is the use of FCFF instead of 
FCFE. Using this method, the value of the firm is obtained by discounting expected cash 
flows to the firm, i.e. the cash flows after covering all operating expenses and taxes, but 
prior to debt payments, at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Problematic in 
discounting FCFF is that it introduces circularity into the valuation model. The FCFF must 
be discounted at the WACC to calculate firm value, but in order to calculate the WACC the 
value of the firm is needed in the first place. Consequently, valuation becomes an iterative 
process. 
The discounted free cash flow models were most popular after the 1980’s until recently 
when Ohlson (Ohlson, 1995) proposed a new DCF approach that had a considerable impact 
on the academic valuation literature. This approach is discussed next. 
 
3.2.3 Residual Income Models 
Residual income (RI) is net income less a charge for investors opportunity cost in 
generating this net income (the cost of capital or required rate of return). Recognized by 
economists since the 1770’s, residual income is based on the premise that in order for a firm 
to add wealth to its owners, it must earn more on its invested capital than the total cost of 
that capital.4 A company can have positive net income but may still not be adding value in 
dollar terms for shareholders if it does not earn more than the dollar cost of equity capital.  
Residual income models (RIM) have been referred to by a variety of names (residual 
income, economic profit, discounted abnormal earnings, excess profit) and variations 
(Edwards-Bell-Ohlson, Ohlson, Ohlson-Juettner etc). Commercial variations of the model 
have resulted in ‘brand name’ products such as Stern Stewart's EVATM, or McKinsey's 
Economic Profit Model. All these models are based on the concept of residual income 
developed by Edwards and Bell (1961) and Ohlson (1991, 1995).  
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Hamilton (1777) or Marshall (1890)  
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In the following, the concept of the residual income model is explained shortly. All model 
variations mentioned above are based on the same principle but make slightly different 
assumptions in their implementation.5 
 
The residual income model starts with the same assumptions about the value of a stock as 
the DDM: ∑
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Thus, the value of the firm is defined in terms of current book value (B0) and abnormal 
earnings ( 1)( −− tt BkROE ). From formula 1-3 can be seen that investors are only willing to 
pay a premium over book value of equity if the company is able to earn a rate of return on 
equity above the equity cost of capital (i.e. the firm produces positive residual income).  
 
The advantage of the RIM valuation approach is that it is expressed entirely in terms of 
accounting numbers and therefore should reduce estimation error in the application of the 
model. Furthermore, the assumptions made to estimate the terminal value in DFCF models 
are crucial. In the RI model book value, which often represents a sizable portion of firm 
value, is given and does not have to be estimated so that the portion of terminal value to 
total value is smaller. The main advantage of the RI model is thus that investors only need 
to estimate the difference between firm value and book value while in DFCF models firm 
value itself has to be estimated.  
Despite its merits and the academic effort, residual income models were not widely used in 
valuation practices until recently (Demirakos, Strong, and Walker, 2002).  
                                                 
5
 For a survey of the literature see Lee (1999). 
6
 The clean surplus relation states that all changes in book value (other than transactions with stockholders) 
must flow through the income statement without any direct charges to stockholders equity. US GAAP is 
generally consistent with clean surplus accounting (White, 1998).  
7
 For a more detailed deviation of the model see White (1998), p. 1063. 
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3.3 Relative Valuation or Price Multiple Models 
In absolute valuation the objective is to find the intrinsic value of an asset given its cash 
flow, growth and risk characteristics. In relative valuation the objective is to value assets 
based on how similar assets are priced in the market. The principle underlying relative 
valuation models is the law of one price - the economic theory that two similar assets should 
sell for similar prices.  
There are two steps in correctly applying relative valuation techniques. First, stock prices 
have to be standardized and made comparable, usually by converting them into multiples of 
earnings, book values or sales. In a second step, similar firms have to be found to compare 
the standardized multiples to in order to determine their relative adequacy.  
Four main methods using different multiples are commonly used in the relative approach to 
valuation of common stocks (Stowe et al., 2002): 
1. Relative earnings valuation method: P/E ratio or earnings multiple, PEG ratios8 
2. Relative revenue valuation method: P/S ratio9 
3. Relative cash-flow valuation method: P/EBIT, P/EBITDA, P/CFO, EV/EBITDA 
ratios10 
4. Relative asset valuation method: P/B or B/M ratios.11 
 
Earnings multiples are commonly used when analysts have high confidence in the quality of 
historical and projected earnings per share (EPS) and when EPS are expected to grow. The 
revenue based valuation method is used when earnings are negative or declining, or when 
earning figures are not comparable or not representative for the future. Cash flow ratios are 
used in industries characterized by low or negative EPS due to large non-operating expenses 
or for cyclical companies with high earnings volatility.  
In general, the use of earnings multiples is best when earnings are reliable. In case of a non-
reliable bottom line, investors should move the income statement up to EBIT, then EBITDA 
and if nothing else is reliable, sales. The relative asset valuation approach gained on 
                                                 
8
 P/E ratio = Price / Earnings per share; PEG = P/E / g where g is the expected growth rate of earnings 
9
 P/S ratio = Price / Sales per share 
10
 EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, EBITDA= Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization, CFO = Cash Flow from Operation, EV = Enterprise Value = market value of equity + market 
value of debt - cash and investments 
11
 P/ B = Price / Book value of equity per share; B/M = Book value of equity / Market value of equity 
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popularity after a study by Fama and French (1992) showing that the B/M ratio is one of the 
best explanatory variables of historical stock returns.  
 
Most commonly used is however the earnings multiple approach (Demirakos, Strong and 
Walker, 2002). In this method, analysts need to forecast EPS for the year ahead and 
determine an appropriate price-to-earnings multiple (P/E ratio). The P/E ratio expresses how 
many dollars the investor is willing to pay for a dollar of expected future earnings per share. 
By multiplying the earnings multiple with the estimated earnings, analysts find the target 
price for the stock (P/E*E = P).  
Key and at the same time major weakness in this method of common stock valuation is the 
earnings multiple. It is determined usually in a rather subjective way relative to multiples of 
other ‘comparable’ companies and is therefore subject to biases and even manipulation. 
Bhojraj and Lee (2001) write that “the aura of mystique that surrounds this technique is 
discomforting from a scientific perspective, limits its coverage in financial analysis courses, 
and ultimately threatens its credibility as a serious alternative in equity valuation.”  
Another problem associated with the widespread use of relative valuation techniques is an 
obsessive focus on short-term earnings numbers. While research shows that reported 
earnings are decreasingly important in explaining stock prices (e.g. Lev and Zarowin, 
1999), the market’s focus on earnings has steadily increased.12 Related to this problem of 
relying too heavily on next year’s earnings is the problem of accurately forecasting them. 
Several studies have shown that analysts make large mistakes in forecasting earnings (e.g. 
Dreman, 1998, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2001). Some authors even argue that the mistakes 
are too large to derive any kind of meaningful information from these forecasts (Dreman, 
1998).  
Another often ignored fact in using relative valuation approaches is that relative valuation 
models only give relative investment recommendations. A stock selling at a P/E that is low 
relative to the P/E of another comparable stock is relatively undervalued. If the comparison 
stock is overvalued (in an absolute sense) so might be the stock the relative valuation model 
identified as undervalued.  
 
In summary, the relative valuation techniques are only useful when a good set of 
comparable companies exists, when the market is not at a valuation extreme and when the 
                                                 
12
 Rappaport, Alfred; WSJ, March 10 2003, page R2. 
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company’s fundamentals are difficult to forecast. While the multiple approach bypasses 
explicit projections and present value calculations, it relies on the same principles 
underlying the more comprehensive absolute valuation approach: value is an increasing 
function of future cash flows and a decreasing function of risk. Multiples are therefore only 
a poor substitute for comprehensive valuations. 
 
3.4 What is Used and what Works in Practice 
Barker (1999) reviews the actual use of valuation models by professional investors and 
financial analysts. He finds that both groups rank the simple P/E model as the most 
important valuation model. His results confirm earlier studies of Moizer and Arnold (1984), 
and Pike, Meerjanssen and Chadwick (1993). In a recent survey Demirakos, Strong, and 
Walker (2002) analyze analyst valuation methodologies in the research reports they provide. 
They find that relative valuation is the dominant valuation approach and that 89% of 
valuation reports contain some form of earnings multiple. Surprisingly, considering the 
large number of published papers about the RIM model in the academic literature, they find 
no case in which this model is the dominant valuation model and only 2% of the reports use 
RIM. However, they do find several instances (21% of all research reports) where a multi-
stage DFCF model is the dominant valuation model and DFCF is used in 36% of the analyst 
reports.  
 
These results suggest that the use of valuation models is divers but relatively stable over 
time. The actual use tells a lot about what the investment professionals think which models 
work best in valuation. In the following, we provide an overview of academic studies that 
illustrate the ability of different valuation models to explain or predict stock prices.  
 
Asset based Valuation studies 
Asset based valuation studies are almost non-existent in the academic literature as they 
require subjective adjustments to accounting numbers. The soundness of the approach is 
however confirmed by the many practitioners of Value investing who produce extraordinary 
returns using this approach. Greenwald et al. (2001) names some money managers of the 
Graham school that have consistently beaten stock market averages over extended periods 
of time. Walter Schloss, for example, has with 45 years (1956-2000) one of the longest 
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uninterrupted records as a money manager. His return over the period averaged 15.3% per 
year, compared to 11.5% for the S&P 500. The risk was low too, Schloss lost money in only 
seven out of the 45 years. Nothing however compares to Warren Buffets realized returns: a 
$10,000 investment in Berkshire Hathaway when Buffet took over in 1965 grew to be worth 
over $50 million by 2003 compared to only $500,000 for the S&P 500.13 
 
Absolute Valuation studies 
Most tests of DCF models have been done in the 1980’s using dividend discount models. 
Sorensen and Williamson (1985) for example, test four DDM models that differ in their 
complexity. They find that the top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolios of all four models 
outperformed (underperformed) the market average and that portfolio returns improve 
considerably as the complexity of the model used is increased.  
More academic research compares the DCF and various RI models. The evidence regarding 
the relative superiority of these models is mixed. Bernard (1995), Penman and Sougiannis 
(1998), Frankel and Lee (1998) and Francis et al. (2000b) find that the RI valuation models 
predict or explain stock prices better than the models based on discounting short-term 
forecasts of dividends or cash flows. On the other hand, provide studies by Stober (1996), 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Myers (1999) and Callen and Morel (2000) evidence 
that the RI model is of limited empirical validity.  
 
Relative Valuation studies 
While multiples are used extensively in practice, there exists little published academic 
research documenting the relative superiority of different multiples. Empirical evidence in 
Kim and Ritter (1999) and Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) suggest that in the earnings 
multiple approach forward earnings perform better than historical earnings. Liu et al. (2002) 
show that in terms of accuracy relative to current prices, the performance of forward 
earnings is followed by that of historical earnings, cash flow, book value, and finally sales. 
Furthermore find Liu et al. (2002) that contrary to the popular view that different industries 
have different ‘best’ multiples, the previous rankings are observed consistently for almost 
all industries examined.  
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  www.investopia.com 
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More empirical tests have been done on the absolute investment performance of different 
multiples. Studies over many decades and in different countries have shown that low 
multiple stocks (value stocks) perform better than high multiple stocks (growth stocks). 
Among many others show Basu (1977), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), and 
Dreman (1998) that low P/E stocks earn positive abnormal returns relative to the market and 
high P/E stocks negative abnormal returns. Goodman and Peavy (1983) find the same using 
industry relative P/E ratios. Peters (1991) tests the PEG ratio approach and finds significant 
higher returns for low PEG stocks than for high PEG stocks. Fama and French (1992) and 
Dreman (1998), again among many others, find that low P/B (or low B/M) stocks perform 
better than stocks with high such ratios. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) extend the 
analysis of P/B ratios across international markets, and conclude that low multiple stocks 
earn abnormal returns in every market they analyzed. The results of studies on the P/S and 
P/CF and even P/DY are no different (Dreman, 1998).  
These results arise the question of whether the abnormal returns associated with a low 
multiple investment strategy represent a market anomaly in relation to relative valuation 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) or whether they simply represent a premium for 
taking on extra risk (Fama and French, 1992). Empirical and behavioral evidence points 
more to the mispricing hypothesis than to the risk explanation (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998; Froidevaux, 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the practical implementation of the three main approaches to valuation – asset 
based, absolute and relative valuation – will generally yield different estimates of intrinsic 
values for the same firm and the results are inconclusive on which model works best in 
praxis.  
We believe that behind the inconclusive results of the practical validity of the different 
valuation models lies a conceptual problem. In our opinion, we need to differentiate two 
different types of valuation models: conceptual models and application models. Conceptual 
models are related to the explanation of an idea or concept. By doing so, the model can be 
simple and schematic. Assumptions and restrictions are tolerated in order to facilitate the 
explanation. Application models on the other hand are related to the application of a 
conceptual model to economic reality. This type of model must be comprehensive and must 
include all the variables that were omitted in a conceptual model.  
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The results about the relative superiority of different valuation models are inconclusive 
because most previous research tested conceptual models instead of application models. A 
realistic test of the different valuation approaches requires the test of more complex models. 
In the following parts of this dissertation, we will develop and test such a comprehensive 
application oriented valuation model to examine whether it can be used to generate 
abnormal returns in the US stock market.  
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PART II: THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUITY VALUATION 
MODEL  
“The greatest gift is the power to estimate correctly the value of things.” 
Francois, Duc de la Rochefoucauld 
Maximes, 1664 
 
4. The Fundamental Equity Valuation Model 
From the previous discussion of valuation models becomes evident that even though the 
monetary reward couldn’t be higher in any economic subject, there is still great diffusion of 
what valuation model captures best the intrinsic value of common stocks. In the following, 
we present and later test a sophisticated discounted cash flow valuation model based on a 
behaviorally inspired approach of replicating investors’ value finding process in financial 
markets.  
 
4.1 Overview of the Fundamental Equity Valuation Model 
Before presenting a short overview of the model, the idea, goal and underlying logic of the 
model are discussed.  
 
Idea, Goal and Logic behind the Fundamental Equity Valuation Model 
The idea of model development is to derive a stock valuation model that explicitly relates a 
stock’s intrinsic value to currently observable fundamental variables. We recognize that 
stock prices in the market are generated by expectations of investors about the intrinsic 
value of the stock. A valuation model to be practically useful must therefore as closely as 
possible replicate investors’ expectations and thus the price finding process in the stock 
market. In the fundamental approach to valuation presented in this dissertation, we try to 
replicate the processes behind investors’ stock pricing decisions in form of a complex 
application oriented valuation model.  
In order to determine the conception of the model and its inputs, we have to understand how 
and which information market participants transfer into stock prices. Capital market theory 
should explain how capital markets work. Unfortunately, the modern capital market theory 
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based on Markowitz (1959) is too simplistic and rigid to capture the complex process of 
human beings transferring information into stock prices. In our opinion, ironically, the best 
work on capital market theory is done by practitioners and not by academics. Books by De 
La Vega (1688), Mackay (1852), Levèvre (1923), Graham (1949), Fisher (1958), Malkiel 
(1973), Hunt (1987), Soros (1987), Lynch (1990), Peters (1991), Vaga (1994), Hagstrom 
(1994) or Shefrin (2000) provide valuable insights into the mind of the stock market and its 
participants.  
Peters (1991), for example, shows that stability in the market exists because of different 
expectations of investors. One investor sells a stock based on his expectations of value to 
another investor who buys the stock based on different expectations. It is therefore likely 
that investors in the market have different assessments of the relevant input factors to a 
valuation model. Consequently, the input factors reflected in the stock prices are a weighted 
average of these different individual assessments, where the weights are based on the wealth 
the investor invests in the stock market.  
Shefrin’s (2000) review of behavioral finance provides some additional insights into the 
way people form expectations and price stocks in financial markets. When the many 
behavioral factors (such as fear, greed, loss aversion, mental accounting, overconfidence 
etc.) are considered together, must the resulting behavior of investors be viewed as more 
complex than the purely rational behavior assumed by the ‘modern’ capital market theory. 
Kent et al. (2001) show that behavioral factors indeed do affect stock prices in many 
different ways. 
 
In building a valuation model, we must recognize that financial markets are characterized 
by complex and dynamic price finding processes. Replicating these processes requires 
equally complex valuation models. Based on the results of the empirical and theoretical 
discussion of valuation approaches in chapter 3, we believe that a DCF model using FCFE 
as the relevant cash flow is best suited to fulfill this difficult task. The fundamental 
valuation principle is clear enough: the value of all financial assets is the cash flow the asset 
generates for its owners discounted at their required rate of return. The discounted free cash 
flow model is therefore the only theoretical correct valuation method  reflecting directly the 
cash flow available for distribution and hence should capture best the pricing mechanism of 
the stock market (Rappaport and Mauboussin, 2001). RI models rely on transformations of 
the original principle of discounted cash flow. Even though equivalent on a conceptual 
basis, their implementation requires moving away from the distribution focus of financial 
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markets. Compared to relative valuation models, a FCFE model is more objective as it 
states explicitly the assumptions that go into the valuation process. It is also superior to 
asset based valuation models that require subjective adjustments to already questionable 
accounting numbers.  
 
The purpose of this part of the dissertation is therefore to develop the so called 
‘Fundamental Equity Valuation Model’ (FEVM or FEV model) based on the discounted 
cash flow valuation theory. The model is ‘fundamental’ in such a way that it attempts to 
convert all relevant available information about the fundamentals of a company into one 
estimate of value for the stock - just like the stock market is doing. Although the actual 
valuation process of investors is unobservable, we believe that a comprehensive application 
oriented DCF valuation model is the most useful proxy for that process.  
 
Overview of the Fundamental Equity Valuation Model (FEVM) 
Our fundamental equity valuation model is based on the discounted cash flow methodology 
originally developed in Williams (1938). As our goal is to find mispricing in the stock 
market, it must be application oriented and complex enough to capture the way perceived 
economic reality finds its way into stock prices. Previous valuation research (e.g. Sorensen 
and Williamson, 1985) shows clearly that investment returns improve considerably as the 
complexity of the valuation model used is increased. 
 
Like for every discounted cash flow model, we have to estimate two main input factors: the 
cash flows in the nominator and the discount rate in the denominator. We know of no 
economically and behaviorally sound approach to estimate the discount rate and develop 
therefore in the following our own approach. It consists of a mix of different methods 
suggested in the literature and of a new method linking fundamental risk factors to a market 
implied risk premium.  
In the nominator, we use free cash flow to equity (FCFE) as the relevant measure of cash 
flow. FCFE is the amount of cash that can be distributed to investors in any given year 
without negatively affecting the future of the company. The most difficult variable to 
forecast in the nominator is the growth rate of these cash flows. According to Sharpe et al. 
(1999) investors assume that economic growth of a corporation falls into three phases: a 
high growth phase, a transition phase and a mature phase. A company in its high growth 
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phase typically enjoys rapidly expanding markets, high profit margins and an abnormally 
high growth rate of sales and earnings. In the transition phase to maturity, earnings growth 
slows as competitors put pressure on prices and profit margins or as sales growth slows 
because of increased market saturation. In the mature phase, the company reaches an 
equilibrium in which sales and earnings grow in line with long-term economic growth.  
As we attempt to replicate the actual valuation process of investors’ in the stock market, we 
replicate in our model these three different growth stages. The initial growth period ranges 
from five to 15 years and requires a forecast for all input variables in the first two years and 
a growth rate for the remainder of the period. It is build upon the best practice of analysts to 
forecast complete financial statements two years into the future and thereafter to provide a 
long-term growth forecast for the most important variables like earnings (Cornell, 2000).  
After this initial period, the company’s growth rate is expected to revert to the average 
growth rate of the economy. The economic law of diminishing returns indicates, and many 
empirical studies have shown (e.g. Little, 1962; Lev, 1983), that a company cannot grow for 
an extended period of time faster than the industry in which it operates. For most 
companies, sales growth will eventually slow down to the level of nominal GDP growth. 
This fact is captured in the intermediate fading period in the second stage of the model. 
Growth rates, profit margins and all other input factors are faded from the forecasted first 
stage level to the steady state long-term growth stage level.  
The third and final stage assumes that the company has reached its maturity stage in the life 
cycle and will grow only as fast as the general economy from there on. Depending on the 
business of the company, profit margins in this period can be faded to reflect the 
deterioration of competitive advantage over time. The model is also flexible enough to 
allow for time-varying discount rates, where the time variation is caused by expected 
changes in interest rates and risk over time. 
The sum of the discounted free cash flows to equity in all three stages equals the intrinsic 
value of the stock. Mathematically the model looks as follows:14 
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14
 In our model, we implicitly assume that cash flows are received at the end of each year. It might be more 
reasonable to assume that the cash flows are distributed evenly throughout the year (Pratt, 1998). We however 
do not adjust the model for the mid-year convention, as the difference would be small and the potential error 
appears on the conservative side. 
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FCFE1 = Free cash flow to equity in year 1 
FCFE2 = Free cash flow to equity in year 2 
FCFEt = Free cash flow to equity in year t 
k1 = Discount rate in stage 1 
kt = Discount rates in stage 2 
kT = Discount rate in stage 3 
n = Year ending stage 1 
N= Year ending stage 2; (N-n) is the length of stage 2 
M = Year ending stage 3; (M-N) is the length of stage 3 
 
A short but comprehensive overview of the model is presented in figure 2 in the appendix. 
 
4.2 Determining the Nominator: Cash Flow, Cash Flow 
Growth and the Growth Duration 
In this chapter, we determine the nominator of our fundamental equity valuation model: the 
cash flows. According to the theoretical DCF model, three main variables must be 
determined in the nominator:  
1. what are the relevant cash flows and how to measure them (cash flow to 
discount), 
2. how much the asset generates in cash flows to investors (cash flow growth rate),  
3. when these cash flows are expected to occur (cash flow growth duration). 
 
In the following pages, we will examine these important input variables to our FEV model. 
 
4.2.1 The Cash Flow to Discount 
In the chapter about valuation models, we identified three main candidates for the relevant 
cash flows to discount in a discounted cash flow valuation model: dividends, residual 
earnings, or free cash flow. 
While dividends are the right measure in explanatory models, in an application model they 
are inappropriate. It is not the actual dividend that determines stock prices but the potential 
dividend in each year because, as discussed in the previous chapter, observed dividends are 
not directly related to the actual cash flow generated by the company in each year.  
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In recognition of this fact, two alternative cash flow definitions have been proposed in the 
literature (e.g. Gentry et al., 2002). The accounting approach assumes the relevant cash flow 
to investors to be earnings, while the finance approach assumes that the value of a stock is 
more related to the actual amount of cash generated for investors.  
In recent years, academic research has attempted to provide empirical evidence on the 
relative superiority of cash flow versus earnings based valuation techniques. Dechow (1994) 
finds that stock returns are more highly associated with earnings than with cash flow. 
Similarly document Penman and Sougiannis (1998) that earnings valuation techniques 
consistently outperform cash flow valuation techniques over alternative forecasting 
horizons. In another study, however, Black (1998) finds that the relative superiority of 
earnings versus cash flow exists only for companies in mature life cycle stages. In the start-
up stage, growth stage and the declining stage operating cash flow is more value relevant. 
Furthermore Biddle, Seow and Siegel (1995) show that the relative superiority differs from 
industry to industry, without however differentiating the life cycle of the industries.  
A study by Sloan (1996) brought another interesting insight into the discussion. He finds 
that when the market considers earnings, it makes a cognitive error in relation to the two 
types of information contained in earnings – accrual earnings15 and cash flows. He shows 
that investors systematically overreact to accrual earnings, despite their lower persistence 
than cash earnings. Sloan captures the mispricing with a trading strategy that holds a long 
position in low accrual firms and a short position in high accrual firms. This simple strategy 
yields an average annual excess return of more than 10% and generates positive returns in 
28 of the 30 years in the sample. His results were later confirmed by Houge and Loughran 
(2000) and Xie (2001).  
These studies show that firms with large accrual earnings have lower subsequent returns. It 
seems therefore that investors focus too much on earnings and do not consider adequately 
the temporary accrual components of those earnings. Block (1999) provides evidence that 
earnings fixation is persistent throughout the financial community. His survey reveals that 
financial analysts rank earnings as a more important valuation tool than cash flows. Because 
the market anchors on earnings, investors consistently underestimate the transitory nature of 
accruals and the long-term persistence of cash flows. This mistake can be avoided by 
focusing on cash flow rather than earnings. Furthermore, Gentry et al. (2002) show that all 
                                                 
15
 Accrual earnings are the difference between the income recognized and actual cash flows for the period 
(White, 1998) 
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individual components of free cash flow are significantly related to capital gains and hence 
are value relevant. 
Empirical evidence therefore favors, although inconclusively, free cash flow over earnings 
as the relevant cash flow to discount. Theoretically, free cash flow is superior as well. One 
conceptual difference between earnings and free cash flow is that earnings measure the 
accounting based value creation and free cash flow the potential value distribution. So the 
question is mainly whether the stock market discounts the value created or the value 
distributable. In this respect, the economic concept behind the DCF model favors clearly 
value distribution and thus free cash flow. Economically, the relevant cash flow to investors 
is the amount of money available for distribution to shareholders because the shareholders 
as legal owners of the firm have the right to demand whatever amount they want distributed 
up to the rational maximum amount where the future of the company would be 
‘cannibalized’. This amount is free cash flow to equity (FCFE).  
FCFE adds back all non-cash charges to net income and accounts for future reinvestment 
needs such as capital expenditures and necessary investments in working capital. It can be 
therefore distributed without compromising the economic survival or future growth of the 
firm.  
 
For these reasons, FCFE is the relevant cash flow to discount in our fundamental equity 
valuation model. Based on Damodaran (1996, 2004), we calculated FCFE in our model in 
the following way: 
Sustainable net income 
+/- Change in working capital * (1-debt financing proportion of working capital) 
+ Depreciation & amortization * (1-debt financing proportion of depreciation  
    & amortization)  
- Capital expenditures * (1-debt financing proportion of capital expenditures) 
= Free Cash Flow to Equity  
 
Sustainable net income is the most important input variable for calculating FCFE as it 
usually accounts for the biggest portion of the final FCFE number. Our long term valuation 
perspective requires earnings that are persistent rather than transitory (Sharpe et al., 1999). 
Three such persistent earnings measure are generally considered valid: ‘The Street’ earnings 
(a pro-forma operating income proxy obtained from firms’ earnings releases), earnings from 
operations, and earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Brown and 
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Sivakumar (2001) and Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) compare the three measures based on 
predictive ability, valuation relevance and information content. They find that for all three 
criteria the pro-forma operating income measure released by managers (‘The Street’) is of 
higher quality than EPS from operations and both ‘The Street’ and EPS from operations are 
of higher quality than is EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  
Nevertheless we choose as our measure of sustainable net income a mix of all the different 
measures proposed in the literature. We are assuming though that more than one estimate is 
actually reflected in stock prices given the common divergence of opinion among investors.  
 
In a second step, the change in working capital must be added or subtracted from these 
earnings depending on whether more or less short-tem capital must be contained in the 
business to deal with future economic growth (Damodaran, 2004). However only the part 
financed by equity investors (1-debt financing proportion of working capital) will affect the 
available cash to equity holders. If the company finances the increasing working capital 
needs with more debt, no additional equity capital must be contained in the business and 
nothing needs to be subtracted from earnings. 
In a next step, all non-cash expenses like depreciation and amortization are added back and 
future capital expenditure needs are subtracted (Damodaran, 2004). This amount of net 
investment into long lived assets is needed to continue or grow the operations of the 
business and consequently cannot be distributed to shareholders. Again only the part 
financed by equity investors will reduce the distributable income.16  
 
The sum of the sustainable earnings, working capital changes, depreciation and 
amortization, and subtracting capital expenditure equals the FCFE in any given year.  
As our goal is to determine the intrinsic value of one stock, we divide the resulting FCFE 
values by the number of shares. In our model, we measure the number of shares by the fully 
diluted number of shares outstanding and furthermore forecast this number in the first stage 
using an average of a regression estimate, the geometric average and the arithmetic average 
of the past 5 year share dilution percentage. 
 
                                                 
16
 We thus implicitly assume that working capital changes and net capital expenditures are financed using a 
fixed mix of debt and equity and consequently that principal repayments are made from new debt issues. This 
procedure eliminates the need to make difficult forecasts about absolute changes in debt levels over time and 
facilitates the application of the model (Damodaran, 2004). 
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4.2.2 Fundamental Cash Flow Growth  
A DCF model shows that for investors not the actual free cash flows but the future free cash 
flows are value relevant. This creates a forecasting problem since projections of dollar cash 
flows cannot be made throughout infinity and growth rates need to be applied instead. To 
deal with this forecasting problem, our model separates the infinite horizon into the three 
different life cycle stages explained earlier.  
 
First stage: Explicit Forecasting 
First, earnings - the most volatile part of FCFE - are forecasted directly for the next two 
years and thereafter indirectly through an earnings growth rate for the remainder of the first 
stage. The other components of FCFE are estimated after forecasting earnings. 
 
Earnings estimates 
To estimate the next two years earnings of the company, we use three methods 
simultaneously: (1) a simple mechanical extrapolation model, (2) a comprehensive 
mechanical extrapolation model, and (3) analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. We use 
different earnings estimates because, as explained earlier, it is unlikely that stock prices 
reflect only one single estimate given the common divergence of opinions among investors.  
Evidence from the earnings forecasting literature provides some insight into the forecast 
accuracy of each method. Many researchers (e.g. Collins and Hopwood, 1980; Fried and 
Givoly, 1982; O’Brian, 1988) examine analysts’ ability to forecast earnings compared to 
mechanical extrapolation models. The results of their studies confirm that analysts do better 
in forecasting earnings - at least over the short term. O'Brien (1988) finds that analysts 
outperform time series models for one-quarter ahead and two-quarter ahead forecasts, do as 
well for three-quarter ahead forecasts and do worse than the time series models for four 
quarter ahead forecasts. Thus, the advantage gained by analysts from other information 
sources than financial statements seems to deteriorate as the time horizon for forecasting is 
extended.  
Furthermore Dreman and Berry (1995) find that analysts’ forecast errors are large across 
industries and through various stages of the business cycle and that they are increasing over 
time. They conclude that the average forecast error is too high for investors to rely on as a 
major input factor to stock valuation models.  
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The many problems associated with analyst forecasts indicate that the market might not rely 
on these forecasts alone when discounting cash flow information into stock prices. We 
should keep in mind that we are not necessary looking for the most accurate forecast, but 
for the forecast that is most likely to be reflected in the stock prices. As mentioned earlier, 
we use therefore in addition to analyst forecasts two mechanical extrapolation models (a 
simple and a complex mechanical forecasting model) to estimate earnings for the next two 
years.17 That mechanical models can be used in equity valuation is shown in Francis et al. 
(2000a). 
The simple mechanical forecasting model extrapolates earnings into the future using the 
following statistical methods applied to the past 5 years of realized earnings data: 
1. Arithmetic average 
2. Moving arithmetic average 
3. Weighted moving arithmetic average 
4. Geometric average 
5. Moving geometric average 
6. Linear regression 
7. Moving linear regression 
8. Loglinear regression 
9. Moving loglinear regression. 
 
Each of these extrapolation techniques producing an estimate within a 30% band of 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts is considered a valid estimate of future earnings and 
included into the model. The assumption behind the bands is that large errors caused by 
extrapolating a volatile data series are to a certain degree (the bands) detectable by 
investors.18 Only the estimates producing values within the bands can be considered valid 
forecasts and are included into the model. 
In the comprehensive mechanical forecasting model, earnings are estimated based on best 
practices of earnings forecasting used by financial analysts: first sales are forecasted from 
which all forecasted costs (cost of goods sold, depreciation and amortization, interest 
expenses, and other costs) are subtracted. Estimated sales minus all estimated costs yields 
estimated earnings in this method. To forecast sales and costs, the same statistical 
                                                 
17
 Where analysts’ forecasts for a third year into the future were available, they have been used as well.  
18
 The band has been fixed at 30% because the average analyst forecast error reported in the literature (e.g. 
Collins et al., 1980, Dreman, 1998) has been about 30% historically. 
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extrapolation techniques used for the simple mechanical forecasting model have been used 
and again bands are applied to minimize the distortion caused by large outliers. 
The final earnings estimate is a weighted average of the estimates from the simple 
mechanical forecasting model (25%), the comprehensive mechanical forecasting model 
(30%) and the consensus forecasts of analysts (45%).  
By including other forecasts than the analysts’ consensus earnings estimates, we recognize 
that the forecasts will generally be less accurate than those made by security analysts alone. 
In the broad context of equity valuation, we however think it is important to diversify the 
input source to reflect the market’s divers pricing mechanism better.19 
 
Earnings growth forecasting 
Forecasting earnings growth over the remainder of the first stage is one of the most 
important and challenging task in DCF valuation. To estimate the growth rate of earnings, 
we rely again on several different approaches because of our belief that an input mix is 
necessary to reflect the process of investors weighting different estimates and pricing them 
into the value of the stock. The methods used are the following: 
1. Analysts’ consensus earnings growth rate 
2. Simple mechanical forecasting model 
3. Comprehensive mechanical forecasting model 
4. Sustainable growth rate 
5. Estimate based on profit margins 
6. Own estimate. 
 
The analysts’ consensus growth rate is generally the most accurate estimate of the earnings 
growth rate. Vander Weide and Carleton (1988) and Chatfield et al. (1990) find that 
analysts’ consensus forecasts of five-year earnings growth is superior to historically 
oriented growth measures in predicting future growth. This view has however recently been 
challenged by several authors. For example, Chan et al. (2001) show that analyst forecasts 
are in general too optimistic and have low predictive power for long-term growth. They 
                                                 
19
 In our opinion, the real test of input usefulness to a valuation model is not accuracy but valuation relevance. 
In chapter 5, we will however examine whether a DCF model works better when only consensus analyst 
estimates are used rather than the mix of different estimates. 
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write that “caution should be exercised before relying too heavily on I/B/E/S long-term 
forecasts as estimates of expected growth in valuation studies.”  
For this reason, we also use other methods like the simple mechanical forecasting model. In 
this method, earnings are forecasted by extrapolating realized earning numbers of the past 5 
years into the future using the mix of different extrapolation techniques described earlier. 
The earnings growth rate is then calculated as the geometrical average of forecasted 
earnings in the fifth year and the last year of available realized earnings. 
Another method used again is the comprehensive mechanical forecasting model. Like 
before, the method is comprehensive in such a way that earnings are not forecasted directly, 
but rather are the result of forecasting the individual components that make up earnings. 
Sales and all costs are again estimated using the same mix of statistical forecasting 
techniques used previously. The earnings growth rate is again the geometrical average of 
forecasted earnings in the fifth year and the last year of available realized earnings. 
 
The two historical extrapolation techniques assume that future earnings growth is somewhat 
related to past earnings growth (Damodaran (2004) shows that this is indeed the case). As 
the past earnings growth rates are more likely to slow down than to accelerate, these 
methods are, like the analyst estimates, mostly optimistic. To correct for this tendency, we 
also use the sustainable growth rate approach outlined in Sharpe et al. (1999) and suggested 
as a forecasting method in Copeland et al. (2000).  
The sustainable growth rate is the rate of earnings growth a company can sustain for a 
given level of return on equity while keeping the capital structure constant. It is defined as 
the retention rate multiplied by the return on equity (ROE). The greater the proportion of 
earnings a firm reinvests, the greater is its potential for growth and given a level of 
reinvestment a firm will grow faster, if it earns a higher rate of return on the reinvested 
capital. This approach captures a firms’ value creation potential by focusing on ROE and its 
components (profit margin, asset turnover and leverage). It however underestimates the true 
growth potential for most firms because they can issue new capital and hence increase their 
growth potential beyond the theoretical sustainable growth rate. We therefore modify the 
traditional model of sustainable growth slightly to allow the debt ratio to be increased up to 
the debt ratio of the S&P 500. An average of both sustainable growth rate estimates, the 
original and the modified version, are used in the model. 
The margin method forecasts the more stable and therefore relatively easier to forecast 
profit margin instead of the diverse and volatile cost components. In this method, four 
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different profit margins are forecasted: the gross profit margin, the EBITDA profit margin, 
the operating or EBIT profit margin, and the net profit margin. Multiplying each forecasted 
profit margin by the level of sales yields earnings estimates from which the earnings growth 
rate is derived. The average of the earnings growth rate estimates obtained from each profit 
margin yields the earnings growth rate estimate included into the model. 
The final method used is an own estimate of earnings growth. However, in order to reduce 
subjectivity, the own forecast consists simply of an average of the geometrical average, the 
arithmetical average and a simple regression estimate based on the latest five years of 
realized annual earnings growth adjusted for extraordinary factors and implausible results. 
This approach corrects the previous approaches for extraordinary and non-recurring 
earnings as according to Sharpe et al. (1999) such transitory earnings should not be 
considered in the nominator of a DCF model but rather be added at the end of the valuation 
process to the obtained intrinsic value of the stock. 
 
The earnings growth rate used in the first stage of the model is a fundamental growth rate 
(FGR) consisting of a weighted average of the six estimates just described. Most weight is 
given to the consensus forecasts of analysts, the smallest weight to the profit margin 
method.20  
 
Forecasting the other components of FCFE 
After forecasting earnings, the other components of FCFE are estimated. Working capital in 
the first stage is determined using the average of an estimate based on the historical working 
capital-to-sales ratio and an estimate based on regressing working capital-to-sales ratios. 
The debt financing proportion of additional working capital is proxied by the average 
current ratio of the past 5 years.  
Capital expenditures tend to be volatile and are therefore not estimated directly but a 
growth rate is applied instead to the latest normalized numbers available. The growth rate is 
estimated using four different methods: (1) an average of the geometrical average, the 
arithmetical average and a linear regression of the latest 5 year capital expenditure data, (2) 
an estimate based on the historical capital expenditure-to-sales ratio, (3) an estimate based 
                                                 
20
 The actual weights used are for analysts’ consensus earnings growth rate 40%, the comprehensive 
mechanical forecasting model 25%, the simple mechanical forecasting model 15%, the own estimate 10%, the 
sustainable growth rate 5%, and the profit margin method 5%.  
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on the historical capital expenditure growth-to-sales growth ratio, and (4) a method 
decomposing historical capital expenditure into growth capital expenditure and maintenance 
capital expenditure. The debt financing proportion is estimated using the average debt-to-
asset ratio of the past 5 years. 
The growth rate of depreciation and amortization is analogously determined by (1) an 
average of the geometrical average, the arithmetical average and a linear regression of the 
latest 5 years data, (2) an estimate based on the historical depreciation-to-capital 
expenditure ratio, (3) an estimate based on historical asset growth and depreciation rate, and 
(4) a method based on the maintenance capital expenditure-to-sales ratio. The debt 
financing proportion is again estimated by using the average debt-to-asset ratio of the past 5 
years. 
 
Second Stage: Fading Period 
In the transition or fading stage, all growth rates, except of the earnings growth rate, are 
faded linearly over the total length of the fading period from the first stage level to the 
steady state growth level determined in stage three.21 The earnings growth rate is not 
directly estimated anymore in this stage as such an estimate would certainly prove to be 
unreliable. Instead a sustainable profit margin is estimated based on the average profit 
margin in the high growth phase.22 The profit margin from the end of the high growth phase 
is then faded linearly to this sustainable profit margin over the length of the fading period.  
The length of the fading period is determined in relation to the length of the high growth 
stage (see chapter 4.2.3) adjusted with ratios that proxy for the competitive situation of the 
company (e.g. sales growth, ROE, P/B ratio). The minimum fading period length is three 
years, the maximum 10 years.  
 
Third Stage: Stable long-term Growth Stage 
In the long-term growth stage only the sales growth rate is still estimated directly. All other 
inputs are determined in relation to sales as these relationships are stable enough in 
                                                 
21
 The fading is achieved trough simple linear interpolation. 
22
 As such a profit margin requires forecasting sales, we estimate a sales growth rate for the first stage based 
on the average of (1) a simple extrapolation model, (2) an average of the arithmetic average, geometric 
average and a simple regression forecast of 5 year historical sales data, and (3) an economic estimate based on 
the average GDP growth, the average inflation rate and a company specific growth premium determined by 
factors such as the current profit margin, the ROE and the relative P/B ratio. 
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maturing companies and explicit forecasts are unreasonable in that period. To determine 
earnings, sales are multiplied with the profit margin from the last year of the fading growth 
stage. 
We assume that sales growth in the long-term growth stage is determined by (1) the average 
long-term corporate profit growth, and (2) the long-term historical average real GDP growth 
plus the average long-term historical inflation rate. We choose these two factors because the 
assumption that sales growth is constant perpetually puts strong constraints on how high 
this growth rate can be. Economically, no firm can be expected to grow forever at a rate 
higher than the growth rate of the economy in which it operates. Consequently can the 
constant growth rate not be greater than the overall nominal growth rate of the economy. It 
is more likely to be even lower as new products outside the company’s now mature industry 
are introduced constantly leading to a lower share of economic growth attributable to 
maturing companies (Damodaran, 2004). The average historical GDP growth rate is 
therefore most likely too high an estimate for most existing industries so that we deflate 
mechanically both historical estimates by a fixed percentage depending on the industry.23 
On the other hand, some companies can sustain competitive advantages so that the average 
long-term economic growth estimate might be again too low.24 We use a ratio to inflate or 
deflate average long-term sales growth by up to 20% based on certain proxies for 
competitive advantage like the relative profit margin, relative P/B ratios and the relative 
average ROE.  
 
The length of the third stage has been fixed at 150 years. This time frame is a valid proxy 
for the theoretical infinite life of a company because our methodology produces in the third 
stage a discount rate that is always higher than the FCFE growth rate. Consequently, the 
present value of the cash flows is approaching zero before the end of the 150 year time 
period. Nevertheless assumes our approach a going concern for all companies over the 
entire three-stage forecast horizon of up to 175 years. This is conventional for this type of 
research as valuation models are generally applied using similar terminal value calculations 
(Penman and Sougiannis, 1998). 
                                                 
23
 The percentages are 10% in the consumer discretionary industry and the healthcare industry, 25% in the 
industrial industry and 0% in the ITT industry. 
24
 The same argument applies to international firms that have the potential to grow at a higher rate than the 
domestic nominal GDP growth rate. 
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4.2.3 The Fundamental Growth Duration 
Notably the growth estimate in a DCF model must not only consider the absolute level of 
growth but also for how long a company can sustain this growth rate. While in praxis the 
duration of the growth phase can be linked to a company’s life cycle and to the competitive 
position within its industry, it is difficult to convert these qualitative estimates into a 
specific time period.  
The measure with which we try to capture the inescapable decline of sales and earnings 
growth in later life cycle stages is the growth duration (also known as competitive 
advantage period (CAP) or value growth duration). The growth duration is not directly 
observable and difficult to estimate. To reduce uncertainty and to reflect the divergence of 
opinion in the stock market, our model uses three different methods to determine the growth 
duration: (1) a relative growth duration approach, (2) an absolute growth duration approach, 
and (3) an economical growth duration approach. The first two growth duration estimates 
are derived from market prices and the third from fundamental variables.  
 
1. Relative growth duration approach 
The relative growth duration approach answers the question of how long the earnings of a 
growth company must grow at the expected higher rate relative to a stock in the stable 
growth phase (usually an index like the S&P 500) to justify its prevailing P/E ratio. Holt 
(1962) shows that if equal risk between a growth stock (g) and an average stock or market 
security (a) is assumed, the differences in P/E ratios can be explained by differential growth 
rates. Assuming though the growth stock and the average stock have similar risk, the market 
should value the two securities in direct proportion to their earnings in year T, where T is 
the time the growth company will begin to grow at the same rate as the average stock. In 
other words, current prices should be in direct proportion to the expected P/E ratio that will 
prevail in year T. This relationship can be stated as 
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duration, a market based estimate of the length of the high growth stage of a company.25  
                                                 
25
 For a detailed derivation of the formula see Reilly and Brown (2003), p. 594-595. 
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2. Absolute growth duration approach 
The obvious choice for a duration measure would be the traditional Macaulay duration 
measure generally used in bond valuation. Unfortunately, for stocks this duration is usually 
much longer than the reasonable growth duration because of the relative higher importance 
of later cash flows in determining stock prices relative to bond prices. The absolute growth 
duration approach described below is based on Pratt (1998) and corrects for the 
shortcomings of the traditional duration method in relation to stocks.  
In the absolute duration approach, we use the current market price of the stock to determine 
when the sum of the expected discounted cash flows equals this price. For this purpose, we 
develop a simplistic two-stage DCF model. Using the forecasted FCFE and FCFE growth 
rates developed in the previous chapter, we calculate the present value of these cash flows 
assuming different lengths for the growth period. We extend the growth period until the 
present value of the cash flows matches the market price of the stock. The number of years 
it takes for the company to grow FCFE at the high growth rate serves as a proxy for the 
growth duration in this approach.  
 
3. Economical growth duration approach 
In the third approach to estimate the growth duration, we use economic factors that indicate 
in what life cycle the firm currently is to find out how long it can be expected to continue 
growing at a higher rate. The economical growth duration approach is conceptually based 
on Porter’s (1980) work on competitive advantage. The approach assumes that the further 
away a company’s economic factors are from the norm (in our case the S&P 500), the more 
time the factors need to approach this norm and the longer the company can grow at a 
higher rate. The economic factors considered in this method are: 
1. Size of the firm: The larger a company, the more difficult it becomes to maintain 
high growth rates. 
2. Current growth rate: While past growth is not a reliable indicator of future growth, 
there is a correlation between current growth and future growth (Damodaran, 2004). 
Thus, a firm growing sales at 30% currently probably has a longer expected growth 
duration than one growing 5% a year. 
3. Barriers to entry and competitive advantages: Ultimately, high growth comes from 
high project returns, which in turn come from barriers to entry and sustainable 
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competitive advantages. A high ROE indicates competitive advantage that justifies a 
longer growth duration.  
4. Growth characteristics: In the stable growth phase, firms should have the 
characteristics of other stable growth firms: 
- P/E and P/B ratios should be comparable to the average 
- beta should be close to one 
- the debt-to-asset ratio of the firm should approach the average 
- depreciation should approximately equal capital expenditure  
- the ratio of sales growth to earnings growth should be close to one 
- the retention ratio should be comparable to the average. 
 
Given the complexity of the task of estimating the number of years a company is expected 
to grow at an exceptional growth rate, it is unlikely that only one estimate is reflected in the 
stock price. The fundamental growth duration estimate included into our model is therefore 
a weighted average of the estimates obtained from the three methods outlined above.26 
Based on findings of Dechow (2001) has the minimum growth duration been fixed at five 
years and the maximum growth duration at 15 years. 
 
4.3 Determining the Denominator: The Fundamental Discount 
Rate 
The fundamental valuation principle states that the value of financial assets is the sum of all 
future cash flows to their owners discounted at their required rate of return. The discount 
rate represents therefore a very important variable in a DCF valuation model determining 
directly how much an asset is worth. Unfortunately, as with the growth duration, the 
discount rate is not observable or estimated by analysts. In this chapter, we will briefly 
review the current methods for determining the discount rate and propose thereafter an own, 
more fundamental method. 
                                                 
26
 The weights were assigned as follows: 30% for the relative growth duration, 40% for the absolute growth 
duration and 30% for the economical growth duration approach. 
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4.3.1 Risk and the Required Rate of Return 
In the academic literature, estimating a firm's cost of equity capital is a very underdeveloped 
concept in relation to valuation models. What we know is that the required rate of return or 
discount rate is a market-driven rate (Pratt, 1998). It represents the expected rate of return 
necessary to induce investors to commit available funds to the subject investment given its 
level of risk (Stowe et al., 2002).27  
Risk is the main concept behind the required rate of return. It is commonly accepted that the 
discount rate for risky assets consists of two parts: a risk-free rate that compensates 
investors for the opportunity of investing in a risk free asset, and a risk premium 
compensating for bearing additional risk (Pratt, 1998). The risk premium should be a 
function of how risk adverse investors are and how risky they perceive the risky asset to be 
relative to a risk free investment (Bodie et al., 2001). The required rate of return is therefore 
mainly a function of perceived risk; it translates the market’s risk preference and perception 
of risk into stock prices. 
 
What we would like to find out in this chapter is how risk, especially the investment risk 
reflected in the discount rate, can be measured in a single number. Unfortunately, 
throughout most of the history of the stock market, it never occurred to anyone to define 
risk with a number. Stocks were risky and some were riskier than others and people let it go 
at that (Bernstein, 1998). Things only changed with the modern portfolio theory (MPT) and 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the 1960’s and the introduction of volatility and 
beta as risk measures. Both concepts assume that investors define risk as the volatility of 
returns. Results from behavioral finance however clearly show that they dislike losses and 
not necessarily volatility (e.g. Kahneman, 1979). This may be explained by the distribution 
of stock returns that is right skewed, meaning that most of the volatility is actually on the 
good side. Consequently, a relevant risk estimate should be based on a downside risk 
measure. Volatility or standard deviation is a very poor risk measure from that view – 
especially for longer investment horizons considered in a DCF model.  
That beta also might not be a good risk measure for the longer term has been shown in 
many recent studies of the CAPM which find that beta is not related to realized returns over 
                                                 
27
 The discount rate reflects not only the opportunity cost for the investor, but at the same time the cost of 
equity capital for the company. It is the rate of return that companies would have to offer in order to attract 
new equity capital from investors (Pratt, 1998). The terms ‘discount rate’, ‘required rate of return’, and ‘cost 
of equity capital’ therefore are used interchangeably. 
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time (e.g. Fama and French, 1992) or ex ante risk premiums (e.g. Gebhardt et al., 2001).     
It is however not the purpose of this chapter to review 30 years of academic discussion on 
the CAPM. For us, it is only important to realize that given these problems, it is unlikely 
that the CAPM is the only model reflected in the discount rate and thus in stock prices.  
 
In recent years the evidence against the CAPM has motivated a search for alternative 
measures of risk and models to determine the discount rate. Fama and French (1993) 
suggest the use of an “empirically inspired” three-factor model in which the CAPM is 
augmented by two additional variables, the book-to-market ratio (B/M) and market 
capitalization. The problem with this kind of approach is the missing link to fundamental 
risk. It’s an adaptation to the facts, the result of extensive data mining. Statistically have 
reverse engineered models the problem that their validity may be non-stationary; because of 
the missing economic logic, the results are valid for the considered historical measurement 
period only. It seems however to be true that size (i.e. market capitalization) and the B/M 
ratio are important determinants of stock returns. We believe however that not size 
determines risk, but that the characteristics of small companies justify a higher risk 
premium. Small companies have for example higher business risk, financial risk, or 
earnings variability. Size is not directly responsible for risk, but indirectly through the 
different underlying risk factors. The same holds true for the B/M ratio: companies with 
high growth and lots of intangible assets and thus low B/M ratios have simply different risk 
characteristics than average stocks. Market capitalization and the B/M ratio can be used as 
proxy variables for risk, but to gain a more detailed understanding of the real risk factors of 
a stock, another approach is needed.  
The theoretical foundation for such an approach to estimate the discount rate originates 
from the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) first presented in Ross (1976). The APT attempts 
to measure the various dimensions of market related risk in terms of several underlying 
economic factors that systematically affect the prices of all stocks (such as the inflation rate, 
GDP growth or the term structure of interest rates). Empirical evidence indicates that the 
APT indeed explains expected returns better than the single factor CAPM (e.g. Chen, 1983; 
Chen, Ross and Roll, 1986; Berry, Burmeister and McElroy, 1988). The practical 
application of the APT is however confronted with immense measurement difficulties 
because the theory neither specifies the relevant risk factors nor their sensitivities.  
In the next chapter, we will present a more fundamental approach based on the concept of 
the APT that corrects for the weaknesses in the application of this theory.  
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4.3.2 The Fundamental Risk Premium  
A reliable estimate of the very value sensitive discount rate is essential in testing our 
fundamental equity valuation model. Prior research however does not provide us with an 
unmistakably superior method to determine the discount rate. 
In the following pages, we propose therefore an alternative method that better reflects the 
process of investors transferring risk into a return requirement. In short, we estimate a 
stock’s risk premium based on company characteristics that indicate fundamental risk. Our 
primary goal is to gain more understanding of the market's perception of the risk variables 
associated with investing in a firm’s stock. If the market tends to consistently assign a 
higher (or lower) risk premium to firms with certain fundamental risk characteristics, these 
characteristics could be used to estimate a market based cost of equity capital measure 
(Gebhardt et al., 2001).  
Our approach consists of identifying all relevant risk factors, measuring the risk inherent in 
each risk factor, assigning a market implied risk premium to the measured risk level of each 
risk factor and aggregating the individual risk premiums to a comprehensive fundamental 
risk premium for the stock. The result of this approach is a market implied discount rate 
based on fundamental risk factors.  
 
This fundamental risk premium approach can be summarized in the following four steps:  
1. Identify relevant risk factors 
2. Measure the risk inherent in each risk factor 
3. Assign a specific risk premium to the risk measured in each risk factor 
4. Aggregate the risk premium from each factor to a risk premium for the stock. 
 
We hope that with this approach, we are better able to replicate the markets process of 
transforming risk into a return requirement than with any of the existing models. In the 
following, each step is explained in greater detail. 
 
Step 1: Identification of relevant risk factors 
First, we have to answer the question of what are the risk factors relevant for the equity risk 
premium. Our opinion is that investors look at variables that indicate lower than expected 
returns. Lower than expected returns come from lower than expected cash flows as in a 
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DCF model this downside potential directly translates into lower prices. Consequently our 
idea of risk is that the greater the downside uncertainty of a firm’s future cash flows and 
thus returns, the greater investors perceive investment risk to be and the higher will be the 
risk premium they require for investing in a stock.  
From this idea follows that in order to replicate investors’ risk pricing behavior, we have 
first to identify factors that show investment risk. Based on fundamental analysis and 
empirical research we find 90 fundamental variables that indicate lower than expected 
returns for investors and are therefore considered risk factors in our fundamental risk 
premium approach.28 We use the following risk factor categories to structure the various 
risk factors: 
1. Business risk factors 
2. Financial risk factors 
3. Profitability risk factors 
4. Operational risk factors 
5. Market risk factors 
6. Valuation risk factors. 
 
Our approach assumes that risk transferred into the discount rate is a function of the risk 
factors in these six risk categories. In the academic literature there is no evidence on the 
optimal set of fundamental risk signals; with 90 risk factors extents our study the risk 
proxies suggested in Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Gode and Mohanram (2001). Although our 
risk factors are typically correlated, each is designed to capture one potential source of 
investment risk. The probable correlation between the factors is therefore intentional as in 
the market multiple risk factors represent multiple risks.  
In the following, each risk category is explained shortly.  
 
1. Business risk factors 
Business risk reflects the incidence of fixed operating costs on the cash flows to investors. It 
reflects the uncertainty of income due largely to two factors: fluctuation in sales and the 
level of a company’s fixed operating costs (Brigham and Gapenski, 2000).  
                                                 
28
 A detailed list of all the individual risk factors and a brief justification is provided in table 1 in the appendix. 
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We separate business risk factors in accounting based risk factors and analyst based risk 
factors. Accounting based risk factors measure the variability of the business as visible from 
the financial statements. Analyst based risk factors are not based on financial statements but 
on financial analysts who use a broader information set. We think that measures like the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors are 
valid proxies for business risk. The more difficult it is for analysts to forecast earnings, the 
more volatile is the business of the company and the higher therefore its business risk. 
 
2. Financial risk factors 
Financial risk reflects the incidence of fixed financing costs on the fluctuation of cash flows 
to investors (Reilly and Brown, 2003). Borrowing also increases the risk of bankruptcy or 
costly restructuring and reduces management flexibility. Financial risk factors include 
leverage ratios, expense ratios and financial exposure ratios.  
Leverage ratios signal how much debt the company is taking on in relation to its size. 
Expense ratios measure the ability to service that debt and financial exposure ratios 
measure, among others, the need of additional financing in the future. 
It is important to note that financial risk is related to other risk categories. A firm’s ability to 
tolerate debt depends mostly on the availability and volatility of future operating cash flows. 
The optimal level of financial risk depends therefore on the company’s level of business 
risk. Our approach is considering this interrelationship explicitly in the aggregation step. 
 
3. Profitability risk factors 
Profitability risk factors are factors than examine the potential of a company to sustain its 
current level of profitability. Lower profitability translates directly into lower cash flows 
and lower than expected returns. The main risk factors affecting the future profitability of 
the company are competition risk and management risk. 
Competition risk is the risk that competitors within the industry or new entrants will erode 
market share and profit margins of a company resulting in lower future cash flows. 
Management risk is the risk of bad management. Wrong management decisions turn 
directly into lower cash flows and therefore represent risk. The importance of management 
increases in a fast changing business environment and the evaluation of management is an 
important part of investors’ assessment of company risk.  
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4. Operational risk factors  
Operational or company risk factors summarize factors affecting the company’s operations. 
They include factors like life cycle risk, product risk and exposure risk.  
Life cycle risk or time horizon risk reflects investors’ desired compensation for the time to 
payouts. Investors require a higher compensation for holding investments with relatively 
longer times to payout as these payments are more uncertain and therefore riskier (Pratt, 
1998). The concept is similar to the concept of duration in bonds; long duration stocks have 
higher life cycle risk than short duration stocks and are therefore considered riskier by the 
market. 
Product risk or technology risk is the risk that a change in the external environment will 
have a negative impact on a company’s products and thus on sales and earnings. Changes in 
demand and technology are the two major determinants of product risk.  
Exposure risk is the risk that a company will run into some kind of trouble due to the nature 
of its operations that require either management attention or the use of funds. 
 
5. Market risk factors 
Lower than expected returns and thus investment risk can not only come from lower than 
expected cash flows but also lower prices caused by market related factors. We identified 
several market risk factors: expectation risk, variability risk, marketability risk and market 
efficiency risk. 
Expectation risk is the risk of a change in the market’s expectations of the company. High 
expectations about future cash flows bear the risk of disappointment when the expectations 
cannot be met for whatever reason. Disappointment turns directly into lower prices and 
lower than expected returns and therefore indicates risk.  
Variability risk considers the human desire for stability. A stock is considered more risky if 
its returns are more unstable than returns of other stocks. Variability is considered costly to 
investors because it can at times result in lower than expected returns requiring 
compensation in form of a higher risk premium.  
Marketability risk or market liquidity risk reflects the ability of investors to convert the 
stock investment quickly into cash with minimum transaction costs. Being able to do so 
results in a higher degree of certainty of realizing the expected return and thus lowers risk. 
Market efficiency risk reflects the risk that a stock price might not reflect all available 
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information and therefore is mispriced. Mispriced securities, especially overvalued stocks, 
bear a higher risk of lower than expected future returns and are thus riskier.  
 
6. Valuation risk factors 
Valuation or estimation risk refers to investors’ uncertainty in estimating future cash flows 
(Lewellen et al., 2000). It should capture how much confidence an investor can put into the 
input factors of a DCF valuation model. All inputs are uncertain and so include the 
probability of error; the higher this probability, the higher is the valuation risk. We consider 
two main sources of valuation risk. First, inputs are considered risky when they divert from 
industry averages and second when they divert from their normal historical range.  
 
The relevant risk factors in the five categories can be considered a stock’s fundamental risk 
because they deal with the intrinsic factors that affect a security’s standard deviation of 
returns over longer time periods. Some might expect a conflict between the market measure 
of risk (systematic risk or beta) and our fundamental risk factors. Studies (e.g. Thompson, 
1976) have shown that a significant relationship exists between systematic and fundamental 
risk. This consistency seems reasonable because in a properly functioning capital market, 
the market measure of risk should reflect the fundamental characteristics of the stock.  
 
Step 2: Measurement of risk inherent in each risk factor 
After having identified the relevant risk factors, the risk inherent in each factor needs to be 
measured. We measure risk relative to the average of the industry: a risk factor above 
(below) the average reflects more (less) risk. Gebhardt et al. (2001) find a wide range of risk 
among different industries at a point in time but the results of the analysis of risk stability 
within the industries are positive. This indicates that risk measurement must be done 
industry specific and that historical risk analysis is useful when estimating future risk within 
an industry. In our approach, we will therefore measure whether a stock is fundamentally 
riskier or less risky than the average stock in its industry.  
Problematic is the measurement of the risk inherent in the risk factors mainly because the 
various risk factors involve different sets of natural units and ranges. Furthermore does the 
need for aggregation in the fourth step require a standardization of all risk factors and the 
measurement relative to industry averages requires rescaling. A method standardizing and at 
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the same time rescaling factors is proposed in Grinold and Kahn (1994). We use their 
method to measure risk inherent in each risk factor: )(
)(
raw
rawraw
norm XSTDEV
XMEANXX −= , where 
xraw is the original value for the risk factor and xnorm is the standardized and rescaled value 
of the risk factor.29  
The result of this procedure is that each risk factor has a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. In this way, results are also easy to interpret: as an example, a size 
exposure of 0.8 indicates below average size and therefore above average risk, while an 
exposure of -0.5 signals above average size exposure and thus below average risk.  
This standardization procedure also facilitates the detection and handling of outliers that 
could distort the risk level measurement. We furthermore winsorize the inputs to the risk 
factors at the top and bottom 5% of observations. This allows enough room for reflecting 
differences in relative risk while at the same time not significantly distorting the whole 
measurement process because of a few large outliers.  
 
Step 3: Assignment of a specific risk premium to the risk measured in each risk factor  
After coming up with a measure for risk, we are faced with an even more difficult problem: 
the assignment of a risk premium to the measured risk level of each risk factor. We have to 
keep in mind that the discount rate is a market-based rate and that we must consequently use 
market data to link the fundamental risk level to a risk premium. In recent years, studies 
have used different versions of discounted cash flow models to infer the ex ante cost of 
capital from stock prices (e.g. Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 
2001; Lee, Ng and Swaminathan, 2003). Based on our previous discussion of the relative 
attractiveness of different DCF valuation models, we suggest the use of a risk premium 
implied from a comprehensive application oriented DFCF valuation model. Given the 
market price of the stock and forecasts of future free cash flows provides this method a 
market implied and thus forward looking ex ante estimate of the otherwise unobservable 
risk premium for the stock.  
                                                 
29
 We believe that this method is superior to the methodology of e.g. Piotroski (2000) who measures each 
factor as being either “good” or “bad” depending on its implication for risk. This qualitative measurement is 
less informative than our quantitative measure and information relevant to the risk level is lost. Our procedure 
allows stating whether the measure is good or bad and also how much better or worse than the average. We 
believe that this additional differentiation is important in a fundamental approach to risk. 
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The level of fundamental risk inherent in each risk factor can then be linked to this risk 
premium by using a multiple linear regression model (OLS regression). In our approach, we 
regress the risk inherent in each risk factor for each risk category to the market implied risk 
premium obtained from our DFCF model and use the coefficients from the regression to 
calculate a theoretical risk premium for each risk factor in the risk category.  
 
Step 4: Aggregation of the risk premium from each factor to a risk premium for the 
stock 
The last step consists of the aggregation of the individual risk premia the market assigns to 
each risk factor to a comprehensive fundamental risk premium for the stock.  
An important point in this aggregation process is the weighting of each risk factor. Our 
approach of linking a market implied risk premium to each risk factor within a risk category 
using multiple regression statistics solves this problem automatically. The risk factors that 
have the strongest relationship with the risk premium will also have the highest regression 
coefficients and thus the highest risk premium values. To calculate the risk premium for 
each risk category we thus can simply add the risk premiums of each factor within the 
category together. 
Our approach does however not solve the problem which risk category is the most relevant 
for investors. This is a difficult problem as the weighting is mostly circumstantial. For 
example, financial risk is more important for a stock with high business risk or is valuation 
risk more important for stocks with high market risk. In absence of a reliable indicator, we 
assume that on average the categories are more or less equally important and assigned the 
weights as follows: business risk 25%, financial risk 20%, profitability risk 15%, 
operational risk 15%, market risk 15%, and valuation risk 10%. 
The discount rate estimate of the fundamental risk premium approach is then calculated as 
the weighted average of the risk premium from each category and by adding the nominal 
risk free rate (yield on the 20 year US Treasury bond) to this risk premium.  
 
The fundamental risk premium approach is a cross-sectional microeconomic multifactor 
model that measures risk relative to industry averages and that recognizes that the 
relationships between different risk factors and the risk premium are not stable over time. 
Recalculating the coefficients of the regression annually is hence more a market based 
adaptation to the new investment environment rather than a sign of instability of the results. 
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The model is designed to give a better sense of how the risk exposure of stocks differs and 
therefore helps in identifying the underlying sources of investment risk for each stock. Its 
main use however is that it can provide us with a market implied estimate of the discount 
rate that can be used in a DCF valuation model. 
 
4.3.3 The Fundamental Discount Rate 
Our behavioral approach advises against relying too heavily on one approach to estimate 
uncertain input factors to a DCF valuation model. Consequently, for the application in our 
FEV model we use a weighted average of the following methods to estimate the discount 
rate: 
1. CAPM 
2. Fundamental method 
3. Fundamental risk premium 
4. Market implied discount rate 
5. Economic method. 
 
The CAPM is the most widely accepted method of estimating the cost of equity capital and 
can therefore not be ignored in a valuation model no matter whether it actually works or 
not. We use as inputs to the CAPM, as recommended in the literature (e.g. Stowe, 2002), 
the yield on the 20-year Treasury bond for the risk free rate. For the equity risk premium, 
we use an average of the arithmetic and geometric average of realized stock returns from 
1927 to 2002 and for beta the estimate obtained from Research Insight. When such betas 
were not available we calculated them using 60 monthly returns. We furthermore adjust the 
historical betas using the smoothing technique suggested by Blume (1975): historical betas 
in the high growth phase are adjusted 1/3 towards one, while the stable growth betas are 
adjusted by 50% in the same direction. This procedure corrects for the tendency of future 
betas to move towards the mean value of one. 
The fundamental method is a conceptual mix of the CAPM and the Fama and French three-
factor model (Fama and French, 1993). It is a ‘build-up’ or ‘bottom up’ model as 
conceptually outlined in Pratt (1998). The fundamental method attempts to correct the 
CAPM for some of its problems documented in the literature. We accept the conceptual 
structure of the CAPM but build a more fundamental beta using the three factors identified 
in Fama and French (1993) (beta, market capitalization and the B/M ratio) and in addition to 
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that the P/E ratio to measure expectation risk and the debt-to-asset ratio as a measure of 
financial risk. The higher, or lower respectively, each of these five factors is compared to 
the average of all stocks, the higher is the stock’s fundamental beta. By multiplying this 
fundamental beta with the CAPM estimate of the risk premium and adding the nominal long 
term risk free rate, we obtain a measure for the discount rate. 
The fundamental risk premium approach is explained in detail in the previous chapter.  
In recognition of the findings of e.g. Gebhardt et al. (2001) that the most direct approach to 
estimate a market determined discount rate is to infer it from market prices, we use the 
market implied discount rate as well. To avoid circular reasoning, we are not considering 
the discount rate implied in the current stock price but rather the average of the market 
implied risk premium of the past four years and a regression forecast based on that data. 
The historic market implied risk premia have been determined using our FEV model. 
In addition to the ex ante methods, we use also a so called economic method. This method is 
based on a rearrangement of the sustainable growth rate equation proposed in Damodaran 
(2004): g = ROE * RR, where the return on equity (ROE) over the long term is assumed to 
be a proxy for the long term cost of equity capital and RR is the retention rate. Replacing 
ROE with cost of capital and solving for it in the above equation yields: cost of equity 
capital = g / RR. The higher the growth rate and the lower the retention rate, the higher the 
risk and thus the cost of equity capital. 
 
The fundamental discount rate used in our FEV model is a weighted average of the discount 
rate estimates obtained from the five methods above.30 
                                                 
30
 The weights are assigned as follows: CAPM 25%, fundamental method 25%, fundamental risk premium 
25%, market implied discount rate 20% and economic method 5%. 
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PART III: EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
EQUITY VALUATION MODEL 
“It might work in practice, but it will never work in theory.” 
Ewa A. Froidevaux, 2003 
 
This final part of the dissertation brings everything written before together. We will 
empirically test the Fundamental Equity Valuation Model (FEVM) developed in the 
preceding parts. The inputs to the model are determined in the way outlined in part two: the 
fundamental growth rate, the fundamental growth duration and the fundamental discount 
rate. After presenting the results, the implications and findings are discussed, limitations 
evaluated and future research suggested.  
 
5. Test of the Fundamental Equity Valuation 
Model 
The DCF valuation model is the conceptually best valuation model. In this chapter, we will 
test whether it is also practically rewarding. The ultimate goal of every valuation model is to 
find mispriced stocks and to make an economic profit based on the findings – our FEV 
model is not different. 
 
5.1 Previous Research 
Practical tests of DCF valuation models are rare in the empirical academic literature. A 
simple study of the dividend discount model was conducted by Sorensen and Williamson 
(1985) who valued 150 stocks from the S&P 400 in December 1980. They use the 
difference between the market price and the intrinsic value obtained from the model to form 
five portfolios based upon the degree of under- and overvaluation. They make fairly broad 
assumptions by testing the dividend discount model: (a) the average of the earnings per 
share between 1976 and 1980 is used as the sustainable earnings per share, (b) the cost of 
equity is estimated using the CAPM, (c) the extraordinary growth period is assumed to be 
five years for all stocks, (d) the I/B/E/S consensus forecasts of earnings growth is used as 
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the growth rate for this period, (e) the stable growth rate is assumed to be 8% for all stocks, 
and (f) the payout ratio is assumed to be 45% for all stocks.  
The returns of these five portfolios are calculated for the following two years (January 
1981-January 1983) and excess returns are measured relative to the S&P 500 index. 
Nevertheless the crude assumptions produces the undervalued portfolio a positive 
annualized abnormal return of 16%, while the overvalued portfolio has a negative abnormal 
return of -15%. Sorensen et al. also test whether the investment performance could be 
increased by using more sophisticated models and test therefore one-, two-, and three-stage 
dividend discount models. They conclude that model performance improves as model 
sophistication increases. 
In another study, Haugen (1997) reports on the results of a fund that used the DDM to 
analyze 250 large capitalization US firms from 1979 to 1991 and to classify them into five 
quintiles. The valuation was done by six analysts who estimated an extraordinary growth 
rate for the initial high growth phase, the length of the high growth phase and a transitional 
phase for each of the firms. They find that the undervalued portfolio earned significantly 
higher returns (22.2% p.a.) than the overvalued portfolio (13.75% p.a.) and the S&P 500 
(16.8% p.a.).  
Skantz and Marcheini (1992) use a DCF model to value liquidating firms where the cash 
flows and growth patterns are known. They conclude that the market appears to value 
stocks by discounting expected cash flows using a risk-adjusted required rate of return. The 
uniqueness of their sample however makes a generalization to going concern companies 
difficult. 
Frankel and Lee (1998) test the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) operationalized 
with analysts’ earnings forecasts. They find that the model predicts abnormal returns over 
one-, two, and three-year holding periods. Specifically, a portfolio constructed by taking a 
long position in the most undervalued quintile of firms and a short position in firms in the 
most overvalued quintile produces cumulative returns of 3.1%, 15.2%, and 30.6%, over 
one-, two-, and three-year holding periods. Herzberg (1998) shows that the Frankel and Lee 
results can be improved further by using more refined model estimation procedures. 
Bradshaw (2000) and Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) confirm these results.  
In a similar study Frankel and Lee (1999) find that the residual income model applied 
internationally produces abnormal returns in a cross-country investment strategy. 
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Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) implement the RIM using a number of different time-
series models for predicting future ROEs, as opposed to analyst based forecasts in Frankel 
and Lee (1998). Despite this fact, they still find that under- (over-)valued stocks as 
identified by the model earn higher (lower) future returns, particularly over horizons of 3 to 
5 years. 
In different variations describe Chang, Chen, and Dong (1999) and Lee, Myers and 
Swaminathan (1999) also profitable trading strategies based on comparing stock prices to 
intrinsic values from residual income models. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
In the tradition of fundamental analysis, we test in our study whether observed stock prices 
tend to revert towards the intrinsic values predicted by our DCF model. This test assumes 
the possibility of temporary stock mispricing that can be systematically predicted and 
exploited by a comprehensive application oriented valuation model. We test our 
fundamental equity valuation model (FEVM) described in the previous part of this 
dissertation. Conceptually, the model looks as follows: 
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V0 = Value of the stock in t=0 
FCFE1 = Free cash flow to equity in year 1 
FCFE2 = Free cash flow to equity in year 2 
FCFEt = Free cash flow to equity in year t 
k1 = Discount rate in stage 1 
kt = Discount rates in stage 2 
kT = Discount rate in stage 3 
n = Year ending stage 1 
N= Year ending stage 2; (N-n) is the length of stage 2 
M = Year ending stage 3; (M-N) is the length of stage 3 
 
Even though a DCF valuation model is the theoretically correct method for valuing stocks, 
it is difficult to apply in practice because the input factors are difficult to forecast and very 
sensitive - small changes in certain inputs lead to great differences in intrinsic values. 
Consequently is any test of a DCF valuation model a joint test of the model and of the 
quality of the numerous input factors that go into the model. For this reason at least two 
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possible sources of errors exist in testing the model: model uncertainty and input 
uncertainty.  
Model uncertainty refers to the degree of simplification in the empirical implementation 
process of an application oriented valuation model. We try to reduce model uncertainty with 
the comprehensive and fundamental model construction. Since a spreadsheet is a convenient 
way to implement complex but flexible models, we use the spreadsheet modeling technique 
as the base of our model construction. Spreadsheets allow the building of complicated and 
interrelated models that would be very difficult to describe using standard programming 
research practices. 
Input uncertainty refers to the quality of the input factors that go into a valuation model. In 
our model, three input factors are highly sensitive and therefore important: (1) earnings per 
share forecasts, (2) earnings growth rates, and (3) the discount rate. Our approach to deal 
with input uncertainty is to test the model using different input specifications in the same 
valuation model. The performance of the different input specifications will then show which 
inputs best reflect market expectations and should be used in valuation studies. We will test 
the model with the following ten input specifications: 
1. As entered: leaves all the fundamental input factors unchanged and values the 
stock “as is”; 
2. Best estimate: the fundamental inputs are adjusted manually to reflect economic 
logic better and to correct for outliers caused by mergers and other extraordinary 
circumstances; 
3. Analysts only: considers only analysts’ forecasts as valid inputs, the other 
earnings and earnings growth rate estimates are ignored; 
4. Excluding analysts: considers all fundamental estimates as valid and analysts’ 
forecasts are ignored; 
5. FRP only: uses in the denominator only the approach of the fundamental risk 
premium (FRP) and in the nominator the ‘Best estimate’ input specification; 
6. IDR only: uses in the denominator only the approach of the market implied 
discount rate (IDR) and in the nominator the ‘Best estimate’ input specification; 
7. CAPM only: uses in the denominator only the CAPM and in the nominator the 
‘Best estimate’ input specification; 
8. Foresight only: uses in the nominator the actually realized earnings and earnings 
growth rates over the next five years following portfolio formation; 
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9. Earnings methods: considers instead of FCFE earnings as the relevant cash flow 
to discount. Three different earnings specifications are tested using in the 
nominator either analyst forecasts or ‘Best estimate’ forecasts and in the 
denominator either the CAPM or the ‘Best estimate’ discount rate;31 
10. Mix: calculates intrinsic values as the average of the intrinsic value estimates 
obtained from the previous nine methods. 
 
The different input specifications of the model provide insight into the two possible sources 
of valuation errors (model uncertainty and input uncertainty) and furthermore help to 
examine the stability of the DCF valuation methodology. 
 
Sample Selection and Description 
We test the FEV model in the ten years from 1993 to 2002 in the four main economic 
sectors in the US: healthcare, industrial goods and services, consumer discretionary, and the 
information technology and telecommunication (ITT) industry. In each case, the first fourty 
companies in the Compustat database of Research Insight with their fiscal year ending in 
December and without any missing input data, including earnings estimates from I/B/E/S, 
for the years 1987 to 2002 have been selected and included into the sample.  
The healthcare and industrial goods industries have been selected for their relative stability 
of earnings and earnings growth, while the ITT industry has been selected to test whether 
the model can detect mispricing in a very dynamic industry that is usually not valued with 
an absolute valuation model. The test of consumer discretionary stocks examines whether 
the model is able to deal with a certain degree of economic cyclicality.  
We choose the US stock market because it is generally perceived to be the most efficiently 
priced market in the world. A successful test of a valuation model in this market would 
indicate that it should work in other markets as well. 
 
The sample selection yields a total of 1600 companies in the four industries over the ten 
years from 1993 to 2002. Some companies later have been excluded from the sample 
                                                 
31
 The three earnings specifications are: (1) EARBEANA which uses in the nominator only analyst earnings 
forecasts and in the denominator the estimate from the ‘Best estimate’ input specification; (2) EARCAANA 
uses analyst earnings forecasts in the nominator and the CAPM to estimate the discount rate; (3) 
EARCABEST uses the ‘Best estimate’ earnings estimates in the nominator and the CAPM in the denominator. 
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because of either missing data or different kinds of logical errors caused by mathematical 
calculation problems that made it impossible to derive an intrinsic value estimate. 
Especially in the ITT industry many companies had to be excluded because the valuation 
yielded implausible values.  
Descriptive statistics in relation to the sample (table 3) and the industry sub-samples (tables 
4-7) are provided in the appendix. It is to notice that the average market capitalization of the 
sample over the testing period is $15.9 billion with a median value of $4.3 billion. Both 
measures indicate that we are valuing on average large stocks. Companies are relatively 
larger in the industrial and ITT industries and smaller in the healthcare and the consumer 
discretionary industries. The betas of our sample companies average about 1 showing that 
we are valuing a representative sample for the overall market in terms of systematic risk. 
P/B values and trailing P/E ratios are generally lower than those of the market, probably 
because we are valuing larger and more stable companies. 
 
Methodology 
Two steps are necessary to test the validity of our FEV model. First, intrinsic values have to 
be estimated using the model and second, investment strategies have to be defined based on 
the intrinsic values found.  
In the first step, intrinsic values are estimated using the ten different input specifications of 
the model outlined earlier. We thus test the accuracy of the inputs not by comparing them 
against each other or the realized numbers. In our opinion, the real test of the quality of an 
input factor to a valuation model is not its accuracy compared to the at the time unknowable 
realized number but whether it produces a valid intrinsic value estimate of the stock. Valid 
intrinsic value estimates are estimates that either explain or predict abnormal returns in the 
stock market. It is however likely that the most accurate forecasts also are the most value 
relevant input factors. 
In order to reduce subjectivity in the ‘Best estimate’ specification where manual 
adjustments to the calculated input factors are permitted, a set of rules for these adjustments 
is developed:  
1. The name of the company is hidden from the spreadsheet to avoid human 
tendency to subconsciously use future knowledge about the company in the 
adjustment process; 
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2. Changes in the earnings and sales growth rates are only allowed to bring the net 
profit margin in line with either the arithmetic average growth rate of the past 5 
years or a regression estimate based on this data, or to filter out distortions from 
mergers and acquisitions; 
3. Changes in capital expenditure and depreciation are only allowed to bring the 
ratio of capital expenditure to depreciation in line with normalized historical 
averages or a regression forecast; 
4. Changes in the degree of share dilution can only be made to correct for merger 
and acquisition distortions in the data; 
5. Discount rates can only be changed to correct for unrealistically high or low 
estimates; no discount rate is lower than 7% or higher than 20% for any of the 
companies to avoid moving too far away from historical averages. 
 
After having determined the intrinsic values of the stocks in the sample, we must in a 
second step judge the quality of these estimates. The quality is best measured by using them 
in an investment strategy.  
We suggest an investment strategy where the market price as of the end of June32 is 
compared to the intrinsic values estimates obtained from the FEV model and investment 
decisions are made mechanically based on the following simple rule: in case the intrinsic 
value is within plus or minus 10% of the market price, the stock is assigned a ‘Hold’ 
because the model signals that it is approximately fairly valued and to include a ‘margin of 
safety’33 into the valuation. A stock with an intrinsic value above 10% of the market price is 
rated a ‘Buy’ and below 10% a ‘Sell’ because the model indicates either a clear over- or 
undervaluation. The ranked stocks are then assigned to one of three portfolios according to 
their Buy, Hold and Sell recommendation. The portfolios are held for a period of six months 
in a first test, one year in a second test, and three years in a third test. The different holding 
periods are used to study the speed of the potential price adjustment process in the market 
over time. 
 
                                                 
32
 This month has been chosen to ensure that the most recent financial statements were publicly available at 
the time of the valuation. Although long after the end of the fiscal year, the lag is conventional for this type of 
research. 
33 According to Graham the margin of safety is “that of rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the 
future” (Graham, 1973). 
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This trading strategy is requiring a higher degree of precision from the model than generally 
used research practices in that subject examining quintiles of mispricing (e.g. Frankel and 
Lee, 1998). In our methodology, we explicitly decide whether a stock is a Buy, Hold or Sell 
candidate by comparing the intrinsic value with the market price. We demand thus from the 
model not only a relative rank based on the degree of mispricing but a concrete investment 
recommendation based on the absolute degree of mispricing. 
We expect the stocks rated Buy to outperform the stocks rated Hold and the stocks rated 
Hold to outperform the Sell-rated stocks over the various holding periods. We also expect 
most of the mispricing, in case we find any, to correct over the one year holding period. 
Based on prior research (e.g. Frankel and Lee, 1998) we however expect some mispricing to 
persist over the three year holding period. We furthermore expect Buys (the stocks rated 
buy) to have positive excess returns,34 Holds (the stocks rated hold) should have excess 
returns around zero and Sells (the stocks rated sell) should have negative excess returns. 
 
Theoretically, the discounted cash flow valuation model can be used to value all stocks. In 
our opinion it is however not adequate to invest indifferently in all stocks the model defines 
as under- or overvalued. Graham (Graham and Dodd, 1934) defined an investment as 
follows: “an investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis promises safety of 
principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are 
speculative.” In respect to this definition, we differentiate in our methodology investment 
from speculation. Stocks that are determined to be ‘Safe’ are considered investments and 
are included into our main testing sample. Stocks named ‘Speculative’ are excluded. The 
differentiation between ‘Safe’ and ‘Speculative’ stocks is based on the sensitivity of the 
intrinsic value estimate on small changes in the major input variables (earnings growth, 
sales growth and net capital expenditure). ‘Speculative’ stocks are stocks in which a small 
change in one of these variables would change the investment recommendation or where the 
reliability of the input data could not be verified by historical relationships.35  Stocks that 
could not be valued because either the intrinsic value was not meaningful or data was 
missing were excluded completely from the analysis.  
 
                                                 
34
 Excess returns are defined as the returns above or below the returns of all stocks in the sample. 
35
 Table 15 and 21 in the appendix present the results of a trading strategy where both the ‘Safe’ and 
‘Speculative’ stocks are included into the portfolios. They are not significantly different from the results of the 
‘Safe’ stocks alone. 
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Data Selection and Measurement 
Three main input factors have to be estimated to test our FEV model: (1) the cash flow to 
discount, (2) the cash flow growth rate, and (3) the discount rate. The data used as well as 
the measurement of each of these input factors is explained below.  
 
1. The cash flow to discount 
As explained earlier is the cash available to shareholders or free cash flow to equity (FCFE) 
the most correct measure of cash flow to use in the nominator of a discounted cash flow 
valuation model. We calculated FCFE in the following way: 
Sustainable net income 
+/- Change in working capital * (1-debt financing proportion of working capital) 
+ Depreciation & amortization * (1-debt financing proportion of depreciation  
    & amortization)  
- Capital expenditures * (1-debt financing proportion of capital expenditures) 
= Free Cash Flow to Equity 
 
As discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.2, we use an average of the pro forma earnings, 
last year’s earnings per share and last year’s operating earnings per share as our measure for 
sustainable net income. We believe that an average of these measures represents best the 
ongoing performance of the company priced by investors into stock prices. The debt 
financing proportion of capital expenditure and depreciation and amortization is proxied by 
the average debt-to-asset ratio and the debt financing proportion of working capital by the 
average current ratio of the past 5 years.  
All financial data is obtained from Compustat in Research Insight and pro forma earnings 
are obtained from I/B/E/S. 
 
2. The growth rate of FCFE 
We differentiate in our model three stages of growth and consequently need growth rate 
forecasts for the initial high growth stage, the transition stage and the long term growth 
stage.  
In the first stage, we base the growth rate of earnings on the fundamental growth rate (FGR) 
approach developed in chapter 4.2. The FGR is an average of six different earnings growth 
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rate estimates: (1) the analyst’s consensus earnings growth rate, (2) a simple mechanical 
forecasting model estimate, (3) a comprehensive mechanical forecasting model estimate,  
(4) the sustainable growth rate, (5) an estimate based on profit margins, and (6) an own 
estimate. 
The other components of FCFE are estimated based on the several casual forecasting 
techniques making assumptions about the economic relationships between sales, working 
capital, capital expenditure and depreciation also outlined in chapter 4.2. 
In order to avoid applying the growth rates to an extraordinary base year, the model 
normalizes current input data like working capital, capital expenditure and depreciation. 
Base working capital is recalculated based on the same ratio of working capital to sales later 
used in the high growth phase. Base capital expenditure and depreciation are adjusted by a 
linear regression to reflect more normalized values on which to apply estimated growth 
rates. 
In the transition stage, the first stage growth rates are faded through linear interpolation to 
the stable growth rate in stage three of the model. The third stage growth rate is determined 
by the long-term average nominal GDP growth and the average historical net profit growth 
rate in the US economy.  
 
The relevant input factors are obtained from Research Insight (historical financial data), 
I/B/E/S (consensus EPS forecasts and long-term earnings growth forecasts) and the bureau 
of economic activity (estimates for the long-term growth rate of earnings). 
 
3. The discount rate 
The discount rate is estimated using the approach of the fundamental discount rate (FDR) 
outlined in chapter 4.3. The FDR is a mix of five different discount rate estimates: (1) the 
CAPM, (2) a fundamental method, (3) the fundamental risk premium approach, (4) the 
market implied discount rate, and (5) an economic method. 
Theoretically, each cash flow should be discounted at a different discount rate as the risk 
free rate and the risk premium are likely to change over time. We however do not believe 
that it is necessary to assign a different risk premium to each annual cash flow separately. 
The main reason is that implicit in a constant discount rate is already included a larger 
deduction for risk from later cash flows because the discount rate compensates for the risk 
borne per period (Brealey and Myers, 2000). The more distant the cash flows, the greater 
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the number of periods and the larger the total risk adjustment of the later cash flows.36 A 
change in the discount rate is only warranted when the underlying investment risk of the 
company changes significantly. We identified three such instances: the three main life-cycle 
stages of each company. Consequently, we are using three different discount rates reflecting 
the different risk levels in the three life cycle stages. In particular, we adjust in the methods 
using either market or fundamental betas, the beta towards one as suggested in Blume 
(1975) and adjust the risk free rate and the risk premium to better align the long-term 
discount rate forecasts with historical averages.  
 
The various relevant input factors needed to determine the FDR are obtained from Research 
Insight (historical financial data), I/B/E/S (consensus EPS forecasts and pro forma 
earnings), the bureau of economic activity (estimates for the long-term earnings and sales 
growth rate) and Ibbotson Associates (risk free rate averages, market risk premium 
estimates and data related to the S&P 500 index). 
 
5.3 Empirical Results 
Before presenting the results of our fundamental equity valuation model test, we would like 
to highlight the fact that all inputs to the model are estimated based solely on historical data. 
All information included into our model was publicly available at the time of the valuation.  
We present first the results of the different input specifications, followed by more detailed 
results for the three main input specifications, and the results in the different industries. 
 
5.3.1 Input Specification Results 
As discussed earlier, to test whether our valuation model is valid or not we must separate 
the effect of model uncertainty from input uncertainty. To solve this problem, we proposed 
a test of the model using different input specifications. In the following, the excess returns 
of a hedging strategy buying the top ten ‘Buy’ stocks and selling short the top ten ‘Sell’ 
stocks identified by each input specification in each year and for three different holding 
                                                 
36
 Technically, the increased risk of later cash flow is reflected in steadily declining certainty equivalents. For 
a discussion of certainty equivalents see Brealey and Myers (2000), p. 243. 
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periods are presented. RANK indicates the ranking of the input specification of the model in 
generating abnormal returns. 
 
Table 5.1: Average returns; Different input specifications; Buy-Sell; All industries; Top 10; 1994-
2002 37 
 
BUY-SELL
Results 94-02 6 MONTHS Results 94-02 1 YEAR Results 94-00 3 YEARS
RANK STDEV Avg Return RANK STDEV Avg Return RANK STDEV Avg Return
2 BEST ESTIMATE 17.64% 24.86% 3 BEST ESTIMATE 13.16% 24.34% 2 BEST ESTIMATE 7.26% 13.94%
9 AS ENTERED 18.45% 12.29% 9 AS ENTERED 14.23% 12.95% 9 AS ENTERED 6.18% 6.87%
6 ANALYSTS ONLY 17.80% 21.56% 4 ANALYSTS ONLY 14.10% 23.94% 6 ANALYSTS ONLY 9.51% 10.71%
12 EXCL. ANALYSTS 15.28% -3.64% 12 EXCL. ANALYSTS 10.11% -4.21% 12 EXCL. ANALYSTS 2.84% -4.87%
10 FRP 12.91% 11.29% 10 FRP 15.00% 9.92% 10 FRP 4.36% 1.75%
11 IDR 13.04% 4.58% 11 IDR 17.63% 4.26% 11 IDR 10.24% -1.25%
3 CAPM 18.15% 24.47% 6 CAPM 14.47% 23.47% 8 CAPM 7.34% 10.13%
1 FSIGHT 10.88% 26.96% 8 FSIGHT 9.22% 20.74% 1 FSIGHT 7.36% 16.59%
5 EARBEANA 16.32% 22.41% 2 EARBEANA 13.25% 25.55% 3 EARBEANA 8.49% 13.15%
8 EARCAANA 20.04% 16.85% 5 EARCAANA 15.23% 23.49% 5 EARCAANA 9.12% 11.14%
7 EARCABEST 19.82% 20.28% 1 EARCABEST 15.97% 25.98% 4 EARCABEST 9.76% 11.43%
4 MIX 15.82% 23.72% 7 MIX 12.82% 23.05% 7 MIX 9.92% 10.33%
Average 0.00% 0.00% Average 0.00% 0.00% Average 0.00% 0.00%
 
 
In the above table can be seen that all specifications with the exception of ‘Excluding 
analysts’ show positive excess hedge returns over the ten year testing period. This and that 
‘Foresight’ performs best over the 6 months and the 3 year investment horizon indicates that 
the model is valid and that input uncertainty appears to be the main reason for performance 
differences. The fact that the only specification not showing positive excess returns over the 
testing period uses unadjusted and purely backward looking inputs demonstrates 
furthermore that the model is even rather insensitive to mistakes in the input factors - 
remotely correct inputs produce investment returns. 
 
By looking in more detail at the results of the different input specifications, we find that 
over the one year holding period earnings seem to be more value relevant than cash flows. 
Two out of the three earnings based measures beat the cash flow measures in relation to 
their relative investment performance. The ‘Best estimate’ specification follows closely on 
the third place with only 1.2% less annual return; ‘Analysts only’ performs not much worse 
on the fourth place. Additional human input like in the ‘Best estimate’ specification does 
therefore not seem to improve model performance in a significant way. 
                                                 
37
 The results for all input specifications are for the years 1994 to 2002 because not all specifications produced 
a result in 1993 due to missing data. To make the results comparable, we choose 1994 as the starting year for 
our investment strategy. The results of the 3 year holding period are from 1994 to 2000 as no later realized 3 
year returns are available. For the same reason are the results for the ‘Foresight’ specification requiring 5 year 
ahead data only from 1994 to 1998. 
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The CAPM input specification worked well in the short term (up to 1 year). One possible 
explanation for this fact might be that the CAPM is widely used by financial professionals 
(Welch, 2000) so that it is reflected at least temporarily in stock prices no matter whether it 
actually works or not. The other discount rate approaches (IDR and FRP) did not produce 
satisfactory investment returns. That the IDR approach does not work well indicates that 
past information about the discount rate is not particularly helpful in estimating future 
discount rates. The FRP approach works only slightly better because it is based on the IDR 
approach and therefore strongly correlates with it.  
 
The ranking of the input specifications is rather robust over the different holding periods. 
‘Foresight’ works best over the short and long term but surprisingly not over the one year 
holding period. The ‘Best estimate’ specification appears to be most reliable with ranks of 2 
over six months, 3 over one year and again 2 over three years. It might consequently be best 
suited for an investment strategy, even though it never produced the highest returns. In the 
following, we focus therefore on the results of this specification test.  
 
5.3.2 Portfolio Strategy Results 
The validity of the model becomes even more evident when comparing the individual 
portfolio excess returns. From the following graphs can be seen that the model ranks the 
valued stocks correctly: the stocks rated Buy outperform those rated Hold, and Hold stocks 
outperform Sell stocks. A clear step formation appears in every holding period. 
 
Over the 6 months holding period (figure 5.2) the stocks the model identified as a Buy have 
positive excess returns of 9.37%, Hold stocks produce excess returns around zero (-1.38%) 
and Sell stocks have negative excess returns of -12.52%. All returns are annualized. 
Over the one year holding period (figure 5.3) the results are similar: Buy stocks returned 
27.6% annually while the Sell stocks returned only 6.3% and the Holds 18%. Just as 
expected are thus the excess returns for Buy stocks again positive (8.11%), Holds have 
excess returns around zero (-1.44%) and Sells have negative excess returns (-13.2%). That 
the absolute Buy excess returns are smaller than the absolute Sell excess returns indicates 
that the model is better able to identify stocks to sell than stocks to buy. We explain this fact 
by a higher degree of market inefficiency in relation to overvalued stocks. The institutional 
money management industry is still more focused on finding undervalued stocks and gives 
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more buy recommendation than sell recommendations (Barber et al., 2001). The only 
slightly negative excess returns of stocks rated Hold show that the model identifies 
successfully which stocks not to buy or sell. 
 
Figure 5.2: Returns and excess returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 6 month holding 
period 
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Figure 5.3: Returns and excess returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding 
period 
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Like documented in prior research generates a strategy based on a DCF valuation model 
excess returns over extended periods of time. Our model is able to distinguish between 
future winners and losers in the stock market over a period of three years (figure 5.4). This 
shows that the market needs more than three years to correct the pricing mistakes detected 
by the model. In opposition to Frankel and Lee (1998) we find however that the mispricing 
effect diminishes over time; annualized excess returns over the short and medium holding 
periods are larger than over the three year investment horizon. 
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Figure 5.4: Returns and excess returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 3 year holding 
period 
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Given the return differences over the various holding periods and considering transaction 
costs and reinvestment uncertainty, it appears that the optimal holding period for stocks 
selected with a DCF valuation model is the 1 year holding period. Although rebalancing 
after 6 months produces the highest absolute returns, these returns are annualized and to 
actually realize them, investors needed to assume that the reinvestment in the second half of 
the year would produce the same rate of return. It would also be necessary to deduct more 
transaction costs. Rebalancing the portfolios only every three years reduces these 
transaction costs but at the cost of much lower annual returns.  
 
The return differences between the various holding periods can be seen more clearly in 
figure 5.5. As discussed above, the absolute annualized returns for all portfolios are 
decreasing from the 6 month investment horizon to the 1 and 3 year horizons. The 
mispricing is thus correcting over time. The results also show again that the model correctly 
identifies what stocks to buy, hold and sell.  
 
Figure 5.5: Holding period returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002 
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The differences in returns of the three portfolios for each holding period are statistically 
highly significant using a t-test assuming two-sample equal variances. This type of t-test 
examines whether the means of two data sets are equal. The p-values associated with this   
t-test for Buy vs. Hold, Buy vs. Sell and Hold vs. Sell stocks are all significant at more than 
the 1% level of statistical significance over all holding periods (table 27 in the appendix).  
 
In order to be useful, the model should also show some stability in the individual annual 
returns. Examining the results of each year separately in figure 5.6, we find that the ability 
of the model to detect mispricing in the stock market is stable over time. The Buy portfolios 
have positive excess returns in all years; Sell stocks have, with the exception of 1999, 
always negative excess returns. Together this produces hedge returns (Buy-Sell) that are 
always positive, except again for the year 1999. In that year the overvalued stocks became 
more overvalued before collapsing in 2000 and producing large hedge returns for our 
strategy. The irrational pricing during the stock market bubble years found thus its way into 
our model performance.  
We view the negative performance of our strategy in 1999 not as a potential weakness of 
the model but rather as a strength. The model is able to identify when stocks are mispriced 
in the market – from time to time the market just needs more time to find out itself. Over the 
three year holding period excess returns always behave as predicted and not one single three 
year period produces losses in the hedging strategy (table 10 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 5.6: Annual excess returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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When looking at the absolute level of returns over time (figure 5.7) instead of the excess 
returns, we find that the stocks the model identified as undervalued and thus assigned a Buy 
recommendation have positive returns in every year, including the years of the latest bear 
market. Investors using the FEV model for stock selection would thus not incur one single 
year of losses over the entire 10 year testing period that includes one of the largest bear 
market since the great depression.  
We also note that most of the time even the Sell stocks have positive returns, although well 
below the average of all stocks in the sample. This shows that selling stocks short is in 
general not a good idea given the positively skewed equity returns over time. On the other 
hand, a no-cash hedging strategy selling short the Sells and buying with the money the Buys 
would produce large positive absolute returns in all but one year (1999) where they are only 
slightly below zero (-2.21%). 
 
Figure 5.7: Annual returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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What we also find out from figure 5.7 is that the portfolio returns are generally volatile. It 
appears that the hedging strategy produces returns with the least amount of volatility. The 
annual returns produced by that strategy are generally within 20% to 30%, they are lower 
only in the boom years (1998-1999) before correcting in the bust year (2000) and returning 
to the average level in 2001. Volatility data of annual returns in table 5.8 confirm these 
findings. 
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Table 5.8: Returns, volatility and correlation coefficients of annual returns to S&P 500 returns; All 
industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
 
Correlation
Return Volatility to S&P 500
Buy 27.57% 15.44% 56.82%
Hold 18.02% 13.93% 77.66%
Sell 6.26% 11.63% 76.53%
BUY-SELL 21.31% 11.72% -1.07%
BENCHMARK 19.47% 14.31% 76.51%
S&P 500 11.51% 18.19% 100.00%
 
 
The results in table 5.8 show that the high returns of the long and the hedging strategy are 
actually realized with less risk (volatility) than the returns of the S&P 500 index. Especially 
interesting for portfolio managers is also the fact that the correlation coefficient between the 
hedge returns and the returns of the S&P 500 is negative. The model thus does not only 
produce high returns with low risk but the returns are also negatively correlated to the index 
returns making this investment strategy a perfect tool for diversification.38 
 
The most important implication from an investor’s point of view is certainly that substantial 
monetary profits can be made by applying our model to common stock valuation. Presented 
below are the monetary results of an investment strategy based on the recommendations of 
the model. The strategy assumes that an investor invests at the beginning of 1993 $100 in 
each portfolio and rebalances at the beginning of each following year.  
 
Figure 5.9: Trading results; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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38
 This fact can be partly explained by our sample selection process as our benchmark returns of all stocks 
valued in the sample has only a correlation coefficient of 76.5% with the S&P 500 returns. 
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The results are remarkable as the stocks rated Buy produce an ending wealth after ten years 
with annual rebalancing of $1076, the Hold stocks of $491, and the Sell stocks of only 
$173. The no-cash hedging strategy would produce an ending wealth of $661 by actually 
leaving the capital untouched on a bank account.  
These differences are large and clearly show that the model successfully identifies 
mispriced stocks and thus can separate future winners from future losers in the stock 
market. The returns translated into monetary wealth emphasize the excellent performance of 
the model in combination with the power of compounded returns: relatively small 
differences in annual returns compounded over time produce large differences in ending 
wealth.  
 
The results presented in this chapter have important implications for the valuation of 
common stocks:  
1. The market is not efficient in valuing common stocks 
2. Discounted cash flow is a valid method to value common stocks 
3. The FEV model works better in identifying what stocks to sell than in what 
stocks to buy 
4. Substantial excess returns can be realized by investing according to our FEV 
model. 
 
The most important implication however is that the model works; it can be used to generate 
abnormal returns over extended periods of time in the US stock market.  
It should also be noted that the results are not significantly different when the ‘Speculative’ 
stocks are included into the portfolios (table 15 in the appendix). 
 
5.3.3 Industry Specific Results 
On the following pages, the results of the industry specific tests are presented. These tests 
provide further evidence of the stability of the model performance among companies with 
different fundamental characteristics. The results are not significantly different from the 
results of the test of all industries together presented in the previous chapter but nevertheless 
exhibit some interesting characteristics. The ITT industry is treated separately in the next 
chapter. 
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Industrial Goods and Services Industry 
The valuation model proved to be useful in the industrial goods and services industry. The 
portfolio returns of three different input specifications in this industry are presented in table 
5.10.  
 
Table 5.10: Total returns; Industrial industry, 1993-2002; 6 month, 1 year and 3 year holding 
periods 
 
6 months Best Analysts Earnings 1 year Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only Estimate only
Buy 16.64% 18.37% 13.07% Buy 23.91% 28.01% 19.17%
Hold 15.31% 15.35% 16.18% Hold 13.66% 13.56% 13.57%
Sell -5.17% -9.03% -8.94% Sell -1.74% -2.42% -3.62%
Buy-Sell 21.81% 27.40% 22.01% Buy-Sell 25.65% 30.43% 22.79%
3 years Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only
Buy 12.61% 13.39% 10.62%
Hold 9.35% 10.02% 10.40%
Sell 5.28% 5.29% 3.04%
Buy-Sell 7.33% 8.10% 7.58%
 
 
The results show that absolute returns are generally lower for industrial stocks than for the 
average of all stocks, whereas the hedge returns are comparable to the previous results.  
The ‘Analysts only’ specification of the model worked best over all three holding periods, 
followed by the ‘Best estimate’ specification and the ‘Earnings’ specification. To be 
consistent we nevertheless focus on the ‘Best estimate’ input specification in presenting the 
results in greater detail below.  
Over the one year holding period, Buy stocks in the ‘Best estimate’ specification returned 
23.91%, the stocks rated Hold earn annual returns of 13.66% and the Sell stocks have 
negative returns of -1.74% on average over the ten year testing period. This produces 
average annual returns for the hedging strategy of 25.65%. This magnitude indicates that 
industrial stocks are not priced more efficiently than the average of all stocks.  
 
We find again a high degree of stability in the direction of excess returns over time. Figure 
5.11 shows that Buy excess returns are always positive and those of Sell stocks always 
negative. Even the year 1999 shows the predicted relationship indicating that industrial 
companies were less affected by the stock market mania of that time. 
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From the graph can also be seen that it proved again more difficult to find undervalued 
stocks than overvalued ones. The excess returns of the Buy stocks are positive but rather 
small, while Sell stocks have much larger negative excess returns.  
We however note that due to rather stable average returns over time, the magnitude of the 
results is heavily influenced by a few extreme values. The large negative excess returns for 
the Sell stocks in 2002, for example, are due mainly to one single stock.39 
 
Figure 5.11: Annual excess returns; Industrial industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding 
period 
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In relation to the adjustment of mispricing over time (figure 5.12), we find that in this 
industry the one year holding period is clearly superior to the 6 month period. Especially the 
returns of the Buy stocks are much higher over 1 year than over 6 months. The hedge 
returns show most clearly that the 1 year holding period is the optimal holding period for 
industrial stocks. 
 
Figure 5.12 also shows that the 3 year holding period returns for Buy, Hold and Sell stocks 
are more narrowly distributed than in the previous results of all industries meaning that the 
mispricing is correcting more quickly in this industry after one year. The smaller excess 
returns over the longer term might be attributable to the relatively larger size of the 
                                                 
39
 Lockheed Martin Corp. (NYSE: LMT) was correctly identified as a Sell as it lost 19.6% of its value in that 
year while the average of all stocks in the sample gained 28.8%. 
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companies in this industry (see descriptive statistics). Larger companies are generally 
followed by more analysts, have higher institutional ownership and consequently should be 
valued more efficiently. That this is however not always the case is illustrated by the 
example of General Electric (NYSE: GE). The model identified GE in all years from 1997-
2001 as a Sell; nevertheless continued the stock to outperform until the steep correction in 
2000 and 2001. Sometimes individual stocks, especially the ‘darlings’ of analysts and 
portfolio managers, need more time to adjust to intrinsic values. Investors should keep this 
in mind when forming portfolios. 
 
Figure 5.12: Holding period returns; Industrial industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002 
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The monetary results of the trading strategy (figure 5.13) show that the ending wealth is 
lower in the industrial goods industry than in all industries together. It is so mostly because 
of the lower magnitude of returns for these stocks over the testing period and not because of 
more efficient pricing of industrial stocks. Here the hedging strategy produced even the 
highest ending wealth. 
 
Figure 5.13: Trading results; Industrial industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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Healthcare Industry 
The model also works well in the healthcare industry generally perceived to be more stable 
and therefore more efficiently priced. The returns of the Buy portfolio are substantially 
larger than the returns of the Hold and the Sell portfolios for the three main input 
specifications over all three holding periods (table 5.14).  
 
Table 5.14: Total returns; Healthcare industry; 1993-2002; 6 month, 1 year and 3 year holding 
periods 
 
6 months Best Analysts Earnings 1 year Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only Estimate only
Buy 48.36% 47.98% 42.75% Buy 36.88% 39.89% 31.13%
Hold 29.88% 33.50% 30.20% Hold 19.55% 20.40% 20.21%
Sell 19.84% 20.34% 10.76% Sell 9.39% 11.85% 2.42%
Buy-Sell 28.52% 27.64% 31.99% Buy-Sell 27.49% 28.04% 28.71%
3 years Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only
Buy 18.79% 20.30% 16.83%
Hold 11.51% 12.35% 10.11%
Sell 5.58% 7.91% 2.04%
Buy-Sell 13.21% 12.39% 14.79%
 
 
Just like in the industrial industry produces over one year the ‘Analysts only’ specification 
the highest returns, closely followed by the ‘Best estimate’ and the ‘Earnings’ specification. 
The superiority is however not uniform for the different holding periods and the differences 
are not very large. 
In the ‘Best estimate’ specification, the hedge portfolio capturing the difference in return 
between the Buy and Sell stocks produces annualized returns over the 10 year testing period 
of 28.5% for semiannual rebalancing, 27.5% for the one year holding period and still more 
than 13% for the three year holding period. One reason for the models’ superior 
performance in this industry might be that healthcare stocks had on average higher returns 
over the testing period. Higher returns create more volatility which in turn creates a higher 
potential for mispricing that can be exploited by the model. Another reason might be that 
the median size of companies in the healthcare industry is lower and that smaller companies 
are more often mispriced than large companies. 
 
The results are impressive also when compared over time (figure 5.15). In the healthcare 
industry, the results are unambiguous: in every year for the last 10 years the model was able 
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to identify what stocks to buy and what stocks to sell. This time, the excess returns for Buy 
and Sell stocks are about evenly distributed, indicating that the model was equally 
successful in identifying what stocks to sell and what stocks to buy. This fact certainly 
contributes to the higher magnitude of returns of the hedging strategy in this industry.  
The hedging strategy is furthermore profitable in every single year showing that not only 
the magnitude of the returns is remarkable but at the same time the return distribution over 
time. 
 
Figure 5.15: Annual excess returns; Healthcare industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year 
holding period 
 
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Bu
y S
el
l
BU
Y-
SE
LL
-40.00%
-30.00%
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Buy 
Sell
BUY-SELL
 
 
Figure 5.16 illustrates the trading results of a strategy investing $100 in each of the 
portfolios in 1993. The Buy portfolio produces an ending wealth of about $2200 while the 
Sell portfolio ends up with only $228 - almost ten times less. Clearly large profits can be 
made in this industry by following the investment advice of the model. 
 
The holding period returns over 6 months, 1 year and 3 years are not significantly different 
from the average of all industries (table 12 in the appendix). The magnitude of the excess 
returns however remains larger for all three holding periods. 
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Figure 5.16: Trading results; Healthcare industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding 
period 
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Consumer Discretionary Industry  
The results in the consumer discretionary industry (table 5.17) are comparable in their 
magnitude to the results of the industrial industry. This might be explained by the fact that 
in both of these industries mostly large and therefore more efficiently priced companies are 
valued. This industry has furthermore the highest number of hold recommendations 
(45.85%) compared to the average of all industries of 39.26% (table 28 in the appendix).  
The ‘Best estimate’ input specification produces here the best results over the one year 
holding period. This time the differences are quite large between the three specifications 
examined. 
 
Figure 5.17: Total returns; Consumer discretionary industry; 1993-2002; 6 month, 1 year and 3 
year holding periods 
 
6 months Best Analysts Earnings 1 year Best Analyst Earnings
Estimate only Estimate only
Buy 23.19% 16.96% 15.59% Buy 24.08% 21.83% 19.96%
Hold 10.43% 9.68% 11.24% Hold 14.41% 11.82% 10.50%
Sell 5.41% 6.30% -2.58% Sell 4.41% 7.66% 3.74%
Buy-Sell 17.78% 10.67% 18.17% Buy-Sell 19.67% 14.16% 16.22%
3 years Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only
Buy 11.23% 9.85% 10.24%
Hold 9.49% 8.13% 8.52%
Sell 2.61% 3.22% 0.93%
Buy-Sell 8.62% 6.63% 9.32%
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When the results are examined over time (table 5.18), we note that the returns are not as 
evenly distributed as in the previous industries. The stock market boom years produce very 
disappointing results while the three years following the boom produce hedge returns well 
above 30% annually. Again are these returns to a certain degree caused by a few badly 
mispriced stocks,40 less so are the returns of the comparably disappointing earlier years. 
 
Figure 5.18: Annual excess returns; Consumer discretionary industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 
1 year holding period 
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Overall, the model worked well despite the fact that cyclical stocks are more difficult to 
value than other stocks. How well it worked is illustrated by the high average correlation 
coefficients between intrinsic values and one year ahead market prices of 97% and a 
maximum correlation of 99.58% in the year 2002 (table 29 in the appendix). This appendix 
shows also that the consumer discretionary industry has the highest ratio of correct 
recommendations over all three holding periods. It seems that in this industry the model is 
able to very adequately predict future stock prices without however especially profiting 
from that ability in terms of returns. This finding indicates that the stocks in this industry 
are more efficiently priced. 
 
                                                 
40
 NVR Inc. (AMEX: NVR), for example, soared from $5 in 1995 to over $470 today; Ryland Group (NYSE: 
RYL) went from $5.8 in June 1997 to over $80 today. 
 76 
During testing this industry, we noted that most recommendation mistakes by the model are 
caused by misleading analyst forecasts of earnings. Our model requires an input for the 
sustainable level of earnings and not the cyclical highs or lows forecasted by analysts. To 
find this level of sustainable earnings, we had in this industry to determine whether earnings 
forecasts of analysts represent a permanent or only a cyclical level. The inputs could thus 
not be applied per se into the valuation model and adjustments were necessary to correct for 
the cyclical nature of earnings. This additional difficulty explains the much better 
performance of the ‘Best estimate’ specification of the model in this industry compared to 
the non-adjusted other specifications. On the other hand, show the results that the model 
works best in rather unstable macroeconomic times like in the years 2000-2002. Accurately 
forecasting the long-term earnings potential is thus an important additional determinant for 
success of the model in this industry. 
 
The graph showing the results of the different holding periods looks slightly different this 
time (figure 5.19). The one year holding period provides clearly the highest returns, 
followed by the 6 month holding period. That the three year holding period worked still 
quite well is surprising given the fact that investors usually do not hold this kind of stocks 
for such a long period of time but rather are timing them based on the expected future 
macroeconomic environment. 
 
Figure 5.19: Holding period returns; Consumer discretionary industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002 
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That monetary profits can be made in this industry is illustrated in figure 5.20. The Buy 
stocks produce an ending wealth of $730 after ten years, the Hold stocks of $353 and the 
Sell stocks of $145. The hedging strategy produces an ending wealth of $293. These levels 
are considerably lower than the ones in previous industries, showing the more efficient 
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pricing of stocks in that industry or the difficulties of the model in identifying the 
mispricing. 
 
Figure 5.20: Trading results; Consumer discretionary industry; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year 
holding period 
 
$-
$100.00
$200.00
$300.00
$400.00
$500.00
$600.00
$700.00
$800.00
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Buy 
Hold
Sell
BUY-SELL
Benchmark
 
 
In the next chapter, we will test our model in the most challenging industry to value – the 
information technology and telecommunication industry. It is treated separately because 
stocks in this industry are generally not valued with a DCF model. 
 
5.4 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation in High-Tech Industries 
After the successful test of the model in the healthcare, industrial goods and even the 
consumer discretionary industry, we applied our discounted cash flow model to the more 
dynamic and therefore more volatile information technology and telecommunication (ITT) 
industry.  
Arguably all equity valuations are made in conditions of extreme uncertainty. However, it 
does appear that certain industries, like the high tech industries, have particularly dynamic 
conditions that make valuation especially challenging. In the high tech sector estimating the 
drivers of future cash flows, sales growth, earnings growth and net investments is extremely 
difficult. Stocks in the ITT industry are therefore generally not valued with an absolute 
valuation model but rather with relative valuation techniques. Indeed there are several 
problems associated with valuing these kinds of stocks with a DCF model.  
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First, the importance of expectations is enormous for these stocks. In the high tech sector 
what matters is less the currently realized results, but the expectations of future growth in 
sales and earnings. Prices of high tech companies, or growth stocks in general, are 
determined primary by supply and demand for the stock and only secondary by the 
underlying fundamentals of the company. Demand and supply is much more unstable than 
fundamentals and that is why investors’ degree of control over these kinds of stocks is very 
limited and objective valuation very difficult.  
Second, even if all the high tech companies would have successful business models, the 
reversion to the mean effect due to increased competition in profitable areas makes it 
impossible for most companies to sustain growth rates of 30% or even 50% over an 
extended period of time. In this industry, a valuation model must take into account the mean 
reversion effect and cannot use analysts’ forecasts or historical extrapolated inputs.  
A third problem is that the values of high tech companies are highly sensitive to small 
changes in the discount rate. The low or negative current free cash flows and the large 
expected cash flows in the distant future result in very long equity durations which make the 
present value of the cash flow stream very sensitive to changes in the discount rate.  
 
These problems are not necessarily linked to the valuation model, but to the general 
difficulties investors have when forecasting the future of dynamic companies. Despite all 
these difficulties, we test our FEV model in this industry. The results however are mixed. 
 
First of all we find, opposed to the previous more mature industries, that the market seems 
to value earnings and not cash flow in the ITT industry (table 5.21). Over the short and 
medium term, the difference between the earnings and free cash flow input specification is 
large and earnings are clearly more value relevant. Over the 3 year holding period the 
relationship reverses and FCFE becomes again more value relevant than earnings. This 
shows that in the long run also for high tech companies’ cash is king. 
Comparing the magnitude of returns, we find that they are lower than in most other 
industries despite the more volatile prices. The more volatile the prices, the higher is 
theoretically the potential for earning excess returns caused by mispricing. On the other 
hand, it is also more difficult to realize this potential. In our model depends the magnitude 
of excess returns on the successful detection of mispricing. Stocks in this industry are likely 
to be mispriced but the detection of mispricing proved to be difficult.  
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After valuing all these companies, we think that most valuation mistakes are not caused by 
the model but, as in the consumer discretionary industry, by wrong input factors. In the ITT 
industry, we found many cases where analysts’ forecast strong earnings growth that later 
simply did not materialize. Such stocks are wrongly valued not only by the market but also 
by the model. 
 
Table 5.21: Total returns; ITT industry; 1993-2002; 6 month, 1 year and 3 year holding periods 
 
6 months Best Analysts Earnings 1 year Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only Estimate only
Buy 36.62% 40.18% 36.63% Buy 25.43% 27.69% 25.99%
Hold 26.21% 23.37% 19.77% Hold 24.46% 22.61% 21.09%
Sell 17.18% 17.64% 10.53% Sell 12.99% 13.79% 7.67%
Buy-Sell 19.45% 22.54% 26.10% Buy-Sell 12.44% 13.90% 18.32%
3 years Best Analysts Earnings
Estimate only
Buy 18.32% 17.78% 14.79%
Hold 16.12% 15.58% 15.57%
Sell 2.65% 3.74% 3.24%
Buy-Sell 15.68% 14.04% 11.55%
 
 
The results from the different holding periods show again that the mispricing persists over 
three years for all three input specifications. The returns of a hedging portfolio rebalanced 
only every three years are even larger than previously documented. This is quite surprising 
given the stock price volatility and the rather unstable business environment for this kind of 
stocks. 
Nevertheless produce the shorter holding periods higher annualized returns. Especially the 6 
month holding period seems to work better than in the other industries. In figure 5.22 can be 
seen that Buys for the 6 month holding period have almost linearly higher excess returns 
than Hold and Sell stocks. It seems that the dynamic nature of this industry requires more 
frequent portfolio rebalancing. The optimal investment strategy in the more dynamic 
industries is therefore to discount earnings and to rebalance portfolios every 6 months. 
 
Based on these findings, we present in the following the excess returns over time for an 
investment strategy based on the ‘Earnings’ input specification with a 6 month holding 
period (figure 5.23). As the returns are annualized, we thus implicitly assume to earn the 
same magnitude of returns in the second half of the year. This however has not been 
verified empirically. Consequently, the results should be interpreted cautiously. 
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Figure 5.22: Holding period returns; ITT industry; ‘Earnings’; 1993-2002 
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Figure 5.23: Annual excess returns; ITT industry; ‘Earnings’; 1993-2002; 6 month holding period 
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The results of the investment strategy in figure 5.23 show that return in all years until 1997 
are in line with returns in previous industries, slightly better though, before in the later 
phase of the bull market the problems start. In 1998, the excess returns of Buy stocks turn 
negative but produce still higher returns than the Sell stocks and thus remains the hedging 
strategy profitable. In 1999 also the hedge returns turn negative. The stocks the model 
recommended to buy based on their fundamentals have negative excess returns while the 
stocks to sell have positive excess returns. The negative hedge returns persist until the year 
2000, although at a lower magnitude. After the tech bubble burst the hedge returns are again 
in line with pre-bubble returns. Clearly had the irrational stock market behavior at the end 
of the last century an effect on the performance of our model in this industry. 
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The results of this investment strategy should be interpreted with caution in respect to one 
more industry specific aspect. In some years the model identified only a limited number of 
stocks to sell or buy and the reported returns are thus based on a small number of stocks in 
certain portfolios. This makes the returns sensitive to outliers.41 For example, the model 
identified in 1999 only two stocks as a Buy and six stocks as a Sell (table 28 in the 
appendix).  
 
The mispricing in this industry finds its way also into the returns of our trading strategy 
(figure 5.24 and 5.25). Not surprisingly are the monetary returns more volatile than in the 
previous industries. We also note a temporary decline in wealth in 1999, showing the losses 
incurred by the strategy in that year. The losses are however much larger for the hedging 
strategy with annual rebalancing than for the shorter holding period. An investment strategy 
based on DCF is therefore generally more risky in this industry than in the previous ones, 
especially over the medium term. The application of the FEV in the high tech industries 
should thus be more oriented towards shorter holding periods.  
These results show that in the ITT industry the degree of input precision required by the 
model is not always achievable over the longer term. Earnings forecast can be far off, 
growth forecasts reverse, the number of shares jumps up and down and capital expenditures 
are completely unpredictable. We recognize here that the model is only as good as the 
inputs that go into it: garbage in - garbage out. 
 
Figure 5.24: Trading results; ITT industry; ‘Earnings’; 1993-2002; 6 month holding period 
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41
 The loss in the strategy in 1999 is actually entirely attributable to Nortel Networks (NYSE: NT). The stock 
was identified a Sell by the model but moved up more than 200% before loosing more than 90% of its value 
within the following 2 years. 
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Figure 5.25: Trading results; ITT industry; ‘Earnings’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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A related problem we noticed while valuing ITT stocks is that some companies don’t seem 
to care much about their current financial situation. Such companies have usually large 
capital expenditures, negative earnings over extended periods of time, increase sales mostly 
by acquisitions and finance all that annually with additional equity capital. In good 
economic times, this strategy might work well but when equity markets are drying up, these 
companies face immense difficulties to survive. Some companies in the sample nevertheless 
managed to survive the ten year testing period with not a single profitable year or even a 
single year with positive EPS forecasts by analysts. The intrinsic values as measured with a 
DCF model of such companies consequently are usually very low or even negative. 
 
In summary, we think that investors should only cautiously use a DCF valuation model in 
high tech industries. It is however not that the model does not work in these industries, but 
much more that the data available are not accurate enough to provide a reliable input 
estimate.  
 
6. Results, Implications and Consequences 
After a summary of the results of our model test, we propose in this chapter an investment 
strategy based on the findings that best exploits the market inefficiencies found. After that 
we present potential limitations of our study and suggest ideas for future research. 
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6.1 Summary and Results 
While the DCF model is often criticized as being of limited practical value, we have proven 
it to be useful in a wide range of circumstances. Despite the high degree of precision 
required by the methodology of our study, the model worked well in ‘normal’ markets, bull 
and bear markets, in stable industries, cyclical industries and even in very dynamic 
industries.  
From the ten input specification tested in this dissertation, nine earned positive excess 
returns over the entire ten year testing period. Only the specification based on purely 
historical extrapolation of input factors did not work. Given remotely correct input factors, 
the model is thus able to identify under- and overvalued stocks and is consequently capable 
of earning significant excess returns in the stock market over 6 months, 1 year and even 3 
years.  
The magnitude of the returns (excess returns) is that in the ‘Best estimate’ input 
specification Buy stocks produce an average annual return with annual rebalancing over the 
ten year testing period of 27.6% (8.11%) compared to the Hold stocks of 18% (-1.44%) and 
the stocks the model recommended to sell of 6.3% (-13.2%). That the model is able to 
differentiate between under- and overvalued stocks over a period of three years is surprising 
and shows that the US market is not that efficient after all. The optimal holding period for 
stocks in our sample appears to be one year even though six months also produce 
satisfactory returns, especially in the more dynamic industries.  
 
Another important finding of our study is that common stocks are indeed valued based on 
their expected future cash flows and that it therefore pays off to take a long-term view when 
investing. Our approach consists of forecasting up to 175 years of future cash flows, which 
stands in complete opposition to the current practices of focusing only on next quarter’s or 
next year’s earnings.  
 
Discounted cash flow valuation is based upon discount future cash flows. Given these 
informational requirements, our results confirm that the approach is best used for firms 
whose cash flows are currently positive and can be estimated with some reliability for future 
periods. The further we move away from this idealized setting, the more difficult and risky 
discounted cash flow valuation becomes. The model is only as good as the inputs that go 
into it.  
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The success of our model is dependant on the number of identifiable mispriced stocks in an 
industry. We find that some industries are rarely mispriced (e.g. the consumer cyclical 
industry), others are mispriced but not clearly identifiable by the model (e.g. the ITT 
industry). The overall success of the model nevertheless shows some stocks to be always 
mispriced in an identifiable way. Mispriced stocks are stocks of companies that are on 
average small, have a low P/E ratio, a low P/B ratio, a low price and are profitable (table 3 
in the appendix). These preliminary findings regarding the determinants of mispricing 
confirm earlier research into the subject documenting a size effect and a low multiple effect 
in the stock market. Our investment strategy thus partly exploits these anomalies. The fact 
that the mispriced companies have a low price and are more profitable indicates furthermore 
that the model follows a contrarian investment approach by identifying temporary weakness 
in fundamentally strong stocks.  
Given these findings, we believe that the already good results could be improved 
considerably by valuing more small companies that are less followed by analysts and thus 
less efficiently priced. 
 
Taken as a whole, the results show that statistically significant excess returns can be earned 
formulating an investment strategy based on the DCF valuation approach. What these 
findings mean for market efficiency has however not been determined yet. Damodaran 
(2004) writes that in the case of statistically significant excess returns in the stock market, 
these returns first have to be adjusted for risk in order to examine whether a market 
inefficiency exists and then also for transaction costs to conclude on a market anomaly. The 
crucial difference between a market anomaly and a market inefficiency is that it is possible 
to make money in the first case but not in the second – a crucial difference for investors.  
In relation to risk, the DCF approach produces automatically risk adjusted returns as risk is 
explicitly considered in the discount rate of the model. Our approach however exploits some 
of the market anomalies documented in the literature such as the size effect or the low P/B 
and low P/E anomaly. We thus have to determine whether our results are caused by omitted 
risk variables or are the result of market mispricing. It could well be that the approaches of 
the FRP and IDR which did not produce large positive hedge returns simply reflect better 
the true ex ante cost of equity capital so that the results could be explained by omitted risk 
factors in the fundamental discount rate.  
Bernard et al. (1997) write about the distinction between mispricing and omitted risk 
variables that mispricing is more likely if (1) economically large returns are predictably 
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concentrated around earnings announcements, and (2) zero-investment portfolio returns are 
consistently positive for different sub-periods. In our study, we could clearly show that 
returns of the hedging strategy are consistently positive in different years and market 
conditions. Empirical studies of related research in Frankel and Lee (1998) and Ali, Hwang 
and Trombley (2002) find furthermore that the price convergence to intrinsic value occurs 
mostly around earnings announcements. Our results are thus much more consistent with the 
mispricing hypotheses than with the omitted risk variables explanation.  
Overall, these facts indicate that excess returns so high cannot be explained by missing risk 
factors alone, especially if one is considering that in the ten year testing period, the strategy 
produced only one year of slightly negative hedge returns and stocks rated Buy never show 
a loss. The results strongly point to another market inefficiency.  
 
Before concluding on a market anomaly, we must consider explicitly the transaction costs 
associated with actually executing our investment strategy. Transaction costs include the 
trading costs, the bid-ask spread and the price impact of the trade (Sharpe et al., 1999). 
Transaction costs therefore are mainly a function of the liquidity of the stock. In general, 
small and less liquid stocks are more neglected by the market and therefore more likely to 
be mispriced. These same firm characteristics however also create higher transaction costs 
so that the mispricing might not be fully exploitable economically. The stocks in our sample 
have an average (median) market capitalization of $15.9 billion ($4.2 billion) and are 
therefore considered large stocks. In that size range and given our low portfolio turnover, 
the total transaction costs should not amount to more than 1% per year for a roundtrip trade 
(Sharpe et al., 1999). The excess returns remain therefore positive at about 7% annually for 
the simple long strategy and about 20% for the hedging strategy. The results thus suggest 
that we have not only found another market inefficiency but also a market anomaly.  
In the following chapter, we present an investment strategy that shows how to best exploit 
this market anomaly. 
 
6.2 Investing in non-efficient Markets 
In the stock market, two things are essential to earn abnormal returns using a DCF valuation 
model: (1) a successful identification of mispriced stocks, and (2) a convergence of price 
towards intrinsic value. Identifying mispricing that will not correct over time does not 
contribute to excess returns. The results of our previous study show that convergence occurs 
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and that most of it takes place within one year. In an investment strategy, stocks should 
therefore be held for a period of one year.  
 
The investment strategy comes thus down to identifying mispriced stocks. Obviously we 
suggest the use of a DCF valuation model, but with two strict rules attached to its 
application.  
The first rule is to reduce potential behavioral biases as much as possible. Valuation is not a 
science; even though the valuation model is quantitative do leave the inputs plenty of room 
for subjective judgment. Thus, the intrinsic value obtained from the model is colored by the 
biases brought into the valuation process. We suggest two ways to reduce these potential 
biases. The first is to avoid taking a strong public or financial position on the value of a 
stock before the valuation is completed. In many cases, the decision on whether a stock is 
under- or overvalued precedes the actual valuation, leading to seriously biased intrinsic 
value estimate. The second way to reduce behavioral factors is to ignore the name of the 
company in the valuation process and like this to value stocks really solely based on the 
quantitative numbers. Like this, the influence of subconscious associations and prejudices 
are eliminated and the valuation becomes more objective.  
The second rule in the application of the fundamental equity valuation model is to be 
prudent in the stock selection process. When the intrinsic value obtained from the model is 
significantly different from the market price, we suggest to assume first that the market is 
correct and to look for arguments that support this view. Especially, investors should check 
whether the inputs are correct and reliable. Only if the inputs are reasonably conservative 
and the stock is still significantly mispriced should the stock be bought or sold. Furthermore 
should, like in our study, a clear differentiation being made between an investment and 
speculation. We documented in our previous study that ‘Speculative’ stocks do not provide 
considerably better returns than the ‘Safe’ stocks but add a lot more volatility to the 
portfolios (table 15 in the appendix). We suggest therefore to include only stocks into the 
portfolios that are an investment in the sense of Graham and provide a clear margin of 
safety. In general, these are stocks of companies with a somewhat stable past, no mergers or 
acquisition that distort historical relationships, that are profitable, exhibit a stable 
relationship between capital expenditure and depreciation and have reasonable debt levels. 
We advice thus not directly against using the model in certain very dynamic industries, but 
rather to use it for stocks where the investor has a reasonable degree of control over the 
input factors. The degree of control is greatest where stock prices are determined by 
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fundamentals, where the fundamentals are positive and predictable, and where the stock is 
substantially mispriced given these fundamentals. 
 
Following the above rules, about 100 stocks should be valued in each industry to create sub-
samples of under- and overvalued stocks. From these sub-samples the most grossly 
mispriced stocks should be analyzed using fundamental analysis. Making the valuation in 
the way described above before the traditional analysis reduces behavioral biases in this 
more subjective part of the investment process. The other way around, it is mostly that 
investors like the fundamentals of a company and then bring this bias to the valuation model 
ending up with their favorite companies being undervalued as well.  
The sub-sample of under- and overvalued stocks that pass the first valuation test and have 
sound fundamentals should then be valued again using other methods like relative valuation 
techniques to double check the previous findings. Only the stocks that pass all three tests are 
valid investment candidates. 
 
In the portfolio selection process, we have to revise the generally accepted view that 
diversification reduces risk while not reducing expected returns. Unfortunately, this 
statement is only true in efficient markets. In inefficient markets diversification is costly 
because it means investing in the second best stocks (second most mispriced) and so 
forgiving higher returns.  
Our study clearly demonstrates that the more stocks are included into a portfolio, the more 
investors move away from the mispriced stocks and the more average the returns become. 
In that sense, diversification in a non-efficient market is a defense against ignorance. As 
everybody is in some way ignorant about the intrinsic value of common stocks, some 
defense is good, but like with insurance, too much is costly. Too much money might be put 
into mediocre investments and too few into good ones.42 Investors must recognize that in 
non-efficient markets diversification offers no free lunch. 
We therefore suggest including into a portfolio not more than 10 stocks per industry or a 
total of 25 to 30 stocks. Fewer stocks not only increase the potential of earning higher 
returns but at the same time reduce transaction costs.  
 
                                                 
42
 This point is also made by Warren Buffet who asks to consider the following about diversification: “If the 
best business you own presents the least financial risk and has the most favorable long term prospects, why 
would you put money into you twentieth-favorite business rather then add money to the top 
choice?”(Hagstrom, 1995, p. 266).  
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In respect of these recommendations, we test in the following a trading strategy investing in 
only the top 10 (top 5) most undervalued stocks as identified by our FEV model and selling 
short the top 10 (top 5) most overvalued stocks in each industry and each year over the ten 
year testing period. We thus create a portfolio of 40 (20) stocks to buy and 40 (20) stocks to 
sell.  
The strategy outlined above is a hedging strategy meaning that we are selling an overvalued 
stock short and buy with the money an undervalued stock. In essence therefore, this strategy 
is a zero investment strategy and does not require any capital investment, except of a margin 
requirement that could be invested in US Treasury securities. In the hedge fund industry, 
this kind of strategy is known as ‘long-short equity’ or ‘market neutral equity’.  
In more detail, the strategy requires that in each year an equal amount of money is invested 
in each stock bought and sold short. Due to our limited sample of 40 companies per industry 
in each year, we have to regulate for cases where the model identified less than 10 stocks (5 
stocks) as either a Buy or a Sell. In the case of more stocks to sell than to buy, we solve the 
problem by investing the money from the short sale in one year Treasury securities with an 
assumed return of 0%. In the case of more stocks to buy than to sell, we assume that money 
is borrowed to buy the additional stock. We thus assume that in such cases no stock is sold 
short but rather that the money to invest in the Buy stocks is borrowed at the cost of 0%.43 
The results of this hedging strategy for the three main input specifications are presented in 
figure 5.26. 
 
For all three input specifications, the results show an increase in returns as the portfolio size 
is reduced. The strategy investing in only the top 5 most mispriced companies (buying the 5 
most undervalued stocks and selling short the 5 most overvalued stocks) produces always 
the highest returns (up to 30.3% per year), followed by the top 10 strategy (up to 23.9%) 
and the previous strategy including all stocks identified as either a Buy or Sell with up to 
21.6% annual performance over the ten year testing period. These results show that the 
more mispriced a stock is as identified by the model, the higher is the subsequent correction 
and the higher are the hedge returns of our investment strategy. This further confirms the 
validity of our DCF model and proves that diversification is indeed costly in non-efficient 
markets. 
                                                 
43
 Although these assumptions are generally not met in reality, the difference between the interest rate received 
and the interest rate paid in the security lending process is small. Furthermore could instead of using borrowed 
money own money be used to eliminate the interest rate payable altogether. 
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Figure 5.26: Total returns; All industries; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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In figure 5.27 we present the portfolio returns for the Buy and Sell stocks of the ‘Best 
estimate’ input specification in more detail. It can be seen that the top 5 Buy (Sell) stocks 
have significantly higher (lower) returns compared to the average of all Buy (Sell) stocks. 
These results show again that an investment strategy should focus on the most under- and 
overpriced stocks.  
 
Figure 5.27: Total returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; 1 year holding period 
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The monetary returns of such an investment strategy are presented in figure 5.28. There we 
see how the differences in percentage returns translate into monetary differences over time. 
Buying the Buys with the money from shorting the Sell stocks turns an initial $100 
investment into an ending wealth of $1250 after 10 years. This kind of return is earned with 
no capital requirements besides a margin requirement on a bank account. They are also 
produced using no leverage. In essence, investors could earn more than 30% annual return 
over ten years by simply leaving their money on a bank account. The more traditional long 
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strategy produces an ending wealth after 10 years of $1842 compared to the Sell stocks of 
just $154 and the benchmark of all stocks of $554. 
 
Figure 5.28: Trading results; All industries, ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; Top 5; 1 year holding 
period 
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By examining the results in each year in figure 5.29, we see that the top 5 hedging strategy 
does, like in the previous results, produce a loss in 1999. We attribute this loss to the 
irrational stock market behavior in relation to high tech stocks during that time. In 1999, the 
top 5 hedging strategy in the ITT industry produced a return of -76.6% (table 26 in the 
appendix). Excluding this more volatile industry would improve the results in such a way 
that the top 5 hedging strategy would be profitable in every single year.  
The results of the top 10 hedging strategy are not significantly different (table 16 in the 
appendix). 
 
Figure 5.29: Total annual returns; All industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; Top 5; 1 year holding 
period 
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Figure 5.29 also shows that the return distribution over time is comparable to the previous 
results of all stocks but the magnitude both to the upside and downside is larger. In 
inefficient markets diversifying portfolios thus indeed implies a tradeoff between risk and 
return.  
The total returns of the top 5 investment strategy vary in general from 35% to 45% per year. 
The strategy is not only very profitable but at the same time comparable in terms of risk to a 
simple buy-and-hold strategy as indicated by the losses and the traditional statistical risk 
measures in table 5.30. 
 
Table 5.30: Returns, volatility and correlation coefficients of annual returns to S&P 500 returns; All 
Industries; ‘Best estimate’; 1993-2002; Top 5; 1 year holding period 
 
Correlation
Return Volatility to S&P 500
Buy 35.30% 20.82% 47.83%
Sell 5.02% 11.54% 63.49%
BUY-SELL 30.28% 19.53% 13.46%
BENCHMARK 19.47% 14.31% 76.51%
S&P 500 11.51% 18.19% 100.00%
 
 
The low correlation with the S&P 500 returns make both the simple long strategy (Buy) as 
well as the hedging strategy (Buy-Sell) interesting for portfolio managers. With the hedging 
strategy investors could earn almost independently of the direction of the general stock 
market a 30% annual return with volatility comparable to investing in an index fund. 
 
At this point we would like to emphasis again that the model uses only objective and 
verifiable data known to everybody at the time of the valuation. The results shown in any of 
the many strategies (except for the ‘Foresight’ input specification) in every industry could 
actually have been achieved by simply using our fundamental equity valuation model.  
The reported results could even be improved when instead of focusing only on the ‘Best 
estimate’ input specification, the specification that worked best for each industry would be 
selected. We however believe that this would be unfair and not necessarily representative 
for future returns as people may lack the discipline to follow the recommendation of the 
input specification blindly, without having the possibility to adjust these estimates. We 
therefore consider the ‘Best estimate’ specification to be the behaviorally best and 
practically most realistic test of the model.  
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Whether these returns will be realizable in the future is another question. It is important in 
that respect to examine what normally happens to abnormal returns once a successful 
strategy has been uncovered and publicized. In the case of the DCF model have many 
studies (e.g. Sorensen and Williamson, 1985; Haugen, 1997, Frankel and Lee, 1998) shown 
its practical validity in the past. Nevertheless were we still able to identify mispriced stocks. 
Besides that is the DCF model a rather old valuation model and all finance students learn 
how to use it. It is therefore unlikely that the excess returns of an investment strategy based 
on DCF are simply going to disappear once this dissertation has been published. We 
thoroughly believe that in the stock market psychological and institutional factors always 
will create mispricing and therefore the potential to earn abnormal returns using a 
systematic and disciplined investment approach like the one based on DCF valuation.  
 
6.3 Possible Limitations and Future Research 
Investors are constantly in search of the ‘Holy Grail’: an investment strategy producing high 
returns with low risk. It seems that we might have found such a strategy. According to 
Sharpe et al. (1999) it is imperative in the final evaluation of a successful trading system to 
check for the following potential problems: 
1. Failure to adjust for risk 
2. Failure to consider transaction costs 
3. Failure to consider dividends 
4. Non-operational systems 
5. Data mining 
6. Efficient market forces 
7. Failure to use out-of-sample data 
 
In our study, we tried to avoid all of these possible sources of errors. We adjusted for risk 
by using many estimates, also new ones, to determine an appropriate discount rate for each 
stock. Furthermore does the hedging strategy produce only one year with actual losses that 
were even comparably small. The annual return volatility is also comparable to a simple 
buy-and-hold strategy and in the discussion of omitted risk factors vs. mispricing we 
concluded against the risk explanation of excess returns as large as the once documented in 
this study. 
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We did not explicitly adjust our returns for transaction costs. The annual rebalancing 
however requires only a low portfolio turnover rate. The costs are thus comparable to a 
passive investment strategy. Subtracting 1% annually for total transaction cost differentials 
would also not materially impact the impressive performance of more than 30% annual 
return in the hedging strategy. This strongly suggest that our strategy remains profitable 
after transactions costs and the cost of performing the necessary analysis. 
Our study measures the total return and is thus considering dividends explicitly. The return 
differences can therefore not be explained by differences in dividend yields. 
Our system is furthermore fully operational. It only considers information publicly 
available at the time of the valuation. We only use analyst earnings forecasts and historical 
financial information. While adjusting these data in the ‘Best estimate’ study, the names of 
the companies were omitted to avoid as much as possible unconscious knowledge transfer 
about future events. However it might be possible that because the year of the valuation was 
visible, we unconsciously adjusted the inputs slightly in the direction of the existing market 
trend of that time. To minimize that, we followed the adjustment rules outlined in chapter 
5.2. That the returns cannot be explained by that potential problem show the comparable 
returns of the manually unadjusted ‘Analysts only’ input specification. 
A small operational problem arises however from the sample selection of our database. The 
large input requirements of the model forced us to consider companies with rather long 
historical data records. We thus might be subject to an ex post selection bias or survivorship 
bias as we included only companies that survived until 2002 into our sample. Theoretically, 
it was not possible at the time of valuation to know which company will survive that long. 
We however believe that model performance would actually improve if we would consider 
the possibility of bankruptcy because the model did a better job in identifying what stocks 
to sell than it did in what stocks to buy. Furthermore does the bias in no way negate the 
successful relative performance of the model. The comparisons between the model’s Buy 
and Sell portfolios and the average of all stocks in the sample are valid and the hedging 
strategy remains fully operational. Precaution should only be taken when comparing the 
Buy portfolio returns to market averages that include bankrupt stocks. 
Data mining refers to coincidental statistical significance. Without a causal relationship any 
empirical result may be coincidental and might not continue to exist in the future. 
Considering the strong theoretical basis of our approach and given that it is not one of a 
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thousand valuation models tested but the only one, it is very unlikely that data mining plays 
a role in our study. 
More dangerous is the power of efficient markets. Once discovered and copied by other 
investors, the anomaly documented in this dissertation could disappear. As discussed 
earlier, we do not believe that this will be the case in our approach.  
Out of sample testing is not a major problem in our study as the model is stationary so that 
every year in every industry must already be considered an actual out of sample test. It 
remains to be seen whether the results will continue to be so great in the future. Past 
performance is never a guarantee for future performance, but it gives a hint. 
 
Given the results and limitations, we think future research in this area of valuation should 
focus on: 
1. Model building: increase the degree of detail in DCF valuation models 
2. Risk and the discount rate 
3. Additional model testing: formation date, other industries, other countries 
4. Determinants of pricing efficiency. 
 
1. Model building 
Improvements of the model should be made in relation to the degree of detail. However 
given the large input uncertainty, the benefits of small improvements in details might be 
rather small. On the other hand point Levin and Olsson (1998) out that uncertainty is 
additive. The fact that there is a lot of uncertainty in the data should really encourage 
researchers to reduce this uncertainty as much as possible and therefore increase detail.  
When increasing detail in future research, it is of major importance to think about the 
internal consistency of the input variables. For example would increasing details like the 
capitalization of R&D expenditures require a corresponding adjustment to capital 
expenditures, depreciation and probably also the forecasted earnings growth rate.  
More effort should definitively be put into the quantitative determination of the length of 
the extraordinary growth period. Since the growth rate is expected to decline to a stable 
level after this period, the value of a stock will increase as the growth period is extended. 
While we developed criteria and methods that might be useful in making this judgment in 
chapter 4.2.3, it remains difficult to estimate the growth duration quantitatively. 
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The model could also be improved in relation to the implicit assumption about the infinite 
life of each company. A consequence of the assumed survival of the firms in our model is 
that discounted cash flow valuations tends to have an optimistic bias because the likelihood 
of the firm going bankrupt is not considered adequately. 
The most neglected value driver however is the discount rate. This challenging field for 
future research is discussed next.  
 
2. Risk and the discount rate 
In our opinion should much more effort be put into the development of a valid risk-return 
model to determine the appropriate discount rate. Lee (1999) writes that this problem “is 
perhaps the single most pressing research issue in corporate finance”. The theories proposed 
today, e.g. the CAPM or the three-factor model, are still too simplistic and capture only 
poorly the actual market process of translating risk into a return requirement.  
Future research should consider investment risk more broadly. Risk is multidimensional and 
the most important dimension of risk is often ignored in theory: time. Risk and time are in 
essence two sides of the same coin. In the short term, price volatility might be an acceptable 
measure for the probability of lower than expected returns for investors. But in the longer 
term, past price volatility is no longer a good proxy for future cash flow uncertainty and 
therefore return uncertainty. For investing over the long term, fundamental factors that 
indicate higher uncertainty of future cash flows and thus increase the possibility of lower 
than expected returns are a better indicator of risk than simply historical price volatility. We 
believe therefore that our fundamental risk approach is a very promising concept and future 
research should build on our findings.  
We identify three main problems associated with the fundamental risk premium approach of 
determining an ex ante risk premium based on fundamental risk factors. First, the measures 
for uncertainty of future cash flows must be correct; in other words, the fundamental risk 
premium must capture the main risks as well as their individual weights priced into the 
discount rate. Second, the link between the risk level inherent in each risk factors and the 
risk premium must prove reliable. Critical for the successful application of the model is the 
long term stability of the relationship between the risk factors and the implied risk premium. 
The fact that our multivariable approach did not produce large returns means either that the 
approach is misspecified and markets indeed inefficient or that the approach actually 
captures better the true required rate of return of investors so that the excess returns found in 
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our study are nothing else than a compensation for omitted risk factors in the discount rate. 
Future research should answer this question by validation or dismissing the FRP approach, 
for example by comparing the discount rate estimates to realized returns or other risk 
proxies such as size or the B/M ratio.  
The third problem in our fundamental risk premium approach is related to the directional 
predictions of the different risk factors. The effect of some risk factors can be ambiguous. 
For example, an increase in leverage can be either a positive or negative risk signal 
depending on the situation of the company. To the extent that the implications of these 
signals about future cash flows are not uniform across the set of firms, the power of the 
aggregate fundamental risk premium to differentiate between high risk and low risk firms 
will ultimately be reduced. 
 
3. Additional model testing 
After having improved the model in relation to the degree of detail and the discount rate, it 
should be further tested in other industries in the US and also in stock markets outside the 
US. We expect the results in foreign equity markets to be even better than in the more 
efficient US market. The model should also be tested by valuing more small and mid-size 
companies where we also see the potential of earning even higher returns. 
Another important question future research should address is when to best form the 
portfolios. Differences in formation dates can have an impact on the magnitude of realized 
returns. Damodaran (1996) reports on a study that examines the winner-looser portfolio 
study of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and finds that portfolios formed in December earn 
significantly higher returns than portfolios formed in June. We could thus probably improve 
our results further by forming the portfolios in December and profiting from the well 
documented January effect. 
 
4. Determinants of pricing efficiency 
Future research should also focus on identifying why certain stocks are mispriced and 
examine consequently the determinants of pricing efficiency. If stocks with certain 
characteristics are more or more often mispriced than others, then by selecting these stocks, 
the returns from an investment strategy based on a DCF valuation model could be improved 
further while at the same time reducing the risk of such a strategy.  
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Future research should also examine the interrelationship between the market inefficiency 
found in this dissertation and the other inefficiencies documented in previous research. It 
might be that a DCF model exploits to a certain degree the existing anomalies. In the 
descriptive statistics in the appendix (table 3) we find that the degree of mispricing is 
strongly negatively correlated to the P/E ratio. This means that the model identifies low P/E 
stocks as undervalued. That low P/E stocks have higher subsequent returns is already 
documented extensively in the literature. Our preliminary findings into the determinants of 
pricing efficiency also exhibit the well documented P/B effect and the size effect. 
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Final Word 
We show in this dissertation that while valuing a stock is not an exact science, it is also not 
a total mystery. Our discounted cash flow model is able to identify under- and overvalued 
stocks in the US stock market and therefore is able to differentiate between superior and 
inferior investments.  
In respect of the model’s usefulness in generating abnormal returns also in the future, we 
would like to quote Benjamin Graham in his classical book on value investing: “the moral 
seems to be that any approach to moneymaking in the stock market which can be easily 
described and followed by a lot of people is by its terms too simple and too easy at last. […] 
All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.” 44 
                                                 
44
 Graham (1973), page 100 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Risk Factors considered in the Fundamental Risk Premium Approach  
 
 
No Risk categories and risk factors Sign Explanation and Justification 
I Business risk    
 Accounting based business risk 
measures 
  
1 Standard deviation of sales / 5 
year average of sales 
+ 
 
LaPorta (1996) shows that firms that exhibit stable 
growth are more like to show stable future growth  
2 Standard deviation of EBIT / 5 
year average of EBIT 
+ Measures the volatility of operating income 
3 Standard deviation of CFO / 5 
year average of CF 
+ Minton et al. (1999) show that cash flow volatility 
leads to underinvestment, which in turn reduces 
expected future cash flows 
4 %-change in EBIT / %-change in 
sales 
+ Operating leverage 
5 Worst year ROE / average 5 year 
ROE 
+ %-decline in ROE: measure for the volatility of 
ROE 
6 Worst year EBIT / average 5 year 
EBIT 
+ %-decline in EBIT: Barth et al. (1999) find that 
earnings volatility is a proxy for operating risk 
7 %-change EBIT / %-change 
industry EBIT 
+ Billings (1999) finds that a strategy investing in 
stocks with low earnings volatility and selling 
short high earnings volatility stocks generates 
consistently large, positive returns 
8 Net PPE / sales + A higher level of fixed costs creates higher 
earnings variability 
9 Past year EPS growth + Higher past growth indicates more volatile future 
growth due to the life cycle of the firm 
10 5 year average exchange rate 
effect / EBIT  
+ Measures the degree of exposure to international 
risk factors 
11 Market capitalization - Chan et al. (1991) argue that small firms are more 
sensitive to economic shocks than large firms 
 Analyst based business risk 
measures 
  
12 Dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts 
+ Cragg et al. (1982) argue that dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts is the best single risk 
proxy 
13 Magnitude of analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors 
+ Givoly et al. (1984) find that the predictability of 
earnings correlates with traditional risk measures 
14 Standard deviation of long-term 
growth forecast 
+ Gebhardt et al. (2001) find that the long term 
growth forecast of analyst proxies for risk 
 
   
II Financial risk factors    
 Leverage ratios    
15 Cash / current liabilities  - Cash or quick ratio: captures balance sheet distress 
 111 
16 Current assets / current liabilities - Current ratio: captures balance sheet distress 
17 %-change in current ratio - Early indicator of weakening in financial position 
18 Book value of debt / book value 
of equity 
+ Book leverage ratio: A firm’s cost of equity is an 
increasing function of the amount of debt (Fama 
and French, 1992) 
19 %-change in short-term debt + Early indicator of higher risk of financial distress 
20 %-change in long-term debt + Richardson et al. (2003) find a consistently strong 
negative relation between all major categories of 
external financing transactions and future stock 
returns  
21 5 year average %-change in 
shares outstanding 
 See item 20 
22 %-change in accounts payable + Chan et al. (2001) find that following an increase 
in accounts payable future returns are 
disappointing 
23 %-change in EBIT/ %-change in 
net income 
+ Measures the degree of financial leverage 
 Expense ratios    
24 EBIT / interest expense - Interest coverage: captures risk of financial 
distress 
25 %-change in interest coverage - Change in interest coverage: indicates 
improvement or deterioration in financial position  
26 (CFO + interest expense) / 
interest expense 
- Cash flow coverage: captures risk of financial 
distress 
 Financial exposure ratios    
27 CFO / short-term debt - Captures sustainable short term debt level 
28 CFO / long-term debt - Captures sustainable long term debt level 
29 Altman z-score  + Altman's z score captures the possibility of 
bankruptcy (Altman, 1968) 
30 %-change in Altman z-score + Captures change in bankruptcy probability 
    
III Profitability risk factors   
 Competition  risk   
31 %-change in gross profit margin - Indicates intensity of competition 
32 5 year average sales growth / 5 
year average EBIT growth 
+ Captures how good the company is able to 
translate sales growth into earnings growth 
33 %-change in inventory / %-
change in sales 
 Early indicator of future profitability 
34 
 
Retained earnings / total assets - Cumulative profitability: captures age, profit 
accumulation and dividend policy over time 
(Glantz, 2002) 
35 Change in operating cycle  - Leading indicator for the direction of profitability 
 Management risk    
36 EBIT / total assets - ROA: Low ROA indicates less competent 
management 
37 EBIT / total equity  - ROE: Low ROE indicates less competent 
management 
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38 Accumulated depreciation / 
depreciation expense  
- Average asset life: newer assets indicate that 
management takes a long term view of the 
business  
39 %-change in dividends 
 
+ An increase in dividends is a signal of confidence 
40 Return on average investment + Indicator for the quality of management in project 
selection 
41 3 year stock price performance - Comprehensive performance measure 
42 Net income / cash flow + Measure for the quality of earnings 
43 (EBIT – CFO) / ROA - Accruals-to-ROA ratio: proxies for the degree of 
earnings quality  
44 5 year average tax rate - Measure for the degree of earnings management  
45 Sustainable EPS growth / 
expected growth 
- Measure for the investment discipline of 
management 
    
IV Operational risk factors   
 Life cycle risk     
46 EPS in year 10 / current stock 
price 
- Measure for the time to payout; the higher the 
ratio, the lower the long term uncertainty of cash 
flows 
47 Price / book value per share + P/B ratio: Fama and French (1992) show that high 
B/M firms earn higher ex post returns than low 
B/M firms stocks 
48 Price / EPS + P/E ratio: % of payout today vs. later years 
49 Dividend / EPS - Pay out ratio: higher ratios signal a stable position 
in the life cycle and therefore less risk  
50 Total assets / market 
capitalization 
- Shows excess of market value over the value of all 
assets; higher in early life cycle stages 
51 Sales / total assets + The higher the ratio, the earlier is the company in 
its life cycle and the higher the risk 
 Product risk    
52 R&D expenditure / sales - R&D intensive firms earn excess returns in future 
periods (Lev et al., 1996) 
53 Depreciation / total assets + A high depreciation rate indicates higher risk of 
obsolete technology or products 
54 Capital expenditure / sales + Lev et al. (1993) report a positive association 
between returns and changes in capital 
expenditure 
55 Capital expenditure / 5 year 
average capital expenditure 
- Callen et al. (1996) find that returns are increasing 
in the ratio of current capital expenditures to 
average capital expenditures for prior years 
56 Capital expenditure / 
depreciation 
- A ratio above one indicates expansion and 
therefore higher risk 
 Exposure risk     
57 Average extraordinary items / 
average net income before 
extraordinary items 
+ Measure the influence of extraordinary items on 
net income; the higher the ratio, the higher the risk 
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58 GAAP earnings / pro-forma 
earnings as measured by I/B/E/S 
- Doyle et al. (2002) find that firms with large 
exclusions of pro forma earnings have lower 
future cash flows and lower stock returns  
59 Number of basic shares / number 
of diluted shares 
- Measures the degree of earnings dilution 
60 Average daily turnover - Jones et al. (1996) find turnover to be a strong 
indicator for litigation risk 
61 S&P Quality rank - Measures the overall quality of the company 
   
 
V Market risk factors   
 Expectation risk    
62 Price / expected EPS  + Forward P/E ratio: the higher this ratio, the higher 
are the expectations and thus the risk 
63 Forward PEG ratio + Measure of expectations adjusted for growth; the 
higher the ratio, the higher the risk 
64 Mechanical EPS forecast / 
consensus EPS forecast 
+ Indicates the potential of future earnings 
disappointments 
65 Earnings growth rate + Gebhardt et al. (2001) find that the market 
consistently assigns a higher risk premium to 
firms with higher forecasted earnings growth rates 
66 Expected earnings growth / 5 
year average earnings growth 
+ La Porta (1996) finds a negative association 
between realized returns and expected earnings 
growth 
67 Price / book value per share + P/B ratio: Gebhardt et al. (2001) establish a 
positive association between P/B ratios and the 
cost of equity capital 
 Variability risk    
68 Price volatility + Traditional risk measure; higher volatility reflects 
higher uncertainty about future returns  
69 Beta + The CAPM indicates that stocks with high betas 
are more risky 
70 (52 week high – 52 week low) / 
price 
+ Measure of short term price volatility 
71 Standard deviation of annual 
returns (5 years) 
+ Measure of long term price volatility 
 Marketability risk     
72 Average daily volume  - Lee et al. (2000) show that average dollar trading 
volume is negatively correlated with future returns 
73 S&P liquidity index - A comprehensive measure of liquidity 
74 Number of security owners - The larger the number of shareholders, the more 
liquid should be the stock 
75 Market capitalization - Brennan et al. (1995) document that stocks of 
smaller firms are generally less liquid 
    
 Market efficiency risk    
76 Number of analysts following the 
company 
- Brennan et al. (1993) report that stocks with 
greater analyst coverage react faster to market-
wide information compared to those with less 
analyst coverage 
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77 Institutional ownership - The higher the degree of institutional ownership, 
the higher is generally the liquidity 
    
VI Valuation risk factors    
 
All important input factors in the 
DCF model compared to the 
industry average 
 The higher these factors compared to the average 
of the industry, the higher is the risk of lower 
future returns 
78 Earnings growth rate +  
79 EPS year 1 +  
80 EPS year 2  +  
81 Share dilution +  
82 Working capital in % of revenue  +  
83 Incremental fixed capital 
investment  
+  
84 Growth duration +  
 All important input factors in the 
DCF model compared to their 
historical range 
 The higher these factors compared to the 
historical average, the higher is the uncertainty 
about the correct inputs 
85 Earnings growth rate +  
86 EPS year 1 +  
87 EPS year 2  +  
88 Share dilution +  
89 Working capital in % of revenue  +  
90 Incremental fixed capital 
investment  
+  
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Figure 2: Graphical Overview of the Fundamental Equity Valuation Model 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics All Industries 
 
Degree of Avg. 1 year Market Adjusted P/BV Price / Return on 
Mispricing Return Capitalization Sales Beta Ratio trailing EPS Price avg. equity
All Years MEAN 7.51% 19.40% 15,876 8,859 0.97 4.04 19.61 34.46 18.99
MEDIAN 4.53% 15.65% 4,271 3,197 0.95 3.29 17.97 27.61 17.50
CORR MISPRICING 1 28.69% -11.46% -6.28% -1.50% -8.75% -31.51% -10.23% 9.50%
2002 MEAN 26.63% 38.00% 13,494 9,979 1.01 2.40 17.99 42.99 21.22
MEDIAN 21.93% 32.90% 3,709 3,573 0.95 2.11 15.99 30.34 14.09
CORR MISPRICING 1 38.25% -14.31% -4.55% 7.58% -14.10% -41.70% -11.58% 8.55%
2001 MEAN 1.64% -2.76% 24,573 9,783 0.84 3.59 19.68 42.45 22.41
MEDIAN -1.88% -4.58% 5,790 3,881 0.80 3.87 18.49 38.30 19.43
CORR MISPRICING 1 32.12% -7.17% -7.40% -6.52% -16.36% -4.41% 0.69% 9.93%
2000 MEAN 7.17% 14.35% 28,292 11,837 0.93 5.10 20.31 38.40 21.44
MEDIAN 4.15% 13.63% 4,338 4,440 0.91 3.19 16.49 33.41 18.84
CORR MISPRICING 1 47.09% -28.19% -11.95% 4.63% -36.40% -53.79% -29.70% 2.24%
1999 MEAN -1.34% 1.34% 23,441 10,310 0.96 5.97 22.50 47.01 20.22
MEDIAN -4.92% -8.47% 5,996 3,787 0.94 4.03 19.92 38.24 19.06
CORR MISPRICING 1 4.36% -19.03% -9.88% -0.38% -27.17% -44.78% -5.75% 6.52%
1998 MEAN 0.22% 17.81% 20,666 11,221 0.92 4.86 22.95 43.56 15.97
MEDIAN 0.60% 15.34% 6,177 3,534 0.90 3.81 21.60 34.94 17.42
CORR MISPRICING 1 7.40% -18.84% -5.34% -8.92% 3.39% -26.70% -4.63% -12.86%
1997 MEAN 4.60% 23.13% 15,415 9,811 0.89 4.35 20.76 36.63 19.22
MEDIAN 2.68% 19.59% 5,029 3,134 0.88 3.46 19.52 30.39 17.89
CORR MISPRICING 1 31.01% -10.63% -4.47% -17.01% -9.17% -41.66% -3.16% 7.99%
1996 MEAN 7.47% 32.69% 11,024 6,482 0.99 4.19 19.32 28.47 19.52
MEDIAN 4.83% 27.77% 3,620 2,561 0.98 3.40 18.58 22.94 18.37
CORR MISPRICING 1 37.92% -9.25% -3.60% 3.22% -10.70% -41.39% -14.35% 19.60%
1995 MEAN 13.78% 28.39% 7,744 5,174 1.05 3.45 17.27 23.76 18.53
MEDIAN 9.80% 26.31% 2,856 2,649 1.06 2.98 16.24 18.19 17.70
CORR MISPRICING 1 19.54% -9.79% -18.92% -3.93% 4.76% -21.10% -6.71% 7.05%
1994 MEAN 7.15% 33.63% 7,117 6,848 1.05 3.18 16.29 20.12 16.22
MEDIAN 3.37% 30.11% 2,513 2,064 1.05 2.88 15.96 14.88 16.88
CORR MISPRICING 1 36.60% -2.09% -0.94% -6.20% 19.03% -23.94% -12.65% 33.09%
1993 MEAN 7.73% 7.40% 6,988 7,141 1.01 3.32 18.99 21.20 15.11
MEDIAN 4.74% 3.92% 2,681 2,347 1.02 3.14 16.87 14.50 15.30
CORR MISPRICING 1 32.56% 4.66% 4.28% 12.56% -0.81% -15.65% -14.47% 12.93%
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Industrial Goods and Services Industry 
 
Degree of Avg. 1 year Market Adjusted P/BV Price / Return on 
Mispricing Return Capitalization Sales Beta Ratio trailing EPS Price avg. equity
MEAN 5.95% 15.00% 16,543 9,622 0.92 2.91 16.75 37.38 19.24
All Years MEDIAN 4.97% 13.65% 5,462 4,952 0.92 3.10 16.30 32.54 17.54
CORR MISPRICING 1 32.08% -16.02% -12.52% -8.70% -1.14% -45.36% -11.20% 16.35%
MEAN 27.25% 27.28% 18,146 14,082 0.84 1.55 11.52 39.07 12.17
2002 MEDIAN 30.75% 23.48% 5,590 7,195 0.83 2.30 14.74 32.27 11.94
CORR MISPRICING 1 33.48% -6.19% 13.51% 26.57% 1.18% -11.21% -11.46% 19.29%
MEAN 3.46% 7.42% 27,547 13,104 0.80 -1.69 17.40 46.54 21.57
2001 MEDIAN 4.81% 6.28% 7,733 7,243 0.77 3.11 16.86 39.59 19.03
CORR MISPRICING 1 32.87% -20.72% -27.38% -4.08% -33.75% -49.49% -6.28% -12.65%
MEAN 15.37% 20.00% 27,891 13,267 0.95 3.67 14.50 37.81 22.05
2000 MEDIAN 13.93% 24.07% 6,760 6,987 0.94 2.71 12.73 34.69 18.48
CORR MISPRICING 1 36.57% -28.87% -34.63% -20.19% -30.26% -59.63% -19.29% 6.78%
MEAN -5.48% -17.69% 22,803 9,826 0.97 4.97 19.69 47.74 21.76
1999 MEDIAN -6.03% -24.53% 7,468 4,345 0.93 3.83 18.39 43.44 19.67
CORR MISPRICING 1 21.78% -28.24% -24.62% -23.80% -16.51% -44.03% -6.51% -1.49%
MEAN -1.90% 10.34% 18,643 8,728 0.92 3.48 19.82 45.95 19.62
1998 MEDIAN -1.73% 9.42% 6,024 4,119 0.91 3.23 17.91 43.28 18.42
CORR MISPRICING 1 18.12% -22.76% -14.82% -3.88% 9.76% -62.42% 20.36% -1.01%
MEAN 1.50% 15.94% 17,631 9,504 0.88 4.08 18.76 45.22 20.54
1997 MEDIAN -0.57% 12.76% 6,736 5,140 0.89 3.52 18.22 37.34 18.49
CORR MISPRICING 1 10.73% -40.84% -37.09% -33.60% 0.59% -37.19% -13.18% 18.18%
MEAN 8.71% 39.53% 12,563 9,248 0.94 3.43 16.45 33.89 19.99
1996 MEDIAN 2.02% 39.53% 4,520 4,839 0.98 3.17 15.77 28.96 18.89
CORR MISPRICING 1 71.36% -18.85% -15.78% 6.66% 7.10% -44.85% -32.85% 38.16%
MEAN 10.48% 29.92% 4,562 4,732 1.00 3.06 16.48 25.89 19.17
1995 MEDIAN 9.03% 28.26% 2,571 3,023 1.01 2.98 15.86 25.25 18.08
CORR MISPRICING 1 18.24% -27.41% -23.41% 4.88% 17.54% -65.36% 6.05% 23.10%
MEAN 4.71% 17.28% 7,717 6,794 0.98 3.24 15.58 23.11 18.76
1994 MEDIAN 2.35% 17.06% 3,668 2,959 1.01 2.90 15.64 18.47 17.39
CORR MISPRICING 1 58.54% 12.82% 21.37% -25.22% -1.78% -53.20% 1.30% 32.20%
MEAN -4.59% 1.72% 7,931 6,938 0.95 3.32 17.26 28.55 16.76
1993 MEDIAN -4.88% 0.18% 3,551 3,669 0.95 3.21 16.86 22.09 15.05
CORR MISPRICING 1 19.12% 20.84% 17.62% -14.39% 34.71% -29.47% -50.16% 40.96%
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics Healthcare Industry 
Degree of Avg. 1 year Market Adjusted P/BV Price / Return on 
Mispricing Return Capitalization Sales Beta Ratio trailing EPS Price avg. equity
MEAN 10.77% 23.38% 20,754 5,003 1.01 5.41 21.51 29.58 20.31
All Years MEDIAN 8.06% 19.95% 3,296 1,571 1.00 4.11 20.00 27.01 17.94
CORR MISPRICING 1 36.90% -10.07% -11.04% -15.01% -7.24% -47.48% -22.73% -5.36%
MEAN 32.18% 47.82% 10,575 4,925 1.28 1.69 17.38 32.67 15.85
2002 MEDIAN 30.92% 41.77% 2,701 1,746 1.15 1.36 17.64 31.77 18.16
CORR MISPRICING 1 56.14% -13.42% -30.62% -33.74% -9.31% -53.74% -61.64% -58.93%
MEAN -3.49% -2.65% 32,153 7,134 0.75 6.53 26.43 43.76 24.99
2001 MEDIAN -7.18% -4.09% 5,383 1,919 0.73 5.20 22.93 40.80 19.49
CORR MISPRICING 1 47.51% 6.80% 13.40% -33.54% -14.40% -55.81% -29.73% -0.56%
MEAN -5.30% 12.76% 45,684 7,124 0.84 9.84 28.02 46.94 27.78
2000 MEDIAN -5.55% 12.73% 6,315 2,072 0.84 7.96 25.54 46.28 26.57
CORR MISPRICING 1 49.46% -23.77% -20.00% 5.43% -40.22% -54.17% -47.02% -20.03%
MEAN 3.37% 15.69% 35,639 6,918 0.96 7.55 25.97 40.67 16.94
1999 MEDIAN -2.64% 11.94% 6,605 2,541 0.95 5.64 25.91 35.95 12.87
CORR MISPRICING 1 9.30% -29.11% -8.88% 4.94% -35.37% -60.93% -47.90% -3.47%
MEAN 2.06% 20.80% 29,029 5,705 1.03 7.18 26.03 33.34 11.94
1998 MEDIAN -1.50% 13.47% 3,446 1,679 1.01 4.22 24.05 27.78 12.01
CORR MISPRICING 1 23.62% -22.70% -37.94% -22.08% 3.10% -12.73% -35.50% -38.24%
MEAN 2.54% 24.99% 16,445 4,324 0.94 5.41 22.81 29.41 19.93
1997 MEDIAN 3.31% 20.02% 2,077 1,192 0.93 3.49 19.58 24.03 18.11
CORR MISPRICING 1 22.98% -13.60% -12.11% -27.52% -15.51% -67.98% -27.39% 11.40%
MEAN 6.66% 21.02% 12,631 3,446 1.08 4.63 20.87 22.79 21.26
1996 MEDIAN 11.22% 21.02% 1,927 1,103 1.15 3.42 19.65 21.19 17.45
CORR MISPRICING 1 24.31% 11.32% 11.94% -27.06% 15.83% -49.04% 35.03% 26.01%
MEAN 26.20% 34.91% 11,560 4,570 1.09 3.94 16.58 19.02 21.07
1995 MEDIAN 14.40% 34.47% 2,414 1,648 1.08 3.38 15.66 16.33 17.65
CORR MISPRICING 1 20.46% -12.86% -18.21% -13.78% -11.34% -2.96% -11.57% -5.60%
MEAN 18.75% 46.36% 6,672 2,801 1.13 3.37 14.83 13.42 21.49
1994 MEDIAN 18.27% 42.98% 1,007 859 1.13 3.12 13.94 13.63 17.76
CORR MISPRICING 1 59.38% -7.77% -15.00% -26.32% 21.22% -5.95% 7.72% 31.40%
MEAN 24.70% 9.95% 7,155 3,087 1.03 4.00 16.14 13.77 21.87
1993 MEDIAN 19.35% 5.23% 1,086 950 1.03 3.34 15.14 12.34 19.35
CORR MISPRICING 1 55.83% 4.38% 6.97% 23.55% 13.57% -21.17% -9.27% 4.41%
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics Consumer Discretionary Industry 
Degree of Avg. 1 year Market Adjusted P/BV Price / Return on 
Mispricing Return Capitalization Sales Beta Ratio trailing EPS Price avg. equity
MEAN 5.00% 16.22% 7,313 10,047 0.94 3.68 17.36 44.33 20.60
All Years MEDIAN 2.13% 12.40% 3,855 3,176 0.94 2.91 16.99 29.13 17.61
CORR MISPRICING 1 30.11% -17.43% -3.55% 3.80% -21.22% -51.17% -0.36% 17.51%
MEAN 20.81% 34.81% 5,803 5,787 0.87 4.05 16.74 69.04 44.64
2002 MEDIAN 7.79% 26.81% 3,591 3,545 0.88 2.75 15.59 31.33 15.47
CORR MISPRICING 1 49.04% -13.58% 26.96% 39.15% -32.18% -59.13% -9.85% 22.16%
MEAN 6.25% 19.57% 7,203 6,525 0.84 4.75 17.41 41.90 22.89
2001 MEDIAN 2.72% 13.05% 4,334 4,279 0.83 2.86 16.47 35.15 19.48
CORR MISPRICING 1 60.08% -5.91% -9.82% 29.31% 16.52% -54.30% 26.23% 40.23%
MEAN 19.87% 27.76% 7,303 11,612 0.94 3.14 13.77 33.77 19.38
2000 MEDIAN 13.88% 17.35% 3,241 4,324 0.94 1.99 10.48 26.63 17.99
CORR MISPRICING 1 48.87% -30.19% -3.14% 1.66% -33.74% -56.31% -24.46% 14.75%
MEAN -3.73% -18.19% 11,369 14,520 0.90 4.79 18.87 59.07 21.78
1999 MEDIAN -7.31% -19.73% 5,572 3,720 0.93 3.12 17.73 43.31 19.00
CORR MISPRICING 1 7.44% -23.07% -6.93% 5.68% -30.33% -48.71% 4.83% 24.01%
MEAN -0.72% 2.45% 11,876 17,026 0.86 3.87 19.97 61.33 14.26
1998 MEDIAN -0.16% -1.50% 5,798 3,384 0.88 3.24 20.12 37.34 18.35
CORR MISPRICING 1 -11.75% -31.77% -0.12% 9.35% -27.59% -37.43% -3.90% 26.33%
MEAN 4.01% 28.24% 7,677 13,569 0.88 3.41 18.60 45.74 18.58
1997 MEDIAN 1.91% 18.77% 4,189 2,937 0.90 3.12 19.36 32.38 18.32
CORR MISPRICING 1 50.37% -5.34% 2.47% -17.72% -16.11% -45.71% 8.24% 1.13%
MEAN -1.38% 26.65% 5,892 4,400 0.95 3.69 18.50 38.78 17.44
1996 MEDIAN -1.40% 26.65% 3,519 2,391 0.92 3.40 19.09 24.94 17.60
CORR MISPRICING 1 49.15% -54.19% -41.10% -18.00% -29.16% -38.32% -12.57% 3.84%
MEAN 7.12% 24.43% 5,156 5,248 1.06 2.93 15.97 33.20 17.90
1995 MEDIAN 8.33% 24.88% 2,909 2,580 1.06 2.75 16.52 20.28 18.34
CORR MISPRICING 1 18.56% -31.80% -26.22% -0.01% -7.20% -29.46% 2.80% 22.29%
MEAN -3.17% 14.72% 5,259 9,270 1.06 3.09 16.09 30.90 16.98
1994 MEDIAN -2.55% 14.76% 2,708 2,273 1.05 2.81 16.90 23.13 17.04
CORR MISPRICING 1 22.34% 5.87% 7.54% -2.43% -13.75% -37.55% -3.30% 14.79%
MEAN 0.90% 4.51% 5,596 12,512 1.01 3.08 17.72 29.51 12.18
1993 MEDIAN -1.95% 2.97% 2,684 2,330 1.02 3.10 17.64 16.78 14.54
CORR MISPRICING 1 6.99% 15.73% 14.84% -8.97% -38.71% -64.87% 8.41% 5.58%
 
 120 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics ITT Industry 
Degree of Avg. 1 year Market Adjusted P/BV Price / Return on 
Mispricing Return Capitalization Sales Beta Ratio trailing EPS Price avg. equity
MEAN 8.29% 22.83% 21,062 10,628 1.02 4.42 22.96 23.37 15.47
All Years MEDIAN 2.98% 16.43% 5,478 2,901 0.98 3.75 21.27 19.84 16.57
CORR MISPRICING 1 10.79% -14.57% -6.05% 3.57% -9.38% -30.19% -16.05% 12.02%
MEAN 26.58% 40.55% 20,624 15,876 1.15 2.00 20.83 21.65 6.89
2002 MEDIAN 19.48% 37.81% 4,348 2,153 1.12 1.91 19.66 16.18 8.82
CORR MISPRICING 1 7.30% -39.82% -24.83% 10.20% -37.51% -43.94% -13.54% 13.92%
MEAN 0.33% -35.37% 32,466 14,119 1.07 4.85 15.73 34.76 18.51
2001 MEDIAN -7.86% -33.58% 7,955 1,846 1.02 4.34 23.13 29.00 18.17
CORR MISPRICING 1 -11.59% 5.12% 1.87% -10.16% 7.26% 22.71% 10.20% 20.21%
MEAN -1.26% -3.13% 40,436 14,906 0.99 4.97 28.84 37.18 17.40
2000 MEDIAN -5.65% 0.38% 7,380 6,302 0.97 4.17 23.71 29.06 18.58
CORR MISPRICING 1 44.59% -25.23% -7.77% 28.38% -21.89% -43.23% -23.48% 12.31%
MEAN 0.47% 25.55% 29,675 8,020 1.05 7.66 29.46 31.13 19.56
1999 MEDIAN -3.69% -1.56% 3,921 1,959 1.02 5.84 25.92 22.69 22.43
CORR MISPRICING 1 -24.23% -23.36% -19.31% -6.83% -41.30% -54.52% -12.21% 12.54%
MEAN 1.38% 37.34% 23,888 14,326 0.89 4.96 26.77 30.22 19.06
1998 MEDIAN 4.88% 39.96% 8,570 3,554 0.86 4.71 26.71 30.58 17.42
CORR MISPRICING 1 -20.82% -8.39% 5.81% -11.14% 9.86% -31.95% 10.03% 9.62%
MEAN 9.97% 23.55% 22,830 11,330 0.87 4.59 23.79 22.18 17.01
1997 MEDIAN 5.87% 26.81% 7,918 3,438 0.78 3.96 21.82 20.87 14.69
CORR MISPRICING 1 23.94% 6.71% -10.66% -0.26% -2.33% -28.28% -10.15% 9.25%
MEAN 15.91% 23.87% 13,350 8,596 1.00 5.03 21.49 18.00 19.65
1996 MEDIAN 7.48% 23.87% 5,000 2,096 0.96 3.54 17.16 15.98 19.94
CORR MISPRICING 1 28.78% -20.20% 0.28% 21.86% -27.73% -50.39% -30.79% 13.67%
MEAN 11.32% 24.27% 10,908 6,321 1.06 4.02 19.97 15.31 16.76
1995 MEDIAN 7.43% 17.64% 3,991 3,805 1.07 3.17 17.56 12.62 17.18
CORR MISPRICING 1 18.82% -13.32% -15.61% -9.85% 10.20% -18.87% -32.48% -13.27%
MEAN 8.30% 56.17% 9,069 7,533 1.02 3.09 18.28 11.34 9.06
1994 MEDIAN -4.59% 45.65% 3,636 1,995 1.01 2.94 18.59 9.34 14.26
CORR MISPRICING 1 20.54% -14.92% -3.61% -3.98% 44.76% -20.43% -34.98% 41.63%
MEAN 9.91% 13.41% 7,378 5,250 1.07 3.00 24.43 11.89 10.75
1993 MEDIAN 6.42% 7.31% 2,063 1,857 1.04 2.93 18.43 12.09 14.19
CORR MISPRICING 1 20.58% -12.25% 13.35% 17.47% -35.17% -11.44% -23.09% 0.30%
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Table 8: Distribution over Time of Degree of Mispricing and 1 year Stock Returns; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’ 
 
Percentiles Standard
n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
All Years Avg. Mispricing 1,054 7.51% -38.31% -9.27% 4.54% 19.79% 75.95% 27.79%
Avg. 1 year returns 1,054 19.39% -32.42% -1.24% 15.63% 34.64% 99.54% 32.74%
2002 Mispricing 101 26.70% -31.02% 1.17% 22.23% 40.95% 143.76% 41.12%
1 year returns 101 37.82% -12.09% 14.50% 32.68% 57.94% 118.73% 34.45%
2001 Mispricing 109 1.64% -45.79% -13.04% -1.88% 13.93% 56.95% 24.87%
1 year returns 109 -2.76% -50.17% -21.24% -4.58% 14.04% 57.61% 27.34%
2000 Mispricing 104 7.17% -46.35% -11.32% 4.15% 20.68% 82.06% 30.09%
1 year returns 104 14.35% -47.19% -10.20% 13.63% 30.02% 99.78% 35.94%
1999 Mispricing 104 -1.34% -37.18% -21.83% -4.92% 8.45% 78.46% 30.05%
1 year returns 104 1.34% -54.53% -23.10% -8.47% 15.10% 116.78% 42.72%
1998 Mispricing 104 0.20% -39.75% -13.57% 0.37% 10.76% 48.19% 22.38%
1 year returns 104 17.94% -46.50% -6.12% 15.36% 36.30% 103.50% 37.89%
1997 Mispricing 110 4.60% -42.07% -9.44% 2.68% 17.72% 56.19% 24.89%
1 year returns 110 23.13% -36.10% 3.64% 19.59% 39.36% 111.20% 34.56%
1996 Mispricing 106 7.47% -37.86% -6.29% 4.83% 20.08% 72.05% 25.50%
1 year returns 106 32.69% -14.24% 11.67% 27.77% 53.02% 101.15% 30.88%
1995 Mispricing 104 13.78% -30.92% -0.67% 9.80% 25.37% 71.17% 24.76%
1 year returns 104 28.39% -25.15% 10.96% 26.31% 41.22% 113.30% 31.58%
1994 Mispricing 104 7.15% -34.79% -8.85% 3.37% 19.84% 80.35% 27.43%
1 year returns 104 33.63% -15.60% 10.81% 30.11% 44.14% 121.64% 34.02%
1993 Mispricing 108 7.73% -37.42% -8.89% 4.74% 20.10% 70.31% 26.79%
1 year returns 108 7.40% -22.64% -3.34% 3.92% 15.27% 51.70% 18.03%
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Table 9: Distribution across Industries of Degree of Mispricing and 1 year Stock Returns; ‘Best estimate’ 
Percentiles Standard
n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
All Industries Avg. Mispricing 1,054 7.51% -38.31% -9.27% 4.54% 19.79% 75.95% 27.79%
Avg. 1 year returns 1,054 19.39% -32.42% -1.24% 15.63% 34.64% 99.54% 32.74%
Industrial Mispricing 264 5.95% -35.43% -7.46% 4.97% 18.19% 51.12% 20.89%
1 year returns 264 15.16% -27.08% 0.74% 13.75% 26.16% 70.84% 23.40%
Healthcare Mispricing 256 10.81% -33.06% -8.69% 8.08% 22.53% 86.56% 30.39%
1 year returns 256 23.36% -32.99% 0.88% 19.95% 40.98% 114.29% 36.04%
ITT Mispricing 233 8.29% -41.28% -11.58% 2.98% 20.31% 90.01% 32.77%
1 year returns 233 22.83% -43.36% -6.21% 16.43% 41.81% 131.36% 45.53%
Consumer Mispricing 301 5.00% -43.48% -9.36% 2.13% 18.13% 76.11% 27.09%
1 year returns 301 16.22% -26.25% -0.38% 12.40% 29.61% 81.66% 26.00%
 
 
 
 
 123 
Table 10: Results Portfolio Strategy; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’ 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 31.20% 20.46% 9.31% 21.89% 21.84% 9.37% 9.37% -1.38% -12.52% 21.89%
1 YEAR 27.57% 18.02% 6.26% 21.31% 19.47% 11.51% 8.11% -1.44% -13.20% 21.31%
3 YEARS 19.05% 14.52% 5.04% 14.01% 13.91% 11.58% 5.14% 0.62% -8.87% 14.01%
2002 6 MONTHS 26.25% 10.55% 18.82% 7.43% 19.22% 7.16% 7.02% -8.67% -0.41% 7.43%
1 YEAR 49.99% 19.26% 25.64% 24.34% 37.94% 18.62% 12.05% -18.67% -12.29% 24.34%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 17.12% 11.68% -10.73% 27.85% 6.64% -12.08% 10.48% 5.04% -17.37% 27.85%
1 YEAR 7.73% 1.41% -17.32% 25.04% -2.33% -19.16% 10.06% 3.74% -14.99% 25.04%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 49.68% 29.67% 30.99% 18.70% 32.66% -17.62% 17.02% -2.99% -1.67% 18.70%
1 YEAR 31.11% 12.90% -5.77% 36.88% 14.42% -15.82% 16.69% -1.52% -20.19% 36.88%
3 YEARS 11.24% -0.70% -8.79% 20.02% 1.69% -12.26% 9.55% -2.39% -10.47% 20.02%
1999 6 MONTHS 13.78% -12.83% 25.82% -12.04% 5.35% 14.56% 8.43% -18.17% 20.47% -12.04%
1 YEAR 5.77% -6.29% 7.99% -2.21% 0.03% 5.97% 5.75% -6.31% 7.96% -2.21%
3 YEARS 14.05% -4.72% -8.15% 22.20% -1.72% -10.33% 15.77% -3.01% -6.43% 22.20%
1998 6 MONTHS 16.86% 36.27% -0.45% 17.31% 21.12% 17.53% -4.26% 15.15% -21.57% 17.31%
1 YEAR 22.73% 19.78% 9.82% 12.91% 18.53% 21.07% 4.20% 1.25% -8.71% 12.91%
3 YEARS 12.93% 2.15% 1.78% 11.15% 4.82% 2.60% 8.11% -2.67% -3.04% 11.15%
1997 6 MONTHS 32.92% 30.40% -0.11% 33.04% 22.57% 20.20% 10.35% 7.83% -22.68% 33.04%
1 YEAR 28.00% 30.54% 9.72% 18.27% 23.39% 28.10% 4.61% 7.15% -13.66% 18.27%
3 YEARS 10.65% 19.32% 5.36% 5.29% 11.73% 18.01% -1.08% 7.60% -6.37% 5.29%
1996 6 MONTHS 32.69% 19.80% -4.42% 37.12% 22.68% 22.00% 10.01% -2.88% -27.10% 37.12%
1 YEAR 38.68% 34.04% 6.29% 32.39% 32.80% 31.99% 5.88% 1.24% -26.51% 32.39%
3 YEARS 22.61% 22.60% 4.01% 18.61% 21.15% 26.97% 1.46% 1.45% -17.15% 18.61%
1995 6 MONTHS 37.32% 35.16% 12.04% 25.28% 32.72% 27.84% 4.60% 2.45% -20.68% 25.28%
1 YEAR 31.87% 31.21% 8.41% 23.45% 28.55% 23.11% 3.31% 2.66% -20.14% 23.45%
3 YEARS 27.45% 31.65% 4.58% 22.86% 26.40% 27.68% 1.04% 5.24% -21.82% 22.86%
1994 6 MONTHS 56.31% 22.49% 7.75% 48.56% 32.30% 6.87% 24.01% -9.82% -24.55% 48.56%
1 YEAR 47.03% 30.09% 15.76% 31.27% 33.77% 22.62% 13.26% -3.68% -18.01% 31.27%
3 YEARS 31.34% 26.54% 28.07% 3.27% 28.45% 25.83% 2.89% -1.91% -0.38% 3.27%
1993 6 MONTHS 29.11% 21.38% 13.44% 15.67% 23.11% 7.19% 6.00% -1.73% -9.67% 15.67%
1 YEAR 12.83% 7.27% 2.07% 10.77% 7.55% -1.39% 5.28% -0.28% -5.48% 10.77%
3 YEARS 22.12% 19.35% 13.44% 8.67% 18.74% 14.18% 3.38% 0.62% -5.29% 8.67%
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Table 11: Results Portfolio Strategy; Industrial Industry; ‘Best estimate’ 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 16.64% 15.31% -5.17% 21.81% 12.17% 9.37% 4.48% 3.14% -17.33% 21.81%
1 YEAR 23.91% 13.66% -1.74% 25.65% 15.19% 11.51% 8.72% -1.52% -16.93% 25.65%
3 YEARS 15.77% 11.69% 6.61% 9.16% 12.37% 11.58% 3.40% -0.68% -5.76% 9.16%
2002 6 MONTHS 10.72% 5.02% -25.28% 36.00% 8.22% 7.16% 2.51% -3.20% -33.49% 36.00%
1 YEAR 34.26% 17.91% -19.55% 53.81% 28.84% 18.62% 5.43% -10.93% -48.39% 53.81%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 6.58% 8.34% -10.31% 16.89% 3.17% -12.08% 3.41% 5.17% -13.48% 16.89%
1 YEAR 14.21% 9.08% -5.87% 20.07% 7.42% -19.16% 6.79% 1.66% -13.28% 20.07%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 40.42% 53.19% 31.45% 8.97% 41.55% -17.62% -1.14% 11.63% -10.10% 8.97%
1 YEAR 23.48% 23.75% 3.66% 19.82% 20.00% -15.82% 3.48% 3.75% -16.34% 19.82%
3 YEARS 9.90% 8.23% -2.25% 12.14% 7.37% -12.26% 2.53% 0.86% -9.62% 12.14%
1999 6 MONTHS -19.24% -31.11% -9.38% -9.86% -21.23% 14.56% 1.99% -9.88% 11.85% -9.86%
1 YEAR 11.15% -25.66% -18.04% 29.19% -17.69% 5.97% 28.84% -7.97% -0.34% 29.19%
3 YEARS 8.63% 0.63% -0.16% 8.79% 1.43% -10.33% 7.20% -0.80% -1.59% 8.79%
1998 6 MONTHS -3.94% 25.46% -15.88% 11.94% 3.77% 17.53% -7.71% 21.69% -19.65% 11.94%
1 YEAR 15.17% 12.24% 4.72% 10.45% 10.66% 21.07% 4.51% 1.58% -5.94% 10.45%
3 YEARS 2.41% -3.33% 5.56% -3.15% 1.17% 2.60% 1.24% -4.50% 4.39% -3.15%
1997 6 MONTHS 23.68% 28.83% -0.86% 24.54% 20.39% 20.20% 3.29% 8.43% -21.25% 24.54%
1 YEAR 17.33% 18.58% 8.80% 8.52% 15.94% 28.10% 1.39% 2.64% -7.14% 8.52%
3 YEARS -1.74% -2.80% 0.17% -1.91% -1.79% 18.01% 0.05% -1.01% 1.96% -1.91%
1996 6 MONTHS 36.96% 23.46% -9.37% 46.33% 26.65% 22.00% 10.31% -3.19% -36.02% 46.33%
1 YEAR 48.69% 34.03% 2.12% 46.57% 37.78% 31.99% 10.91% -3.75% -35.66% 46.57%
3 YEARS 19.17% 23.18% 10.72% 8.45% 20.53% 26.97% -1.36% 2.66% -9.80% 8.45%
1995 6 MONTHS 28.75% 20.11% 11.48% 17.27% 23.49% 27.84% 5.26% -3.38% -12.01% 17.27%
1 YEAR 32.74% 28.92% 19.48% 13.26% 29.92% 23.11% 2.82% -1.01% -10.44% 13.26%
3 YEARS 34.29% 26.88% 6.53% 27.76% 28.66% 27.68% 5.63% -1.77% -22.13% 27.76%
1994 6 MONTHS 3.71% 7.12% -26.02% 29.73% 1.51% 6.87% 2.19% 5.60% -27.54% 29.73%
1 YEAR 29.38% 16.96% -9.64% 39.02% 17.28% 22.62% 12.10% -0.33% -26.92% 39.02%
3 YEARS 29.79% 26.29% 22.11% 7.69% 26.83% 25.83% 2.96% -0.54% -4.73% 7.69%
1993 6 MONTHS 38.79% 12.69% 2.51% 36.28% 14.13% 7.19% 24.66% -1.44% -11.62% 36.28%
1 YEAR 12.70% 0.83% -3.09% 15.78% 1.72% -1.39% 10.98% -0.89% -4.81% 15.78%
3 YEARS 23.69% 14.44% 10.18% 13.51% 14.73% 14.18% 8.96% -0.29% -4.55% 13.51%
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Table 12: Results Portfolio Strategy; Healthcare Industry; ‘Best estimate’ 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 48.36% 29.88% 19.84% 28.52% 34.54% 9.37% 13.82% -4.65% -14.70% 28.52%
1 YEAR 36.88% 19.55% 9.39% 27.49% 23.36% 11.51% 13.52% -3.81% -13.98% 27.49%
3 YEARS 23.49% 14.39% 6.98% 16.51% 15.65% 11.58% 7.84% -1.26% -8.68% 16.51%
2002 6 MONTHS 36.66% 34.67% 66.46% -29.80% 37.26% 7.16% -0.61% -2.59% 29.19% -29.80%
1 YEAR 56.88% 33.03% 39.33% 17.55% 47.82% 18.62% 9.06% -14.80% -8.49% 17.55%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 25.80% 14.81% 14.37% 11.43% 17.00% -12.08% 8.80% -2.18% -2.63% 11.43%
1 YEAR 19.65% -3.99% -15.01% 34.66% -2.65% -19.16% 22.30% -1.34% -12.36% 34.66%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 99.47% 44.40% 16.63% 82.83% 48.06% -17.62% 51.41% -3.66% -31.42% 82.83%
1 YEAR 48.36% 4.83% -4.80% 53.16% 12.76% -15.82% 35.60% -7.94% -17.56% 53.16%
3 YEARS 22.03% -3.53% -7.81% 29.85% 1.69% -12.26% 20.34% -5.22% -9.50% 29.85%
1999 6 MONTHS -18.65% -1.96% 4.63% -23.28% -3.16% 14.56% -15.49% 1.20% 7.79% -23.28%
1 YEAR 24.97% 24.25% 6.75% 18.22% 15.69% 5.97% 9.28% 8.56% -8.94% 18.22%
3 YEARS 31.21% -6.55% -2.53% 33.74% 5.63% -10.33% 25.58% -12.18% -8.16% 33.74%
1998 6 MONTHS 67.67% 40.34% -2.10% 69.76% 32.99% 17.53% 34.67% 7.35% -35.09% 69.76%
1 YEAR 52.29% 11.56% 4.86% 47.44% 20.80% 21.07% 31.49% -9.25% -15.95% 47.44%
3 YEARS 24.38% 8.77% 3.60% 20.78% 11.38% 2.60% 13.00% -2.62% -7.78% 20.78%
1997 6 MONTHS 31.95% 34.02% 1.90% 30.04% 22.88% 20.20% 9.06% 11.14% -20.98% 30.04%
1 YEAR 27.30% 31.71% 15.63% 11.67% 24.81% 28.10% 2.49% 6.90% -9.18% 11.67%
3 YEARS 6.06% 25.73% 10.96% -4.90% 13.26% 18.01% -7.19% 12.47% -2.29% -4.90%
1996 6 MONTHS 19.33% -12.76% -6.02% 25.34% 6.03% 22.00% 13.30% -18.78% -12.04% 25.34%
1 YEAR 32.52% 11.91% 12.38% 20.14% 23.17% 31.99% 9.35% -11.26% -10.79% 20.14%
3 YEARS 26.14% 5.91% -6.89% 33.04% 14.20% 26.97% 11.94% -8.29% -21.10% 33.04%
1995 6 MONTHS 65.72% 74.55% 49.79% 15.92% 66.56% 27.84% -0.85% 7.99% -16.77% 15.92%
1 YEAR 35.19% 45.51% 0.76% 34.42% 34.91% 23.11% 0.28% 10.60% -34.15% 34.42%
3 YEARS 25.40% 36.40% 0.92% 24.48% 26.08% 27.68% -0.68% 10.32% -25.16% 24.48%
1994 6 MONTHS 110.06% 47.26% 46.09% 63.97% 82.55% 6.87% 27.51% -35.29% -36.46% 63.97%
1 YEAR 60.15% 28.27% 28.70% 31.45% 46.36% 22.62% 13.79% -18.10% -17.66% 31.45%
3 YEARS 27.29% 21.93% 44.02% -16.73% 28.80% 25.83% -1.51% -6.87% 15.22% -16.73%
1993 6 MONTHS 45.57% 23.46% 6.60% 38.97% 35.17% 7.19% 10.40% -11.72% -28.57% 38.97%
1 YEAR 11.49% 8.43% 5.26% 6.23% 9.95% -1.39% 1.54% -1.51% -4.69% 6.23%
3 YEARS 25.37% 26.48% 13.55% 11.83% 24.17% 14.18% 1.20% 2.31% -10.63% 11.83%
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Table 13: Results Portfolio Strategy; Consumer Discretionary Industry; ‘Best estimate’ 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 23.19% 10.43% 5.41% 17.78% 12.53% 9.37% 10.66% -2.11% -7.13% 17.78%
1 YEAR 24.08% 14.41% 4.41% 19.67% 16.22% 11.51% 7.86% -1.81% -11.81% 19.67%
3 YEARS 14.03% 11.87% 3.26% 10.77% 10.57% 11.58% 3.47% 1.30% -7.31% 10.77%
2002 6 MONTHS 33.30% -5.64% 20.33% 12.97% 13.16% 7.16% 20.14% -18.80% 7.17% 12.97%
1 YEAR 61.62% 14.63% 21.77% 39.85% 34.81% 18.62% 26.81% -20.18% -13.04% 39.85%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 38.98% 12.90% -13.20% 52.19% 17.56% -12.08% 21.43% -4.65% -30.76% 52.19%
1 YEAR 40.03% 14.33% -6.83% 46.86% 19.57% -19.16% 20.46% -5.24% -26.40% 46.86%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 44.52% 19.44% 87.11% -42.59% 40.55% -17.62% 3.97% -21.11% 46.56% -42.59%
1 YEAR 36.05% 20.85% 1.04% 35.01% 27.76% -15.82% 8.29% -6.91% -26.72% 35.01%
3 YEARS 15.11% 2.90% -5.24% 20.34% 9.20% -12.26% 5.91% -6.30% -14.44% 20.34%
1999 6 MONTHS -16.55% -11.09% -13.26% -3.29% -13.00% 14.56% -3.54% 1.91% -0.26% -3.29%
1 YEAR -14.71% -21.02% -17.04% 2.33% -18.19% 5.97% 3.48% -2.83% 1.14% 2.33%
3 YEARS 23.29% 0.29% -3.58% 26.87% 2.83% -10.33% 20.46% -2.54% -6.41% 26.87%
1998 6 MONTHS -10.68% -0.38% -27.24% 16.56% -11.22% 17.53% 0.54% 10.84% -16.02% 16.56%
1 YEAR -3.99% 8.09% -1.40% -2.59% 2.45% 21.07% -6.44% 5.64% -3.85% -2.59%
3 YEARS 2.67% -2.59% -6.79% 9.46% -2.81% 2.60% 5.48% 0.22% -3.98% 9.46%
1997 6 MONTHS 45.26% 23.62% 12.50% 32.76% 27.04% 20.20% 18.22% -3.42% -14.54% 32.76%
1 YEAR 40.05% 25.90% 19.02% 21.04% 28.24% 28.10% 11.81% -2.34% -9.23% 21.04%
3 YEARS 5.77% 2.00% -10.68% 16.45% -0.25% 18.01% 6.02% 2.25% -10.43% 16.45%
1996 6 MONTHS 18.53% 12.16% -12.82% 31.35% 6.62% 22.00% 11.91% 5.54% -19.43% 31.35%
1 YEAR 30.23% 30.86% 6.89% 23.34% 23.85% 31.99% 6.38% 7.00% -16.96% 23.34%
3 YEARS 7.96% 22.75% 11.59% -3.63% 15.86% 26.97% -7.91% 6.89% -4.27% -3.63%
1995 6 MONTHS 22.48% 27.25% -12.49% 34.97% 18.56% 27.84% 3.92% 8.69% -31.05% 34.97%
1 YEAR 27.93% 25.52% 12.73% 15.20% 24.43% 23.11% 3.50% 1.09% -11.70% 15.20%
3 YEARS 25.18% 27.48% 12.61% 12.57% 24.01% 27.68% 1.17% 3.47% -11.39% 12.57%
1994 6 MONTHS 38.84% 0.57% -15.90% 54.75% 1.26% 6.87% 37.59% -0.69% -17.16% 54.75%
1 YEAR 20.41% 17.38% 5.58% 14.83% 14.72% 22.62% 5.69% 2.65% -9.15% 14.83%
3 YEARS 21.01% 23.19% 14.93% 6.08% 20.78% 25.83% 0.23% 2.41% -5.85% 6.08%
1993 6 MONTHS 17.22% 25.43% 29.05% -11.82% 24.82% 7.19% -7.60% 0.61% 4.22% -11.82%
1 YEAR 3.13% 7.56% 2.33% 0.80% 4.51% -1.39% -1.38% 3.05% -2.18% 0.80%
3 YEARS 11.27% 18.90% 13.23% -1.95% 14.91% 14.18% -3.64% 3.99% -1.68% -1.95%
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Table 14: Results Portfolio Strategy; ITT Industry; ‘Best estimate’ 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 36.63% 19.77% 10.53% 26.10% 28.11% 9.37% 8.52% -8.34% -17.58% 26.10%
1 YEAR 25.99% 21.09% 7.67% 18.32% 23.10% 11.51% 2.90% -2.01% -15.42% 18.32%
3 YEARS 18.49% 19.46% 4.05% 14.44% 17.05% 11.58% 1.44% 2.41% -13.00% 14.44%
2002 6 MONTHS 31.59% 0.73% -8.99% 40.58% 18.25% 7.16% 13.35% -17.52% -27.23% 40.58%
1 YEAR 47.72% 14.53% 57.01% -9.29% 40.27% 18.62% 7.45% -25.75% 16.74% -9.29%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 8.00% -17.93% -20.87% 28.87% -11.18% -12.08% 19.18% -6.75% -9.69% 28.87%
1 YEAR -36.50% -33.27% -31.58% -4.92% -33.65% -19.16% -2.85% 0.38% 2.07% -4.92%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS -4.91% 6.89% 2.66% -7.56% 0.47% -17.62% -5.38% 6.42% 2.18% -7.56%
1 YEAR -1.08% 7.94% -14.54% 13.46% -2.83% -15.82% 1.74% 10.77% -11.72% 13.46%
3 YEARS -11.63% -7.21% -15.04% 3.40% -11.51% -12.26% -0.12% 4.31% -3.52% 3.40%
1999 6 MONTHS 66.72% 22.16% 93.20% -26.48% 58.78% 14.56% 7.94% -36.62% 34.42% -26.48%
1 YEAR 10.57% 20.83% 31.31% -20.74% 20.29% 5.97% -9.72% 0.54% 11.02% -20.74%
3 YEARS -13.84% -11.20% -26.94% 13.10% -16.76% -10.33% 2.92% 5.56% -10.18% 13.10%
1998 6 MONTHS 55.93% 70.30% 43.43% 12.50% 58.94% 17.53% -3.00% 11.36% -15.51% 12.50%
1 YEAR 46.52% 34.23% 31.10% 15.41% 40.22% 21.07% 6.30% -5.99% -9.12% 15.41%
3 YEARS 12.59% 6.82% 4.74% 7.85% 9.55% 2.60% 3.04% -2.72% -4.81% 7.85%
1997 6 MONTHS 36.49% 10.06% -21.35% 57.84% 19.97% 20.20% 16.52% -9.90% -41.32% 57.84%
1 YEAR 33.32% 21.17% 0.28% 33.04% 24.55% 28.10% 8.77% -3.38% -24.27% 33.04%
3 YEARS 40.40% 33.81% 22.72% 17.68% 35.69% 18.01% 4.71% -1.88% -12.96% 17.68%
1996 6 MONTHS 68.06% 37.07% 10.51% 57.56% 51.42% 22.00% 16.64% -14.35% -40.92% 57.56%
1 YEAR 47.10% 58.06% 3.77% 43.33% 46.40% 31.99% 0.70% 11.66% -42.63% 43.33%
3 YEARS 38.02% 37.66% 0.61% 37.40% 34.02% 26.97% 3.99% 3.63% -33.41% 37.40%
1995 6 MONTHS 29.88% 13.92% -40.92% 70.80% 22.25% 27.84% 7.64% -8.33% -63.16% 70.80%
1 YEAR 28.53% 26.37% -47.23% 75.75% 24.95% 23.11% 3.58% 1.42% -72.18% 75.75%
3 YEARS 22.39% 40.58% -6.46% 28.85% 26.88% 27.68% -4.49% 13.71% -33.34% 28.85%
1994 6 MONTHS 58.02% 37.85% 18.94% 39.08% 43.88% 6.87% 14.14% -6.04% -24.94% 39.08%
1 YEAR 74.30% 36.65% 42.45% 31.85% 56.72% 22.62% 17.58% -20.07% -14.27% 31.85%
3 YEARS 45.33% 21.85% 39.56% 5.77% 37.39% 25.83% 7.95% -15.54% 2.17% 5.77%
1993 6 MONTHS 16.54% 16.64% 28.71% -12.17% 18.31% 7.19% -1.78% -1.67% 10.40% -12.17%
1 YEAR 9.45% 24.39% 4.15% 5.30% 14.02% -1.39% -4.58% 10.36% -9.88% 5.30%
3 YEARS 14.68% 33.34% 13.20% 1.48% 21.13% 14.18% -6.45% 12.21% -7.93% 1.48%
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Table 15: Results Portfolio Strategy; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’; Speculative and Safe stocks 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY HOLD SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY HOLD SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 31.88% 29.07% 11.86% 20.02% 24.64% 9.37% 7.24% 4.43% -12.79% 20.02%
1 YEAR 29.27% 18.95% 9.96% 19.31% 20.56% 11.51% 8.71% -1.61% -10.60% 19.31%
3 YEARS 18.38% 13.74% 7.77% 10.61% 13.89% 11.58% 4.49% -0.14% -6.11% 10.61%
2002 6 MONTHS 39.63% 83.86% 17.64% 21.99% 41.87% 7.16% -2.24% 41.99% -24.23% 21.99%
1 YEAR 58.97% 21.71% 31.41% 27.56% 43.20% 18.62% 15.76% -21.49% -11.79% 27.56%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 16.44% 11.12% -11.80% 28.24% 4.63% -12.08% 11.81% 6.48% -16.44% 28.24%
1 YEAR 10.71% 2.31% -16.48% 27.19% -1.69% -19.16% 12.40% 4.00% -14.79% 27.19%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 74.78% 42.52% 16.11% 58.67% 42.71% -17.62% 32.07% -0.19% -26.60% 58.67%
1 YEAR 43.66% 17.77% -1.49% 45.15% 20.34% -15.82% 23.32% -2.57% -21.83% 45.15%
3 YEARS 10.73% 0.60% -7.01% 17.74% 1.66% -12.26% 9.07% -1.06% -8.67% 17.74%
1999 6 MONTHS 11.72% -6.12% 24.10% -12.38% 8.61% 14.56% 3.11% -14.73% 15.49% -12.38%
1 YEAR 9.88% 4.37% 2.30% 7.58% 2.09% 5.97% 7.79% 2.28% 0.21% 7.58%
3 YEARS 11.71% -3.49% -5.86% 17.56% -0.23% -10.33% 11.94% -3.26% -5.62% 17.56%
1998 6 MONTHS 15.62% 27.28% 5.28% 10.34% 17.96% 17.53% -2.34% 9.32% -12.68% 10.34%
1 YEAR 22.75% 15.75% 12.28% 10.47% 17.01% 21.07% 5.74% -1.26% -4.73% 10.47%
3 YEARS 14.79% 1.87% 2.06% 12.73% 5.57% 2.60% 9.22% -3.70% -3.51% 12.73%
1997 6 MONTHS 34.27% 26.43% 9.48% 24.79% 23.80% 20.20% 10.47% 2.63% -14.32% 24.79%
1 YEAR 32.62% 24.16% 19.29% 13.32% 25.74% 28.10% 6.87% -1.59% -6.45% 13.32%
3 YEARS 9.59% 13.14% 10.63% -1.04% 10.98% 18.01% -1.39% 2.17% -0.35% -1.04%
1996 6 MONTHS 22.05% 19.23% 0.15% 21.90% 17.18% 22.00% 4.87% 2.05% -17.03% 21.90%
1 YEAR 32.59% 33.07% 13.05% 19.54% 29.29% 31.99% 3.29% 3.77% -16.25% 19.54%
3 YEARS 23.04% 22.29% 8.02% 15.02% 20.48% 26.97% 2.57% 1.82% -12.46% 15.02%
1995 6 MONTHS 38.33% 34.35% 18.51% 19.82% 33.28% 27.84% 5.06% 1.07% -14.77% 19.82%
1 YEAR 30.51% 27.41% 11.29% 19.22% 26.87% 23.11% 3.64% 0.54% -15.58% 19.22%
3 YEARS 27.40% 27.07% 9.41% 17.99% 24.84% 27.68% 2.56% 2.23% -15.44% 17.99%
1994 6 MONTHS 38.55% 21.17% 18.31% 20.23% 27.88% 6.87% 10.66% -6.72% -9.57% 20.23%
1 YEAR 39.04% 30.62% 24.53% 14.50% 32.92% 22.62% 6.11% -2.30% -8.39% 14.50%
3 YEARS 28.25% 26.54% 28.58% -0.34% 27.51% 25.83% 0.74% -0.96% 1.08% -0.34%
1993 6 MONTHS 27.40% 30.89% 20.78% 6.63% 28.52% 7.19% -1.11% 2.37% -7.74% 6.63%
1 YEAR 12.03% 12.31% 3.43% 8.60% 9.84% -1.39% 2.19% 2.48% -6.41% 8.60%
3 YEARS 21.52% 21.92% 16.34% 5.18% 20.29% 14.18% 1.23% 1.63% -3.95% 5.18%
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Table 16: Results Portfolio Strategy; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 27.58% 3.47% 24.10% 21.84% 9.37% 5.74% -18.29% 24.03%
1 YEAR 26.00% 2.81% 23.19% 19.47% 11.51% 6.53% -16.66% 23.19%
3 YEARS 16.49% 3.15% 13.34% 14.01% 11.58% 2.58% -10.76% 13.34%
2002 6 MONTHS 19.90% 3.93% 15.97% 19.22% 7.16% 0.68% -14.97% 15.65%
1 YEAR 51.96% 8.23% 43.73% 37.94% 18.62% 14.03% -29.71% 43.73%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 15.17% -5.81% 20.98% 6.64% -12.08% 8.53% -12.44% 20.98%
1 YEAR 9.92% -12.97% 22.89% -2.33% -19.16% 12.24% -10.64% 22.89%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 43.58% 11.96% 31.62% 32.66% -17.62% 10.92% -20.70% 31.62%
1 YEAR 24.66% -5.14% 29.80% 14.42% -15.82% 10.24% -19.56% 29.80%
3 YEARS 11.25% -6.40% 17.66% 20.02% -12.26% 9.57% -8.09% 17.66%
1999 6 MONTHS 0.55% 15.15% -14.61% 5.35% 14.56% -4.80% 9.81% -14.61%
1 YEAR 3.40% 4.31% -0.90% 0.03% 5.97% 3.38% 4.28% -0.90%
3 YEARS 9.30% -4.12% 13.42% 22.20% -10.33% 11.02% -2.40% 13.42%
1998 6 MONTHS 12.94% -6.97% 19.91% 21.12% 17.53% -8.18% -28.09% 19.91%
1 YEAR 16.33% 4.29% 12.03% 18.53% 21.07% -2.21% -14.24% 12.03%
3 YEARS 8.54% 0.98% 7.56% 11.15% 2.60% 3.72% -3.84% 7.56%
1997 6 MONTHS 31.65% 1.01% 30.64% 22.57% 20.20% 9.08% -21.56% 30.64%
1 YEAR 26.72% 8.43% 18.28% 23.39% 28.10% 3.33% -14.95% 18.28%
3 YEARS 9.62% 3.24% 6.39% 5.29% 18.01% -2.10% -8.49% 6.39%
1996 6 MONTHS 31.65% -3.00% 34.65% 22.68% 22.00% 8.98% -25.67% 34.65%
1 YEAR 35.49% 3.32% 32.18% 32.80% 31.99% 2.69% -29.49% 32.18%
3 YEARS 20.98% 2.04% 18.94% 18.61% 26.97% -0.17% -19.12% 18.94%
1995 6 MONTHS 41.94% 1.45% 40.48% 32.72% 27.84% 9.22% -30.75% 39.97%
1 YEAR 35.83% 2.65% 33.17% 28.55% 23.11% 7.27% -25.90% 33.17%
3 YEARS 27.63% 1.82% 25.81% 22.86% 27.68% 1.23% -24.58% 25.81%
1994 6 MONTHS 50.72% 5.76% 44.96% 32.30% 6.87% 18.42% -26.54% 44.96%
1 YEAR 41.63% 13.71% 27.92% 33.77% 22.62% 7.85% -20.06% 27.92%
3 YEARS 25.07% 17.29% 7.77% 3.27% 25.83% -3.38% -11.16% 7.77%
1993 6 MONTHS 27.68% 11.25% 16.43% 23.11% 7.19% 4.57% -11.95% 16.52%
1 YEAR 14.02% 1.24% 12.78% 7.55% -1.39% 6.47% -6.31% 12.78%
3 YEARS 19.49% 10.36% 9.12% 8.67% 14.18% 0.75% -8.37% 9.12%
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Table 17: Results Portfolio Strategy; Industrial Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe stocks   
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 15.16% -2.01% 17.18% 12.17% 9.37% 3.00% -14.18% 17.18%
1 YEAR 20.94% -1.37% 22.32% 15.19% 11.51% 5.76% -16.56% 22.32%
3 YEARS 12.39% 2.66% 9.73% 9.16% 11.58% 0.02% -9.71% 9.73%
2002 6 MONTHS 1.02% -2.53% 3.55% 8.22% 7.16% -7.19% -10.74% 3.55%
1 YEAR 31.07% -1.96% 33.02% 28.84% 18.62% 2.23% -30.79% 33.02%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 9.27% -7.22% 16.49% 3.17% -12.08% 6.10% -10.39% 16.49%
1 YEAR 15.67% -4.11% 19.77% 7.42% -19.16% 8.25% -11.52% 19.77%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 40.64% 15.73% 24.91% 41.55% -17.62% -0.92% -25.83% 24.91%
1 YEAR 21.62% 1.83% 19.80% 20.00% -15.82% 1.63% -18.17% 19.80%
3 YEARS 11.05% -1.12% 12.18% 12.14% -12.26% 3.68% -8.49% 12.18%
1999 6 MONTHS -7.70% -6.18% -1.51% -21.23% 14.56% 13.54% 15.05% -1.51%
1 YEAR 4.46% -17.66% 22.12% -17.69% 5.97% 22.15% 0.03% 22.12%
3 YEARS 3.45% -1.97% 5.42% 8.79% -10.33% 2.02% -3.40% 5.42%
1998 6 MONTHS -3.15% -14.29% 11.14% 3.77% 17.53% -6.92% -18.06% 11.14%
1 YEAR 12.14% 4.25% 7.89% 10.66% 21.07% 1.48% -6.41% 7.89%
3 YEARS 1.93% 5.00% -3.07% -3.15% 2.60% 0.76% 3.84% -3.07%
1997 6 MONTHS 18.94% -0.51% 19.46% 20.39% 20.20% -1.45% -20.91% 19.46%
1 YEAR 13.86% 5.28% 8.58% 15.94% 28.10% -2.08% -10.66% 8.58%
3 YEARS -1.39% 0.10% -1.49% -1.91% 18.01% 0.40% 1.89% -1.49%
1996 6 MONTHS 36.71% -1.87% 38.58% 26.65% 22.00% 10.06% -28.52% 38.58%
1 YEAR 48.65% 0.42% 48.23% 37.78% 31.99% 10.87% -37.36% 48.23%
3 YEARS 17.54% 2.14% 15.40% 8.45% 26.97% -2.98% -18.38% 15.40%
1995 6 MONTHS 33.93% 2.30% 31.63% 23.49% 27.84% 10.44% -21.20% 31.63%
1 YEAR 35.06% 3.90% 31.17% 29.92% 23.11% 5.14% -26.03% 31.17%
3 YEARS 33.83% 1.31% 32.53% 27.76% 27.68% 5.18% -27.35% 32.53%
1994 6 MONTHS 2.60% -7.81% 10.40% 1.51% 6.87% 1.08% -9.32% 10.40%
1 YEAR 20.57% -2.89% 23.46% 17.28% 22.62% 3.28% -20.18% 23.46%
3 YEARS 20.85% 6.63% 14.22% 7.69% 25.83% -5.98% -20.20% 14.22%
1993 6 MONTHS 19.39% 2.26% 17.14% 14.13% 7.19% 5.26% -11.87% 17.14%
1 YEAR 6.35% -2.78% 9.13% 1.72% -1.39% 4.63% -4.50% 9.13%
3 YEARS 11.85% 9.16% 2.68% 13.51% 14.18% -2.89% -5.57% 2.68%
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Table 18: Results Portfolio Strategy; Healthcare Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 44.39% 7.41% 36.97% 34.54% 9.37% 9.85% -26.82% 36.68%
1 YEAR 34.76% 4.06% 30.70% 23.36% 11.51% 11.40% -19.30% 30.70%
3 YEARS 20.53% 3.35% 17.18% 16.51% 11.58% 4.87% -12.31% 17.18%
2002 6 MONTHS 14.99% 6.65% 8.34% 37.26% 7.16% -22.27% -29.34% 7.07%
1 YEAR 59.17% 3.93% 55.24% 47.82% 18.62% 11.35% -43.89% 55.24%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 18.06% 16.30% 1.77% 17.00% -12.08% 1.06% -0.70% 1.77%
1 YEAR 13.75% -11.80% 25.55% -2.65% -19.16% 16.40% -9.15% 25.55%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 59.68% 14.97% 44.71% 48.06% -17.62% 11.62% -33.09% 44.71%
1 YEAR 29.02% -4.32% 33.34% 12.76% -15.82% 16.26% -17.08% 33.34%
3 YEARS 13.22% -7.03% 20.25% 29.85% -12.26% 11.53% -8.72% 20.25%
1999 6 MONTHS -13.05% 9.23% -22.29% -3.16% 14.56% -9.90% 12.39% -22.29%
1 YEAR 17.48% 14.49% 2.99% 15.69% 5.97% 1.79% -1.21% 2.99%
3 YEARS 21.85% 1.93% 19.92% 33.74% -10.33% 16.22% -3.70% 19.92%
1998 6 MONTHS 54.13% -2.10% 56.23% 32.99% 17.53% 21.14% -35.09% 56.23%
1 YEAR 41.84% 4.86% 36.98% 20.80% 21.07% 21.03% -15.95% 36.98%
3 YEARS 19.51% 3.60% 15.91% 20.78% 2.60% 8.12% -7.78% 15.91%
1997 6 MONTHS 34.67% 1.71% 32.96% 22.88% 20.20% 11.79% -21.17% 32.96%
1 YEAR 28.37% 14.07% 14.30% 24.81% 28.10% 3.56% -10.74% 14.30%
3 YEARS 4.86% 9.86% -5.01% -4.90% 18.01% -8.40% -3.39% -5.01%
1996 6 MONTHS 9.18% -3.01% 12.19% 6.03% 22.00% 3.15% -9.03% 12.19%
1 YEAR 23.76% 6.19% 17.57% 23.17% 31.99% 0.59% -16.98% 17.57%
3 YEARS 22.08% -3.45% 25.52% 33.04% 26.97% 7.88% -17.65% 25.52%
1995 6 MONTHS 82.40% 9.96% 72.44% 66.56% 27.84% 15.84% -54.54% 70.38%
1 YEAR 43.27% 0.15% 43.11% 34.91% 23.11% 8.35% -34.76% 43.11%
3 YEARS 24.14% 0.18% 23.95% 24.48% 27.68% -1.94% -25.90% 23.95%
1994 6 MONTHS 119.40% 18.44% 100.96% 82.55% 6.87% 36.85% -64.12% 100.96%
1 YEAR 67.42% 11.48% 55.93% 46.36% 22.62% 21.05% -34.88% 55.93%
3 YEARS 28.47% 17.61% 10.86% -16.73% 25.83% -0.33% -11.19% 10.86%
1993 6 MONTHS 64.41% 1.98% 62.43% 35.17% 7.19% 29.24% -33.55% 62.78%
1 YEAR 23.52% 1.58% 21.94% 9.95% -1.39% 13.57% -8.37% 21.94%
3 YEARS 30.09% 4.06% 26.02% 11.83% 14.18% 5.91% -20.11% 26.02%
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Table 19: Results Portfolio Strategy; Consumer Discretionary Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 22.86% -0.25% 23.11% 12.53% 9.37% 10.33% -12.78% 23.11%
1 YEAR 23.30% 2.37% 20.93% 16.22% 11.51% 7.08% -13.85% 20.93%
3 YEARS 11.58% 3.05% 8.53% 10.77% 11.58% 1.01% -7.52% 8.53%
2002 6 MONTHS 38.33% 6.10% 32.23% 13.16% 7.16% 25.17% -7.06% 32.23%
1 YEAR 67.65% 6.53% 61.11% 34.81% 18.62% 32.83% -28.28% 61.11%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 35.09% -5.28% 40.37% 17.56% -12.08% 17.53% -22.84% 40.37%
1 YEAR 36.03% -2.73% 38.76% 19.57% -19.16% 16.46% -22.30% 38.76%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 65.39% 26.13% 39.26% 40.55% -17.62% 24.84% -14.42% 39.26%
1 YEAR 38.08% 0.31% 37.76% 27.76% -15.82% 10.31% -27.45% 37.76%
3 YEARS 21.99% -1.57% 23.57% 20.34% -12.26% 12.79% -10.77% 23.57%
1999 6 MONTHS -9.93% -15.21% 5.28% -13.00% 14.56% 3.07% -2.21% 5.28%
1 YEAR -8.83% -15.75% 6.93% -18.19% 5.97% 9.36% 2.43% 6.93%
3 YEARS 13.97% -0.64% 14.61% 26.87% -10.33% 11.14% -3.47% 14.61%
1998 6 MONTHS -6.41% -24.52% 18.11% -11.22% 17.53% 4.81% -13.30% 18.11%
1 YEAR -2.39% -1.26% -1.13% 2.45% 21.07% -4.84% -3.71% -1.13%
3 YEARS 1.60% -6.11% 7.71% 9.46% 2.60% 4.41% -3.30% 7.71%
1997 6 MONTHS 45.26% 11.25% 34.01% 27.04% 20.20% 18.22% -15.79% 34.01%
1 YEAR 40.05% 17.11% 22.94% 28.24% 28.10% 11.81% -11.13% 22.94%
3 YEARS 5.77% -9.61% 15.39% 16.45% 18.01% 6.02% -9.37% 15.39%
1996 6 MONTHS 12.97% -10.25% 23.22% 6.62% 22.00% 6.35% -16.87% 23.22%
1 YEAR 21.16% 5.51% 15.65% 23.85% 31.99% -2.69% -18.34% 15.65%
3 YEARS 5.57% 9.27% -3.70% -3.63% 26.97% -10.29% -6.59% -3.70%
1995 6 MONTHS 20.31% -6.25% 26.56% 18.56% 27.84% 1.76% -24.81% 26.56%
1 YEAR 30.87% 6.37% 24.51% 24.43% 23.11% 6.44% -18.07% 24.51%
3 YEARS 27.42% 6.31% 21.11% 12.57% 27.68% 3.41% -17.70% 21.11%
1994 6 MONTHS 15.54% -12.72% 28.26% 1.26% 6.87% 14.28% -13.98% 28.26%
1 YEAR 8.16% 4.46% 3.70% 14.72% 22.62% -6.56% -10.26% 3.70%
3 YEARS 8.40% 11.95% -3.54% 6.08% 25.83% -12.38% -8.83% -3.54%
1993 6 MONTHS 12.06% 28.28% -16.22% 24.82% 7.19% -12.76% 3.46% -16.22%
1 YEAR 2.19% 3.15% -0.96% 4.51% -1.39% -2.32% -1.36% -0.96%
3 YEARS 7.89% 14.77% -6.88% -1.95% 14.18% -7.02% -0.13% -6.88%
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Table 20: Results Portfolio Strategy; ITT Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 33.18% 8.75% 24.44% 28.11% 9.37% 5.07% -19.36% 24.44%
1 YEAR 27.45% 6.17% 21.28% 23.10% 11.51% 4.35% -16.93% 21.28%
3 YEARS 18.90% 3.56% 15.34% 14.44% 11.58% 1.85% -13.49% 15.34%
2002 6 MONTHS 20.92% 5.50% 15.42% 18.25% 7.16% 2.67% -12.75% 15.42%
1 YEAR 44.79% 24.41% 20.38% 40.27% 18.62% 4.52% -15.87% 20.38%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 4.80% -27.02% 31.82% -11.18% -12.08% 15.98% -15.84% 31.82%
1 YEAR -21.90% -33.25% 11.34% -33.65% -19.16% 11.75% 0.40% 11.34%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS -4.91% -9.00% 4.10% 0.47% -17.62% -5.38% -9.48% 4.10%
1 YEAR -1.08% -18.38% 17.30% -2.83% -15.82% 1.74% -15.56% 17.30%
3 YEARS -11.63% -15.88% 4.24% 3.40% -12.26% -0.12% -4.36% 4.24%
1999 6 MONTHS 40.03% 72.78% -32.75% 58.78% 14.56% -18.75% 14.00% -32.75%
1 YEAR 6.34% 36.16% -29.82% 20.29% 5.97% -13.95% 15.87% -29.82%
3 YEARS -8.30% -15.80% 7.50% 13.10% -10.33% 8.46% 0.96% 7.50%
1998 6 MONTHS 54.76% 13.03% 41.73% 58.94% 17.53% -4.18% -45.91% 41.73%
1 YEAR 40.64% 9.33% 31.31% 40.22% 21.07% 0.42% -30.89% 31.31%
3 YEARS 12.43% 1.42% 11.01% 7.85% 2.60% 2.89% -8.12% 11.01%
1997 6 MONTHS 41.86% -8.40% 50.25% 19.97% 20.20% 21.89% -28.36% 50.25%
1 YEAR 41.63% -2.74% 44.36% 24.55% 28.10% 17.07% -27.29% 44.36%
3 YEARS 43.65% 12.59% 31.06% 17.68% 18.01% 7.97% -23.09% 31.06%
1996 6 MONTHS 86.95% 3.15% 83.80% 51.42% 22.00% 35.53% -48.27% 83.80%
1 YEAR 64.15% 1.13% 63.02% 46.40% 31.99% 17.75% -45.27% 63.02%
3 YEARS 46.91% 0.18% 46.72% 37.40% 26.97% 12.88% -33.84% 46.72%
1995 6 MONTHS 7.12% -0.19% 7.31% 22.25% 27.84% -15.12% -22.44% 7.31%
1 YEAR 13.71% 0.20% 13.50% 24.95% 23.11% -11.24% -24.74% 13.50%
3 YEARS 11.77% -0.52% 12.29% 28.85% 27.68% -15.10% -27.39% 12.29%
1994 6 MONTHS 55.17% 25.13% 30.04% 43.88% 6.87% 11.29% -18.75% 30.04%
1 YEAR 75.61% 41.79% 33.82% 56.72% 22.62% 18.89% -14.93% 33.82%
3 YEARS 41.92% 32.98% 8.94% 5.77% 25.83% 4.53% -4.40% 8.94%
1993 6 MONTHS 25.13% 12.48% 12.64% 18.31% 7.19% 6.81% -5.83% 12.64%
1 YEAR 10.62% 3.01% 7.62% 14.02% -1.39% -3.40% -11.02% 7.62%
3 YEARS 14.45% 13.46% 1.00% 1.48% 14.18% -6.68% -7.68% 1.00%
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Table 21: Results Portfolio Strategy; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’; Top 10 Safe and Speculative stocks 
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 36.78% 6.99% 29.79% 24.64% 9.37% 12.14% -17.65% 29.79%
1 YEAR 32.54% 6.25% 26.29% 20.56% 11.51% 11.97% -14.31% 26.29%
3 YEARS 18.16% 6.05% 12.10% 13.89% 11.58% 4.27% -7.83% 12.10%
2002 6 MONTHS 51.32% 7.65% 43.67% 41.87% 7.16% 9.45% -34.22% 43.67%
1 YEAR 79.44% 15.10% 64.34% 43.20% 18.62% 36.24% -28.11% 64.34%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 18.43% -9.35% 27.78% 4.63% -12.08% 13.79% -13.98% 27.78%
1 YEAR 14.45% -16.12% 30.57% -1.69% -19.16% 16.14% -14.43% 30.57%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 93.87% 12.01% 81.86% 42.71% -17.62% 51.16% -30.70% 81.86%
1 YEAR 48.12% -1.10% 49.22% 20.34% -15.82% 27.78% -21.44% 49.22%
3 YEARS 13.87% -6.91% 20.78% 1.66% -12.26% 12.21% -8.57% 20.78%
1999 6 MONTHS 5.01% 16.10% -11.09% 8.61% 14.56% -3.60% 7.49% -11.09%
1 YEAR 6.10% 1.05% 5.06% 2.09% 5.97% 4.02% -1.04% 5.06%
3 YEARS 10.48% -4.73% 15.22% -0.23% -10.33% 10.72% -4.50% 15.22%
1998 6 MONTHS 14.45% 4.76% 9.69% 17.96% 17.53% -3.51% -13.20% 9.69%
1 YEAR 17.29% 10.87% 6.42% 17.01% 21.07% 0.28% -6.15% 6.42%
3 YEARS 13.72% 1.85% 11.87% 5.57% 2.60% 8.15% -3.72% 11.87%
1997 6 MONTHS 31.66% 6.06% 25.60% 23.80% 20.20% 7.86% -17.74% 25.60%
1 YEAR 28.32% 18.45% 9.87% 25.74% 28.10% 2.57% -7.30% 9.87%
3 YEARS 7.93% 12.06% -4.13% 10.98% 18.01% -3.05% 1.09% -4.13%
1996 6 MONTHS 25.99% 0.16% 25.82% 17.18% 22.00% 8.80% -17.02% 25.82%
1 YEAR 36.15% 10.05% 26.10% 29.29% 31.99% 6.85% -19.25% 26.10%
3 YEARS 22.40% 6.60% 15.80% 20.48% 26.97% 1.93% -13.87% 15.80%
1995 6 MONTHS 48.88% 5.66% 43.22% 33.28% 27.84% 15.60% -27.61% 43.22%
1 YEAR 38.44% 5.01% 33.42% 26.87% 23.11% 11.57% -21.86% 33.42%
3 YEARS 27.91% 4.19% 23.73% 24.84% 27.68% 3.07% -20.66% 23.73%
1994 6 MONTHS 47.87% 9.75% 38.11% 27.88% 6.87% 19.98% -18.13% 38.11%
1 YEAR 42.54% 16.93% 25.60% 32.92% 22.62% 9.61% -15.99% 25.60%
3 YEARS 27.03% 21.46% 5.57% 27.51% 25.83% -0.47% -6.04% 5.57%
1993 6 MONTHS 30.35% 17.10% 13.26% 28.52% 7.19% 1.84% -11.42% 13.26%
1 YEAR 14.52% 2.28% 12.25% 9.84% -1.39% 4.69% -7.56% 12.25%
3 YEARS 21.91% 13.91% 8.00% 20.29% 14.18% 1.62% -6.38% 8.00%
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Table 22: Results Portfolio Strategy; All Industries; ‘Best estimate’; Top 5 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 39.40% 7.59% 31.81% 21.84% 9.37% 17.57% -14.24% 31.81%
1 YEAR 35.30% 5.02% 30.28% 19.47% 11.51% 15.83% -14.45% 30.28%
3 YEARS 21.41% 4.66% 16.75% 14.01% 11.58% 7.50% -9.25% 16.75%
2002 6 MONTHS 20.70% 7.86% 12.84% 19.22% 7.16% 1.48% -11.36% 12.84%
1 YEAR 67.48% 16.46% 51.02% 37.94% 18.62% 29.54% -21.48% 51.02%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 27.10% -11.65% 38.75% 6.64% -12.08% 20.46% -18.29% 38.75%
1 YEAR 12.75% -19.05% 31.81% -2.33% -19.16% 15.08% -16.73% 31.81%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 75.01% 29.31% 45.70% 32.66% -17.62% 42.35% -3.34% 45.70%
1 YEAR 41.83% -4.01% 45.84% 14.42% -15.82% 27.41% -18.43% 45.84%
3 YEARS 21.23% -7.46% 28.69% 20.02% -12.26% 19.54% -9.15% 28.69%
1999 6 MONTHS 0.34% 36.86% -36.52% 5.35% 14.56% -5.01% 31.51% -36.52%
1 YEAR 2.86% 18.61% -15.75% 0.03% 5.97% 2.83% 18.58% -15.75%
3 YEARS 14.09% -7.51% 21.60% 22.20% -10.33% 15.81% -5.79% 21.60%
1998 6 MONTHS 7.45% -4.77% 12.22% 21.12% 17.53% -13.67% -25.89% 12.22%
1 YEAR 17.85% 1.84% 16.01% 18.53% 21.07% -0.68% -16.70% 16.01%
3 YEARS 14.11% 1.09% 13.02% 11.15% 2.60% 9.29% -3.73% 13.02%
1997 6 MONTHS 51.71% -0.16% 51.87% 22.57% 20.20% 29.14% -22.73% 51.87%
1 YEAR 39.59% 7.12% 32.47% 23.39% 28.10% 16.21% -16.26% 32.47%
3 YEARS 10.61% 9.51% 1.10% 5.29% 18.01% -1.12% -2.22% 1.10%
1996 6 MONTHS 44.69% -3.07% 47.76% 22.68% 22.00% 22.01% -25.75% 47.76%
1 YEAR 48.08% 4.60% 43.48% 32.80% 31.99% 15.27% -28.20% 43.48%
3 YEARS 23.08% 0.09% 22.99% 18.61% 26.97% 1.93% -21.06% 22.99%
1995 6 MONTHS 64.59% 2.91% 61.68% 32.72% 27.84% 31.88% -29.81% 61.68%
1 YEAR 45.15% 5.31% 39.84% 28.55% 23.11% 16.60% -23.24% 39.84%
3 YEARS 27.17% 3.64% 23.53% 22.86% 27.68% 0.76% -22.77% 23.53%
1994 6 MONTHS 75.51% 12.10% 63.41% 32.30% 6.87% 43.21% -20.20% 63.41%
1 YEAR 56.82% 18.74% 38.08% 33.77% 22.62% 23.05% -15.03% 38.08%
3 YEARS 35.32% 25.30% 10.03% 3.27% 25.83% 6.87% -3.15% 10.03%
1993 6 MONTHS 26.92% 6.54% 20.38% 23.11% 7.19% 3.81% -16.57% 20.38%
1 YEAR 20.58% 0.56% 20.02% 7.55% -1.39% 13.03% -6.99% 20.02%
3 YEARS 25.68% 12.60% 13.08% 8.67% 14.18% 6.94% -6.14% 13.08%
 
 
 136 
Table 23: Results Portfolio Strategy; Industrial Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 5 Safe stocks   
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 21.20% -0.82% 22.02% 12.17% 9.37% 9.04% -12.99% 22.02%
1 YEAR 27.39% -1.96% 29.35% 15.19% 11.51% 12.20% -17.15% 29.35%
3 YEARS 18.67% 3.34% 15.33% 9.16% 11.58% 6.30% -9.02% 15.33%
2002 6 MONTHS 17.79% -5.06% 22.84% 8.22% 7.16% 9.57% -13.27% 22.84%
1 YEAR 53.54% -3.91% 57.45% 28.84% 18.62% 24.71% -32.75% 57.45%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 9.02% -9.42% 18.44% 3.17% -12.08% 5.85% -12.59% 18.44%
1 YEAR 5.30% -2.43% 7.74% 7.42% -19.16% -2.11% -9.85% 7.74%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 45.57% 31.45% 14.12% 41.55% -17.62% 4.02% -10.10% 14.12%
1 YEAR 29.39% 3.66% 25.74% 20.00% -15.82% 9.40% -16.34% 25.74%
3 YEARS 18.35% -2.25% 20.59% 12.14% -12.26% 10.98% -9.62% 20.59%
1999 6 MONTHS -15.39% 4.13% -19.53% -21.23% 14.56% 5.84% 25.37% -19.53%
1 YEAR 8.92% -15.63% 24.55% -17.69% 5.97% 26.61% 2.06% 24.55%
3 YEARS 6.90% -4.37% 11.27% 8.79% -10.33% 5.47% -5.80% 11.27%
1998 6 MONTHS -5.17% -15.11% 9.93% 3.77% 17.53% -8.94% -18.88% 9.93%
1 YEAR 13.44% -7.09% 20.53% 10.66% 21.07% 2.79% -17.74% 20.53%
3 YEARS 5.11% 3.37% 1.74% -3.15% 2.60% 3.95% 2.21% 1.74%
1997 6 MONTHS 31.26% 1.89% 29.37% 20.39% 20.20% 10.87% -18.50% 29.37%
1 YEAR 19.22% 9.14% 10.08% 15.94% 28.10% 3.28% -6.80% 10.08%
3 YEARS 3.03% 1.36% 1.67% -1.91% 18.01% 4.82% 3.15% 1.67%
1996 6 MONTHS 41.08% -3.75% 44.83% 26.65% 22.00% 14.44% -30.39% 44.83%
1 YEAR 58.65% 0.85% 57.80% 37.78% 31.99% 20.87% -36.93% 57.80%
3 YEARS 22.66% 4.29% 18.37% 8.45% 26.97% 2.13% -16.24% 18.37%
1995 6 MONTHS 37.37% 4.59% 32.78% 23.49% 27.84% 13.88% -18.90% 32.78%
1 YEAR 39.68% 7.79% 31.88% 29.92% 23.11% 9.75% -22.13% 31.88%
3 YEARS 38.26% 2.61% 35.65% 27.76% 27.68% 9.61% -26.04% 35.65%
1994 6 MONTHS 11.69% -15.61% 27.31% 1.51% 6.87% 10.18% -17.13% 27.31%
1 YEAR 33.05% -5.78% 38.83% 17.28% 22.62% 15.76% -23.07% 38.83%
3 YEARS 31.33% 13.26% 18.07% 7.69% 25.83% 4.50% -13.57% 18.07%
1993 6 MONTHS 38.79% -1.35% 40.14% 14.13% 7.19% 24.66% -15.48% 40.14%
1 YEAR 12.70% -6.20% 18.90% 1.72% -1.39% 10.98% -7.92% 18.90%
3 YEARS 23.69% 8.45% 15.24% 13.51% 14.18% 8.96% -6.28% 15.24%
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Table 24: Results Portfolio Strategy; Healthcare Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 5 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 61.34% 9.00% 52.34% 34.54% 9.37% 26.80% -25.53% 52.34%
1 YEAR 48.73% 5.60% 43.13% 23.36% 11.51% 25.37% -17.76% 43.13%
3 YEARS 23.62% 7.35% 16.27% 16.51% 11.58% 7.97% -8.30% 16.27%
2002 6 MONTHS 26.30% 13.29% 13.01% 37.26% 7.16% -10.96% -23.97% 13.01%
1 YEAR 94.70% 7.87% 86.84% 47.82% 18.62% 46.88% -39.96% 86.84%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 32.77% 22.86% 9.91% 17.00% -12.08% 15.78% 5.86% 9.91%
1 YEAR 25.55% -16.19% 41.75% -2.65% -19.16% 28.20% -13.54% 41.75%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 113.56% 23.88% 89.68% 48.06% -17.62% 65.50% -24.18% 89.68%
1 YEAR 52.30% 0.37% 51.93% 12.76% -15.82% 39.54% -12.39% 51.93%
3 YEARS 30.31% -5.30% 35.61% 29.85% -12.26% 28.62% -6.99% 35.61%
1999 6 MONTHS -15.04% -10.69% -4.35% -3.16% 14.56% -11.89% -7.54% -4.35%
1 YEAR 19.37% 21.35% -1.98% 15.69% 5.97% 3.68% 5.66% -1.98%
3 YEARS 30.87% 4.70% 26.17% 33.74% -10.33% 25.23% -0.93% 26.17%
1998 6 MONTHS 36.58% -1.43% 38.00% 32.99% 17.53% 3.58% -34.42% 38.00%
1 YEAR 36.25% -2.52% 38.77% 20.80% 21.07% 15.45% -23.33% 38.77%
3 YEARS 25.67% 4.54% 21.13% 20.78% 2.60% 14.28% -6.84% 21.13%
1997 6 MONTHS 69.06% -12.63% 81.69% 22.88% 20.20% 46.18% -35.52% 81.69%
1 YEAR 44.01% 6.34% 37.67% 24.81% 28.10% 19.20% -18.47% 37.67%
3 YEARS -1.21% 18.05% -19.25% -4.90% 18.01% -14.46% 4.79% -19.25%
1996 6 MONTHS 28.64% -6.02% 34.66% 6.03% 22.00% 22.62% -12.04% 34.66%
1 YEAR 39.07% 12.38% 26.69% 23.17% 31.99% 15.90% -10.79% 26.69%
3 YEARS 17.23% -6.89% 24.13% 33.04% 26.97% 3.03% -21.10% 24.13%
1995 6 MONTHS 118.80% 19.92% 98.89% 66.56% 27.84% 52.24% -46.65% 98.89%
1 YEAR 50.30% 0.31% 50.00% 34.91% 23.11% 15.39% -34.61% 50.00%
3 YEARS 24.23% 0.37% 23.86% 24.48% 27.68% -1.85% -25.71% 23.86%
1994 6 MONTHS 159.57% 36.87% 122.70% 82.55% 6.87% 77.02% -45.68% 122.70%
1 YEAR 86.47% 22.96% 63.50% 46.36% 22.62% 40.10% -23.40% 63.50%
3 YEARS 25.20% 35.22% -10.02% -16.73% 25.83% -3.60% 6.41% -10.02%
1993 6 MONTHS 43.16% 3.96% 39.19% 35.17% 7.19% 7.98% -31.21% 39.19%
1 YEAR 39.29% 3.15% 36.13% 9.95% -1.39% 29.34% -6.79% 36.13%
3 YEARS 36.67% 8.13% 28.55% 11.83% 14.18% 12.50% -16.04% 28.55%
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Table 25: Results Portfolio Strategy; Consumer Discretionary Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 5 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 29.95% 3.03% 26.91% 12.53% 9.37% 17.41% -9.50% 26.91%
1 YEAR 30.17% 4.61% 25.56% 16.22% 11.51% 13.95% -11.61% 25.56%
3 YEARS 16.13% 3.31% 12.81% 10.77% 11.58% 5.56% -7.25% 12.81%
2002 6 MONTHS 28.49% 12.20% 16.30% 13.16% 7.16% 15.33% -0.96% 16.30%
1 YEAR 71.08% 13.06% 58.01% 34.81% 18.62% 36.27% -21.75% 58.01%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 60.30% -10.56% 70.87% 17.56% -12.08% 42.75% -28.12% 70.87%
1 YEAR 59.39% -5.47% 64.86% 19.57% -19.16% 39.83% -25.03% 64.86%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 120.80% 52.27% 68.53% 40.55% -17.62% 80.25% 11.71% 68.53%
1 YEAR 61.44% 0.62% 60.81% 27.76% -15.82% 33.68% -27.14% 60.81%
3 YEARS 34.54% -3.14% 37.68% 20.34% -12.26% 25.34% -12.34% 37.68%
1999 6 MONTHS -33.95% -2.85% -31.10% -13.00% 14.56% -20.95% 10.15% -31.10%
1 YEAR -17.87% -8.89% -8.98% -18.19% 5.97% 0.32% 9.29% -8.98%
3 YEARS 22.76% -0.72% 23.49% 26.87% -10.33% 19.93% -3.55% 23.49%
1998 6 MONTHS -15.98% -28.59% 12.61% -11.22% 17.53% -4.76% -17.37% 12.61%
1 YEAR -5.75% -1.70% -4.04% 2.45% 21.07% -8.20% -4.16% -4.04%
3 YEARS 3.40% -6.41% 9.81% 9.46% 2.60% 6.21% -3.60% 9.81%
1997 6 MONTHS 53.80% 24.45% 29.35% 27.04% 20.20% 26.76% -2.59% 29.35%
1 YEAR 53.79% 24.64% 29.15% 28.24% 28.10% 25.54% -3.61% 29.15%
3 YEARS 9.86% -10.09% 19.95% 16.45% 18.01% 10.11% -9.84% 19.95%
1996 6 MONTHS 17.27% -8.81% 26.08% 6.62% 22.00% 10.65% -15.43% 26.08%
1 YEAR 28.26% 2.90% 25.36% 23.85% 31.99% 4.40% -20.95% 25.36%
3 YEARS 4.96% 2.60% 2.36% -3.63% 26.97% -10.90% -13.26% 2.36%
1995 6 MONTHS 16.83% -12.49% 29.32% 18.56% 27.84% -1.73% -31.05% 29.32%
1 YEAR 27.06% 12.73% 14.33% 24.43% 23.11% 2.63% -11.70% 14.33%
3 YEARS 23.58% 12.61% 10.97% 12.57% 27.68% -0.42% -11.39% 10.97%
1994 6 MONTHS 31.08% -16.91% 47.99% 1.26% 6.87% 29.82% -18.17% 47.99%
1 YEAR 16.33% 5.40% 10.93% 14.72% 22.62% 1.60% -9.32% 10.93%
3 YEARS 16.81% 15.69% 1.12% 6.08% 25.83% -3.97% -5.09% 1.12%
1993 6 MONTHS 20.81% 21.62% -0.81% 24.82% 7.19% -4.01% -3.20% -0.81%
1 YEAR 7.99% 2.83% 5.15% 4.51% -1.39% 3.48% -1.68% 5.15%
3 YEARS 13.12% 15.98% -2.86% -1.95% 14.18% -1.79% 1.08% -2.86%
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Table 26: Results Portfolio Strategy; ITT Industry; ‘Best estimate’; Top 5 Safe stocks  
All returns annualized
RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS
BUY- BUY-
BUY SELL SELL Benchmark S&P 500 BUY SELL SELL
All Years 6 MONTHS 45.12% 19.17% 25.96% 28.11% 9.37% 17.02% -8.94% 25.96%
1 YEAR 34.90% 11.82% 23.09% 23.10% 11.51% 11.81% -11.28% 23.09%
3 YEARS 27.23% 4.62% 22.61% 14.44% 11.58% 10.18% -12.43% 22.61%
2002 6 MONTHS 10.21% 11.00% -0.79% 18.25% 7.16% -8.04% -7.25% -0.79%
1 YEAR 50.58% 48.82% 1.76% 40.27% 18.62% 10.30% 8.54% 1.76%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 6.30% -49.48% 55.78% -11.18% -12.08% 17.48% -38.30% 55.78%
1 YEAR -39.24% -52.12% 12.89% -33.65% -19.16% -5.59% -18.48% 12.89%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 20.12% 9.66% 10.46% 0.47% -17.62% 19.65% 9.19% 10.46%
1 YEAR 24.20% -20.68% 44.87% -2.83% -15.82% 27.02% -17.85% 44.87%
3 YEARS 1.72% -19.16% 20.88% 3.40% -12.26% 13.23% -7.65% 20.88%
1999 6 MONTHS 65.73% 156.85% -91.12% 58.78% 14.56% 6.96% 98.07% -91.12%
1 YEAR 1.01% 77.61% -76.60% 20.29% 5.97% -19.28% 57.31% -76.60%
3 YEARS -4.16% -29.63% 25.47% 13.10% -10.33% 12.60% -12.87% 25.47%
1998 6 MONTHS 14.39% 26.06% -11.67% 58.94% 17.53% -44.55% -32.88% -11.67%
1 YEAR 27.45% 18.66% 8.79% 40.22% 21.07% -12.77% -21.56% 8.79%
3 YEARS 22.26% 2.84% 19.42% 7.85% 2.60% 12.72% -6.70% 19.42%
1997 6 MONTHS 52.73% -14.34% 67.06% 19.97% 20.20% 32.76% -34.30% 67.06%
1 YEAR 41.35% -11.63% 52.98% 24.55% 28.10% 16.80% -36.18% 52.98%
3 YEARS 30.75% 28.73% 2.03% 17.68% 18.01% -4.93% -6.96% 2.03%
1996 6 MONTHS 91.76% 6.30% 85.45% 51.42% 22.00% 40.34% -45.12% 85.45%
1 YEAR 66.32% 2.26% 64.06% 46.40% 31.99% 19.92% -44.13% 64.06%
3 YEARS 47.48% 0.37% 47.11% 37.40% 26.97% 13.45% -33.66% 47.11%
1995 6 MONTHS 85.37% -0.38% 85.75% 22.25% 27.84% 63.13% -22.62% 85.75%
1 YEAR 63.57% 0.41% 63.16% 24.95% 23.11% 38.62% -24.54% 63.16%
3 YEARS 22.60% -1.04% 23.64% 28.85% 27.68% -4.28% -27.91% 23.64%
1994 6 MONTHS 99.70% 44.07% 55.63% 43.88% 6.87% 55.81% 0.18% 55.63%
1 YEAR 91.45% 52.39% 39.06% 56.72% 22.62% 34.73% -4.33% 39.06%
3 YEARS 67.96% 37.03% 30.94% 5.77% 25.83% 30.58% -0.36% 30.94%
1993 6 MONTHS 4.93% 1.91% 3.01% 18.31% 7.19% -13.39% -16.40% 3.01%
1 YEAR 22.36% 2.46% 19.90% 14.02% -1.39% 8.34% -11.57% 19.90%
3 YEARS 29.23% 17.82% 11.40% 1.48% 14.18% 8.09% -3.31% 11.40%
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Table 27: Statistical Significance Buy, Hold, Sell Recommendations; All                    
Industries; ‘Best estimate’ 
 
 
6 month holding period
T-TEST P-VALUES BUY HOLD SELL
BUY 1.00000
HOLD 0.00055 1.00000
SELL 0.00000 0.00073 1.00000
1 year holding period
T-TEST P-VALUES BUY HOLD SELL
BUY 1.00000
HOLD 0.00000 1.00000
SELL 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000
3 year holding period
T-TEST P-VALUES BUY HOLD SELL
BUY 1.00000
HOLD 0.00043 1.00000
SELL 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000
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Table 28: Buy, Hold, Sell Recommendation Distribution; ‘Best estimate’ 
 
ALL INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIAL HEALTHCARE CONSUMER ITT
n n in % Mispricing n n in % Mispricing n n in % Mispricing n n in % Mispricing n n in % Mispricing
All Years BUY 391 37.10% 35.04% 102 38.64% 25.62% 108 42.19% 38.19% 94 31.23% 34.96% 87 37.34% 41.39%
HOLD 414 39.28% 0.00% 105 39.77% -0.14% 83 32.42% 0.25% 138 45.85% 0.14% 88 37.77% -0.24%
SELL 249 23.62% -25.46% 57 21.59% -23.75% 65 25.39% -23.23% 69 22.92% -27.76% 58 24.89% -27.11%
2002 BUY 57 56.44% 53.64% 20 74.07% 37.82% 14 60.87% 55.01% 11 37.93% 64.12% 12 54.55% 57.62%
HOLD 35 34.65% -0.20% 6 22.22% 0.71% 8 34.78% -1.36% 15 51.72% 1.14% 6 27.27% -1.28%
SELL 9 8.91% -27.12% 1 3.70% -24.94% 1 4.35% -19.20% 3 10.34% -39.60% 4 18.18% -24.73%
2001 BUY 33 30.28% 30.22% 11 37.93% 23.42% 7 21.21% 30.01% 9 32.14% 28.65% 6 31.58% 38.81%
HOLD 46 42.20% -0.10% 10 34.48% 3.59% 16 48.48% -3.18% 15 53.57% 0.78% 5 26.32% -1.60%
SELL 30 27.52% -25.64% 8 27.59% -24.13% 10 30.30% -27.45% 4 14.29% -23.66% 8 42.11% -27.31%
2000 BUY 45 43.27% 36.13% 17 60.71% 36.00% 5 22.73% 27.26% 18 58.06% 38.79% 5 21.74% 42.46%
HOLD 32 30.77% -0.71% 5 17.86% 0.72% 8 36.36% -3.41% 10 32.26% -0.41% 9 39.13% 0.26%
SELL 27 25.96% -27.24% 6 21.43% -30.85% 9 40.91% -25.08% 3 9.68% -25.99% 9 39.13% -27.06%
1999 BUY 21 20.19% 43.24% 4 13.79% 19.83% 7 26.92% 54.75% 7 21.21% 41.88% 3 18.75% 56.50%
HOLD 40 38.46% -0.03% 14 48.28% 0.23% 7 26.92% 0.33% 12 36.36% -0.49% 7 43.75% -0.18%
SELL 43 41.35% -25.71% 11 37.93% -21.95% 12 46.15% -24.82% 14 42.42% -29.31% 6 37.50% -26.79%
1998 BUY 27 25.96% 28.21% 8 29.63% 21.82% 8 28.57% 36.39% 6 21.43% 31.48% 5 23.81% 23.14%
HOLD 47 45.19% 0.01% 10 37.04% -1.50% 10 35.71% 0.80% 14 50.00% -0.16% 13 61.90% 0.89%
SELL 30 28.85% -26.56% 9 33.33% -23.42% 10 35.71% -24.15% 8 28.57% -25.85% 3 14.29% -32.80%
1997 BUY 39 35.45% 29.91% 8 30.77% 21.57% 11 39.29% 30.69% 10 29.41% 32.32% 10 45.45% 35.06%
HOLD 43 39.09% 0.31% 12 46.15% -0.46% 8 28.57% 0.16% 16 47.06% 0.88% 7 31.82% 0.68%
SELL 28 25.45% -25.55% 6 23.08% -21.33% 9 32.14% -28.55% 8 23.53% -25.14% 5 22.73% -27.18%
1996 BUY 46 43.40% 28.46% 12 46.15% 24.22% 13 54.17% 22.84% 8 28.57% 23.93% 13 46.43% 42.85%
HOLD 42 39.62% -1.07% 12 46.15% -1.98% 6 25.00% -0.89% 12 42.86% -0.59% 12 42.86% -0.82%
SELL 18 16.98% -27.09% 2 7.69% -20.20% 5 20.83% -26.36% 8 28.57% -27.87% 3 10.71% -33.95%
1995 BUY 53 50.96% 30.28% 11 47.83% 28.27% 17 68.00% 39.71% 13 43.33% 22.03% 12 46.15% 31.10%
HOLD 40 38.46% 0.80% 10 43.48% -0.47% 6 24.00% 1.82% 13 43.33% 2.71% 11 42.31% -0.87%
SELL 11 10.58% -24.57% 2 8.70% -32.58% 2 8.00% -15.51% 4 13.33% -27.02% 3 11.54% -23.15%
1994 BUY 34 32.69% 35.07% 7 31.82% 24.38% 12 52.17% 41.04% 5 16.13% 28.83% 10 35.71% 46.03%
HOLD 46 44.23% -0.18% 12 54.55% -1.20% 7 30.43% 3.43% 19 61.29% -1.52% 8 28.57% -1.43%
SELL 24 23.08% -22.74% 3 13.64% -17.56% 4 17.39% -21.28% 7 22.58% -30.49% 10 35.71% -21.65%
1993 BUY 36 33.33% 35.25% 4 14.81% 18.91% 14 58.33% 44.18% 7 24.14% 37.62% 11 39.29% 40.30%
HOLD 43 39.81% 1.20% 14 51.85% -1.06% 7 29.17% 4.83% 12 41.38% -0.90% 10 35.71% 1.94%
SELL 29 26.85% -22.39% 9 33.33% -20.53% 3 12.50% -19.90% 10 34.48% -22.64% 7 25.00% -26.47%
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Table 29: Quality of Intrinsic Value Estimates; ‘Best estimate’ 
 
ALL INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIAL HEALTHCARE CONSUMER ITT
Right Wrong Corr Prices Right Wrong Corr Prices Right Wrong Corr Prices Right Wrong Corr Prices Right Wrong Corr Prices
All Years 6 MONTHS 11.6 14.9 88.84% 11.7 14.9 88.02% 10.9 14.7 86.80% 14.2 15.9 97.02% 9.5 14.2 83.53%
1 YEAR 13.1 13.4 85.37% 12.9 13.7 87.78% 12.8 12.8 80.71% 16.9 13.2 97.13% 9.9 13.8 75.87%
3 YEARS 15.7 10.8 65.62% 16.6 9.5 75.74% 13.9 11.1 46.38% 18.6 11.9 92.84% 13.5 10.8 47.51%
2002 6 MONTHS 6.5 19.3 88.77% 1 27 91.57% 7 16 77.05% 12 17 97.46% 6 17 89.00%
1 YEAR 10.5 15.3 89.92% 11 17 93.00% 10 13 79.48% 16 13 99.58% 5 18 87.64%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 6 MONTHS 14.0 13.5 91.81% 17 12 89.44% 14 19 83.79% 12 16 98.27% 13 7 95.73%
1 YEAR 15.8 11.8 87.07% 17 12 89.46% 21 12 76.93% 18 10 95.11% 7 13 86.80%
3 YEARS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 6 MONTHS 12.0 14.0 82.05% 15 13 71.61% 12 10 87.22% 10 21 82.37% 11 12 86.99%
1 YEAR 13.5 12.5 78.18% 14 14 75.80% 13 9 75.57% 13 18 84.38% 14 9 76.96%
3 YEARS 15.5 10.5 59.71% 18 10 75.54% 13 9 43.84% 18 13 62.10% 13 10 57.35%
1999 6 MONTHS 9.8 16.5 79.33% 10 19 78.33% 11 15 82.27% 13 20 97.67% 5 12 59.04%
1 YEAR 12.5 13.8 71.66% 14 15 78.70% 14 12 77.70% 17 16 97.73% 5 12 32.50%
3 YEARS 17.5 8.8 56.34% 20 9 78.21% 19 7 37.75% 23 10 92.29% 8 9 17.09%
1998 6 MONTHS 11.8 14.5 83.65% 14 14 77.77% 12 16 87.79% 15 13 99.52% 6 15 69.50%
1 YEAR 11.8 14.5 77.74% 14 14 74.01% 13 15 77.96% 13 15 99.18% 7 14 59.80%
3 YEARS 16.3 10.0 67.73% 18 10 68.68% 16 12 43.51% 17 11 98.82% 14 7 59.91%
1997 6 MONTHS 11.8 15.8 90.97% 11 15 93.82% 9 19 85.08% 15 19 99.26% 12 10 85.72%
1 YEAR 11.5 16.0 83.27% 9 17 88.36% 8 20 68.78% 16 18 99.14% 13 9 76.80%
3 YEARS 14.8 12.8 46.08% 15 11 57.47% 14 14 22.45% 20 14 97.32% 10 12 7.09%
1996 6 MONTHS 15.0 11.8 91.81% 17 9 97.67% 14 10 86.58% 17 11 99.35% 12 17 83.65%
1 YEAR 12.3 14.5 87.84% 10 16 96.24% 12 12 76.05% 18 10 99.57% 9 20 79.48%
3 YEARS 14.3 12.5 61.58% 12 14 61.12% 17 7 34.29% 12 16 97.37% 16 13 53.53%
1995 6 MONTHS 10.5 15.5 91.58% 9 14 91.68% 9 16 90.56% 16 14 99.07% 8 18 85.02%
1 YEAR 13.3 12.8 89.17% 11 12 91.07% 12 13 88.89% 20 10 99.18% 10 16 77.54%
3 YEARS 15.5 10.5 68.32% 15 8 85.95% 10 15 49.46% 22 8 98.67% 15 11 39.19%
1994 6 MONTHS 11.3 14.8 94.32% 7 15 93.36% 9 14 92.24% 19 12 99.05% 10 18 92.63%
1 YEAR 15.0 11.0 93.93% 11 11 97.37% 14 9 90.98% 21 10 98.79% 14 14 88.57%
3 YEARS 15.5 10.5 78.47% 13 9 86.09% 9 14 57.78% 22 9 97.60% 18 10 72.39%
1993 6 MONTHS 13.3 13.8 94.13% 16 11 94.95% 12 12 95.41% 13 16 98.16% 12 16 88.02%
1 YEAR 15.3 11.8 94.95% 18 9 93.82% 11 13 94.74% 17 12 98.67% 15 13 92.58%
3 YEARS 16.0 11.0 86.74% 22 5 92.83% 13 11 81.98% 15 14 98.58% 14 14 73.56%
 
